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Abstract 
This project is situated at the locus of discourses on feminism, environmental 
justice, climate change, and ecological restoration.  Asking what kinds of responses to 
climate change are needed on this rapidly-changing planet, and which initiatives will 
address social and ecological dilemmas simultaneously, I turn to ecological restoration as 
a troubled but promising field to harness the insights of feminist environmental justice 
toward intervening in both the causes and consequences of climate change.  In order to 
engender resiliency among human and nonhuman communities, I advocate a 
contextualized, grassroots response to climate change that I have coined justice-oriented 
restoration.  This ideology and method strengthens voices and movements often 
marginalized by engaging diverse stakeholders in order to create ecologies responsive to 
climatically-induced biosocial shifts, as well as the declining field of restoration itself, 
which climate change threatens to render irrelevant.  In so doing, this project contributes 
to debates on sustainability; to the cross-pollination of the humanities, social sciences, 
and sciences; and to the momentum building worldwide for community-driven, site-
specific adaptations, mitigations, and remediations to environmental vulnerabilities.   
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Chapter One 
On Plants, Politics, and Publics 
 
Introduction 
Plants are political.  On some level, this statement has always seemed self-evident 
to me.  Before graduate school, when I ventured away from Minnesota to live in Seattle 
volunteering for a year as an ecological restorationist, I was aware of political 
contestations over the environment.  “Environmentalist” had been a common political 
identity and affiliation, one to which I ascribed at least since popular 1990’s “Save the 
Rainforest!” and “Reduce! Reuse! Recycle!” catchphrases permeated my middle school 
consciousness.  The U.S. government had a well-established regulatory arm in the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and Earth Day—April 22nd—had been a 
nationally recognized holiday since 1970.  Legislation existed to protect certain species, 
often endangered, and to regulate others considered destructive or invasive.   
What I had not yet considered before digging trails in the Cascades or wrestling 
with carpets of invasive English ivy in Seattle’s forests for ten hours a day was that 
politics are not expressed only in highly visible and explicitly contested arenas; they are 
also seen and felt in more subtle and mundane arenas.  The plants in neighborhood play 
lots, lawns, and gardens have a politics; the plants inhabiting our National Parks forests 
have a politics; the plants confined within botanical gardens and research labs have a 
politics; plants farmed and then sold at markets have a politics; and plants from far away 
places flourishing despite a city’s best efforts to eradicate them have a politics.  They are 
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political because land use, ownership, and partitioning have been contested throughout 
history; because plants have been caught up in conflict whilst accompanying people in 
transcontinental migrations and conquests; because they have been resources for 
spirituality, food, livelihoods, medicine, tools, shelter, energy, scientific research, and 
even entire national economies.  More succinctly, they are political because their 
presence and placement reflect individual and cultural values about how humans and 
nonhumans should relate.  
Yet much contemporary wisdom about nonhuman nature, inherited from 
distinctly Euro-American interpretations of wilderness, actively works against the pairing 
of “plants” (indeed, of all nonhuman nature) with “politics.”  According to renowned 
historian of U.S. environmentalism, Roderick Nash, while two competing nature 
ideologies have dominated since European colonization—one wherein nature is cast as 
evil, in need of taming, another wherein nature is sublime refuge from the “spoils” of 
urbanity—both distinguish nature apart from culture and humankind.1  These onto-
epistemologies inform the preservationist ideals that found conventional U.S. 
environmentalism: whether to ensure its sanctity apart from the humans who would 
tarnish it or safely enclose its unruliness away from the people it supposedly stands to 
threaten, nonhuman nature has long been circumscribed within city, state, and national 
parks.  This has everything to do with how nonhuman nature became “environment” 
rather than “home”; “here”; “us”; “me.”  
Back when I embarked on that transformative, challenging, and uplifting year of 
restoration service, I was motivated by the idea that I was living up to my identity as an 
                                                
1 The history of these ideologies is detailed in Nash’s Wilderness and the American Mind (1967). 
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environmentalist, doing my part, both physically as well as symbolically, to respond to 
places damaged by human neglect and ignorance.  It was fulfilling to me to labor on 
behalf of my nonhuman counterparts; like many restorationists, I sought to make up for 
the harm that I and other humans have caused in our ignorance, neglect, and hubris.  My 
crew and I were a testament to the fact that people were not inherently destructive or 
opposed to nature; humans could co-create healthy green spaces, and participate 
beneficially in the wellbeing of nature—a “nature” I now conceived as cultural as well. 
What compels me these days as I continue my volunteer work restoring the 
Mississippi River Gorge in Minneapolis and St. Paul is that I labor on behalf of my home, 
giving thanks to the nonhuman and material actors that have nurtured and sustained these 
communities.  This exchange of gifts roots me even deeper into my home, perhaps 
because I consider my home to be an extension of myself, and caring for it is therefore 
simultaneously self-serving and selfless.  Restoration here feels symbolic and spiritually 
fulfilling, but there also exists a feeling of pragmatic mutualism: when I love something, I 
take responsibility for it by stewarding it.  These ecologies not only deserve, but require, 
that people value and understand their complexities, and work to keep them free from 
harm and exploitation.   
Despite the beneficial qualities of restoration that continue to compel me a decade 
after being introduced to the practice, questions that began to develop in Seattle still 
linger, questions that continue to move my personal environmentalism beyond a 
preservationist mindset: Which versions of “environment” guide this restoration plan?  
How and why did this site win restorative attention versus another one?  And which 
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non/humans are envisioned as stakeholders on this land and why?  The nature of these 
questions indicates that plants have, in these past ten years, become pointedly political to 
me.  Today I share environmental scholar Reid Helford’s view when he writes, “The 
work of ecological restoration should be more than just the interpretation of nature’s 
needs; it must be the discernment of the needs of nature’s publics as well” (140). 
 I may have never come to this conclusion without feminist environmentalisms and 
environmental justice, both of which were introduced to me during my Master’s 
education.  Though rooted in different histories and politics, both impart wisdom that 
“nature” includes “nature’s publics.”  In other words, they work against decades of 
preservationist ideology that relegates nonhuman nature both ideologically and physically 
to enclosures separated from humankind.  Since gaining major momentum in the mid-
1980’s, environmental justice (EJ) politicizes nature-culture distinctions by calling 
attention to the deliberate ways in which marginalized human populations are unduly 
affected by environmental contamination, degradation, or lack of access to clean natural 
resources.2  For EJ advocates, “the environment” is conceptualized along a broad, 
integrated vision of nature and culture,3 or as environmental scholar Giovanna Di Chiro 
writes, as home: the place you live, work, and play (300-301).4   
                                                
2 In From the Ground Up (2000), editors Luke Cole and Sheila Foster describe environmental justice as 
such: “Environmental hazards are inequitably distributed in the United States, with poor people and people 
of color bearing a greater share of pollution than richer people and white people. […] Fueling this 
recognition is a remarkable rise in grassroots activism communities across the country.  Thousands 
are…fighting for their children, their communities, their quality of life, their health—and for 
‘environmental justice’” (10). 
3 Or put another way, according to the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit’s 
“Principles of Environmental Justice” (1991): environmental justice affirms the “ecological unity and the 
interdependence of all species.” 
4 As Di Chiro points out, EJ is further differentiated from mainstream environmentalisms given its 
gendered, racial, and class compositions: whereas “environmentalist” typically signals white and middle-
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 Always already justice-oriented in its aims, feminist environmentalists have 
elaborated a number of connections between hetero/sexism and speciesism or 
environmental destruction, including neo/colonialism, militarism, racism, classism, and 
ableism in their analyses as well (Sturgeon, 23-24).  As ecofeminist philosopher Karen 
Warren explains, nature is a feminist issue, not because gender is the most important axis 
of power, but because gender can be used as an effective lens through which to 
understand marginalizations between women, “other human Others,” and [nonhuman] 
nature (1-2).  Like EJ, then, feminist environmentalisms are highly intersectional—not 
merely additive—as ecofeminist Greta Gaard explains: “Instead of being a ‘single issue’ 
movement, ecofeminism rests on the notion that the liberation of all oppressed groups 
must be addressed simultaneously” (5). 
 These two forms of environmental consciousness share commonalities with 
movements for indigenous sovereignty, anti-corporate exploitation, and natural resource 
protection across the globe.  Both have expanded in recent years to include “climate 
justice”5—a movement to recognize and resist the causes and effects of climate change, 
which impact impoverished communities, sea-level nations, and the economically 
vulnerable first and foremost—and “food justice”6—a movement to recognize and resist 
                                                                                                                                            
class constituents and male leaders, EJ has been a predominantly working class, women of color movement 
(300). 
5As Brian Tokar, author of Toward Climate Justice (2010) explains, “The fact that global warming is 
caused by human activity does not mean that we are all equally to blame.  The greenhouse gas emissions 
from the industrialized ‘North’ have been disproportionate…. [...] Paradoxically, however, the 
intensification of the climate crisis is likely to have the most devastating effects on people in the 
impoverished and underdeveloped ‘South’.  […]  Therefore, the climate crisis…challenges our sense of 
social justice” (8). 
6 Recounted in Robert Gottlieb and Anapama Joshi’s Food Justice (2013), “‘rising evidence of injustice 
within the food system’” includes “‘the maldistribution of food, poor access to a good diet, inequities in the 
labour process and unfair returns for key suppliers along the food chain’” (6).  Food justice is therefore won 
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the local-global foodways that prevent certain communities from accessing, growing, 
transporting, or selling safe, healthy, culturally-appropriate foods.  In these ways, 
feminist environmentalisms and environmental justice productively complicate and 
politicize U.S. environmentalisms, often mobilizing consciousness in more 
contextualized, intimate, and effective ways. 
The growing popularity of feminist environmentalism and environmental justice, 
expressed through an outpouring of scholarly, activist, legislative, and community-
building initiatives in the past few decades, has signaled that clear alternatives to 
conventional environmentalisms are here to stay.  One shining indication of this assertion 
came in 2009, when fifty thousand people from around the world—including myself—
gathered for the ground breaking two week Klimaforum People’s Summit, a climate 
justice alternative convention to the 15th annual United Nations Conference of Parties on 
Climate Change (COP15) in Copenhagen.  The event featured major activists such as 
Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed, Bolivian President Evo Morales, author Naomi 
Klein, author and 350.org founder Bill McKibben, Nobel Laureate and Green Belt 
Movement founder Wangari Maathai, and author and Navdanya founder Vandana Shiva.  
Yet it also provided a forum for any world citizen to identity themselves, their lands, 
nations, epistemologies, or peoples as stakeholders ignored and abandoned by the UN 
decision-making process.  The Klimaforum became a locus for NGO tabling, networking, 
activist meet-ups, banner-making, protest convening, meals, art displays, and nightly 
film, comedy, and musical performances.  Every day, panels and speakers lectured on 
                                                                                                                                            
when “the benefits and risks of where, what, and how food is grown and produced, transported and 
distributed, accessed and eaten are shared fairly” (6). 
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such topics as cross-continental coalition building, indigenous sovereignty, 
environmental justice, Third World debt cancellation, women’s leadership development, 
spiritual and religious perspectives on climate change, climate refugeeism and asylum, 
organic gardening and farming methods, and the latest updates on climate science.  It also 
became the drafting place of the 2009 People’s Climate Declaration, “System Change, 
Not Climate Change,” a document signed by nearly 500 global organizations and 
presented at the COP15 on December 18, 2009.  
I was fortunate to share a scholarly paper entitled “Feminist Environmentalists 
Rewrite the Global Warming Narrative” at the Klimaforum, which elaborated upon the 
ways in which feminist, justice-oriented environmentalisms present more effective and 
salient alternatives to conventional climate change discourse.7  What I had not yet 
anticipated until attending the Klimaforum and seeing how environmental justice 
principles were powerfully expressed in each of the three hundred debates, presentations, 
and protests, was that environmental justice could, and should, be applied to every form 
of contemporary environmentalism.  In an era where human activities have so altered 
Earth’s ecosystems as to warrant the geologic, chronological designation 
“Anthropocene,” and thus, humankind is so self-evidently immersed with nonhuman 
nature, it only makes sense to enact all environmentalisms in consideration for the ways 
in which the planet is co-shaped by nonhumans, material forces, and people.  Indeed, 
perhaps my beloved practice of restoration could benefit, and in turn, more effectively 
benefit others, by incorporating justice aims as well. 
                                                
7 Parts of that paper appear in the following chapter. 
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This project is a joining together of three fields I have found profoundly 
motivating for my environmentalism: feminism, environmental justice, and ecological 
restoration.  Though they have different histories, aims, and constituents, each field has a 
stake in how environmental ills, like climate change, are interpreted and confronted.  For 
example, climate change threatens to render the practice of restoration obsolete (a 
phenomenon explained in Chapter Three), so restorationists have been debating how to 
adapt the field and its purpose in the context of climate change.  Using the guidance of 
feminist environmental thought, this project contributes to those debates by offering a 
timely suggestion: if reconceived to address social justice concerns in addition to the 
traditionally ecological, nonhuman interests restoration has always sought to address, 
perhaps environmental justice could be attained while providing restoration a direction 
forward in our climate changed future.  A justice-oriented restoration could serve nature 
as well as “nature’s publics,” effecting positive socio-ecological change. 
 
Project Introduction 
 General Topic & Relevance 
Climate change predominates environment-based discourse in the Anthropocene, 
for never before in history has humanity’s impact been so globally reaching.  Many 
environmental dilemmas existed before our climate began shifting planetary processes, 
and each requires attention.  But climate change has so pervaded daily life in most of the 
world—including major economies, agrisystems, and ecologies—that the preponderance 
of preexisting environmental problems have been exacerbated by it. 
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Feminist environmental scholar Sherilyn MacGregor critiques the near-
exclusionary focus by major environmental organizations on climate change as the 
environmental crisis, as well as its consequence, the repackaging of long-standing 
environmental lobby groups and environmental troubles to fit “the climate agenda” (623).  
Especially when white male leaders dominate the climate politics arena, MacGregor 
worries that many “interests, views, and voices are very much neglected’” (623).  For 
example, “women have spearheaded campaigns on pesticide use, industrial pollution, 
nuclear radiation, multiple chemical sensitivity, biodiversity, animal welfare and seed-
saving,” few of which, she argues, get much attention from climate change policy-makers 
(623).  Moreover, climate change can be used to “trump” other legitimate concerns, as 
when nuclear energy, GMOs, or biofuels emerge on conservative agendas as supposedly 
harmless initiatives to contend with climate-related energy concerns and crop failures or 
shortages (624-624).   
While not every socio-environmental problem can be circumscribed by climate 
change, climate change deserves attention adequate enough to contend with it, for it 
impacts or exacerbates so many other biosocial problems as well.  But in line with 
MacGregor’s reasoning, my project also intervenes in mainstream environmental politics 
by arguing for the necessity of feminist environmental justice perspectives when many 
discourses, truths, and solutions are drowned out by hegemonic actors: powerful UN 
ambassadors, nations, politicians, and corporations.8  By contrast, I attempt to strengthen 
voices and movements often marginalized by suggesting that contextualized, grassroots 
                                                
8 I agree with MacGregor’s analysis that these actors typically promote a “depoliticized climate consensus,” 
which “erase[s] social difference…cast[s] nature as an external threat to be endured…and replace[s] 
democratic public debate with expert administration and individual behavior change” (618).   
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approaches have the potential to offer socially just and ecologically sound solutions to 
environmental problems. 
One particular contextualized, grassroots response to climate change advocated in 
this project is what I have coined justice-oriented restoration.  Asking, what kinds of 
responses to climate change are needed on this fast-changing planet, and which initiatives 
will address social and ecological dilemmas simultaneously, I turn to ecological 
restoration as a troubled, but promising, field to harness the insights of feminist 
environmental justice toward intervening in both the causes and consequences of climate 
change, engendering resiliency among humans as much as nonhumans.  Against 
traditional definitions of restoration, I advocate justice-oriented restoration because it can 
respond to several pressing climatically induced changes at once.  Among these changes 
include the increasing need to respond to shifting habitat zones in light of temperature 
and condition transformations.  Human needs in the face of climate-related events, such 
as natural disasters, shifting foodways, and new environmental policies could also be 
confronted by justice-oriented restoration.  Additionally, justice-oriented restoration 
could address the decline of restoration as it is currently understood, for traditional 
conceptions of the field rely upon historical definitions of species appropriateness that are 
becoming increasingly irrelevant in light of climatic shifts.  Finally, justice-oriented 
restoration could continue conventional restoration’s tradition of repairing damaged 
relationships between humans and the nonhuman world, but with the added benefit of 
repairing humans’ damaged relationships with each other.  These are the kinds of topics 
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this project explores, which seeks to contribute to cutting edge scholarship on climate 
change while enhancing feminist environmental justice goals. 
 
Scholarship Review  
This project draws upon three main interdisciplinary fields: feminist 
environmental theory, environmental justice case studies and theory, and ecological 
restoration theory.  Feminist environmentalists, like geographer Joni Seager (2009) and 
literary scholar Stacy Alaimo (2009), have demonstrated the gendered constructions of 
climate discourse and policy, and by extension, their gendered impacts.  For example, 
Stacy Alaimo argues that masculinist climate change science accounts for the EPA 
website’s “distant, cold, neutral[]” language, which conveys depoliticized apathy toward 
the plight of those most vulnerable to climate change [impoverished women and children 
(31)] on the one hand, and an “unspoken aspiration” to “understand, assess, and predict” 
climate change, rather than to remedy it, on the other (“Insurgent,” 26-27).   
Sociologist Ariel Salleh (2009), physicist Vandana Shiva (2008), sociologist Ana 
Isla (2009), and philosopher Chris Cuomo (2011), focus primarily on how women and 
other minorities bear the brunt of androcentric climate-related policies and regulations.  
Shiva, for example, details how nuclear energy, popularized in the climate change 
context as a “clean” alternative to carbon-intensive energy production like coal or natural 
gas, has specifically sexed/gendered consequences for women downwind or downstream 
of uranium tailings (Soil, 24-27).  This radioactive material continues to cause menstrual 
problems, miscarriages, fertility issues, stillbirths, and fetal/infant deformities in females 
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near the Jaduguda mine in India, and Navajo reservation spanning parts of Utah, Arizona, 
and New Mexico (26).  For these communities, Shiva argues, “‘Clean’ cannot be 
measured only in terms of CO2 emissions.  It has to include all ecological risks from 
cradle to grave.  Climate change does not make nuclear energy safe” (27).  
Others, like environmental scholar Noël Sturgeon (2009) take a more 
intersectional approach: using a “global feminist environmental justice analysis,” she 
explores popular environmental tropes in advertising, film, and television to better 
elucidate the “connections between social inequalities and environmental problems to 
uncover the systems of power that continue to generate the complex problems we face” 
(6).  One popular trope utilized by environmentalists to raise awareness of climate 
change’s deadly consequences has been Arctic animals, such as polar bears or penguins, 
which are often considered without reference to the Arctic human communities that will 
also suffer.  She argues, “What kind of environmental politics can encompass both the 
threat to emperor penguins and Alaskan Natives from global warming?  The disjuncture 
between the politics of species preservation and the politics of environmental justice 
presents a barrier to thinking through the relation between these looming disasters” (140).  
Nancy Tuana (2008) and Alaimo (2008) are material feminists who describe the 
environment—and by extension, our climate—as a sphere wherein the material-
discursive, human-nonhuman, natural-cultural interact.  The natural world is always-
already political for these scholars.  For example, Tuana uses Hurricane Katrina to 
illustrate how this terrible natural disaster was caused as much by anthropogenic forces as 
by nonhuman, material forces, making it both a “natural” and “cultural” phenomenon.  
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Moreover, Katrina’s destruction unmasked a variety of interacting socio-material 
injustices, due to nonhuman agency of winds, hurricanes, flooding, and river 
sedimentation combined with human agency enacted in activities like river 
channelization, levee building, local plastics manufacturing, and racist housing politics.  
Only in accounting for all of the naturalcultural agents involved can an accurate 
understanding of Katrina exist, as well as an effective proactive plan to prevent future 
natural disasters. 
Feminist environmental scholarship founds my critiques of contemporary climate 
change politics in Chapter Two.  In Chapter Three, it motivates my analyses of 
conventional U.S. environmental ideology, which in certain contexts, both emerges from 
and contributes to processes of racism, heterosexism, and/or sexism.  Feminist 
environmental work also underpins my methodology throughout this entire project, as I 
analyze environmental politics from a biosocial perspective, and evaluate environmental 
policies, histories, and ideologies from the critical lenses of historically marginalized 
classes of people. 
The field and activism of environmental justice provides a second domain of 
literature that informs my project.  Contemporary environmental justice scholarship has 
demonstrated that within the context of climate change, the inequitable distribution of 
environmental hazards is not only intensified and broadened, but also connective of 
otherwise distinct injustices.  For example, Africana studies scholar Filomina Chioma 
Steady (2009) details the cascading effect of climate change for residents of the Sub-
Saharan region of Africa, which many estimate will be hardest hit by climate change, 
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despite the fact that its people produce less than four percent of the world’s greenhouse 
gases (53).  As warmer temperature zones expand, agriculture—the main source of 
income and exports in the region—will be threatened by frequent droughts.  These 
expanding zones, increasing by both latitude and altitude, will enlarge the habitat range 
and breeding season for parasitic insects and the likelihood of diseases, such as malaria.  
Already the single greatest killer of children, malaria imposes a “$12 billion annual drain 
on African economies through death, medical costs, and lost productivity” (53).  Severe 
crop failures and losses of income will further destabilize the ability for Sub-Saharan 
Africans to withstand deadly disease (53). 
Environmental justice author and activist Larry Lohmann (2006) critiques the 
technocratic approaches to climate mitigation that can both exacerbate and create new 
global inequities and environmental destruction.  Writing on behalf of the Durban Group 
for Climate Justice,9 he argues against offsets, a major branch of the contemporary fossil 
fuel economy ushered in by the Kyoto Protocol.  Offsets license and excuse the 
extraction of fossil fuels or the pollution associated with burning them by funding what 
are meant to be environmentally beneficial projects elsewhere in the world.  As Lohmann 
chronicles, offset projects in Guatemala, Ecuador, Uganda, Costa Rica, India, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, South Africa, and Brazil have had disastrous effects.  In Guatemala, for 
example, U.S.-based power producer Applied Energy Service, Inc. purchased an 
                                                
9 According to their website, The Durban Group for Climate Justice “is an international network of 
independent organisations, individuals and people's movements who reject the approach to climate change 
promoted by polluting corporations, financiers, northern governments and economists.  Since 2004 we have 
provided a platform for discussion and analysis of climate justice, and our members engage in regular 
advocacy in favour of real, not false, solutions to the crisis.  We view durable change as emanating 
primarily from grassroots and shop floor movements for climate justice. We aim to help mobilise 
communities around the world and pledge solidarity with people resisting carbon trading across the world” 
(http://www.durbanclimatejustice.org). 
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agroforestry offset in the Western Highlands (222).  Forty thousand farmers were 
educated in sustainable forestry and planted fifty million pine and eucalyptus trees.  But 
the plan failed; the privatization of the forest meant that indigenous subsistence farmers 
were forced out of the Western Highlands and refused reentry, depriving them of daily 
necessities (223).  Furthermore, the tree species planted were inappropriate for the 
climate and ecology, creating an unsustainable economy (224).  All told, the ten-year 
project fell far short of the one million tons of carbon it was supposed to have offset, 
while devastating local ecologies and indigenous sovereignty (224).    
Other environmental justice scholars, like Shiva (2011), agroecologist Eric Holt-
Giménez, and journalist Raj Patel (2009), chronicle the ways food injustice is 
exacerbated by climate change, and climate injustice is exacerbated by certain food ways.  
Poor harvests, caused by climatic events, differentially impact every producer, 
transporter, or consumer along the path from seed to table, affecting impoverished 
communities and nations foremost.  According to Oxfam, “An average of 500 weather-
related disasters are now taking place each year, compared with 120 in the 1980s; the 
number of floods has increased six-fold over the same period” (Holt-Giménez & Patel, 
14).  Further, pollutive and/or energy-intensive methods of food production, harvesting, 
transportation, and consumption likewise contribute to climate change-causing carbon, 
nitrogen, and methane emissions.10  This is why so many climate and food justice 
                                                
10 Carbon emissions primarily result from burning fossil fuels; nitrogen is emitted from chemical fertilizer 
use; and methane gas is emitted primarily from factory farms (although rising methane emissions are also a 
pressing concern as Arctic permafrost thaws due to warming temperatures). 
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activists—including some U.N. researchers11—have advocated for small scale farming, 
food cooperatives, and community gardening efforts as contextualized and efficient 
modes of confronting hunger, poor nutrition, food inaccessibility, greenhouse gases, and 
the devastating ecological impacts of resource-intensive/high input monocultures and 
livestock production.  According to climate and food justice scholars, small, biodiverse, 
ecological farms have the potential not only to help us mitigate and adapt to climate 
change, but to remediate it as well: “small farmers usually amend their soils with organic 
materials that absorb and sequester carbon better than soils that are farmed with 
conventional fertilizers” (125).12  By Shiva’s estimates, organic farming increases carbon 
absorption by up to fifty-five percent and water holding capacity by ten percent 
(“Climate,” 370). 
Environmental justice scholarship informs my project on several occasions.  I 
utilize it to present critiques of, as well as alternatives to, conventional climate change 
politics in Chapter Two.  And by attuning restoration thinking toward the causes and 
constituents infrequently considered, environmental justice scholarship directs my 
research to move restoration past preservationist environmentalisms, and toward a 
definition of restoration responsive to ecological and social needs in Chapter Three.  
                                                
11 See (1) the U.N.’s “Trade and Environment Review 2013: Wake Up Before it is Too Late,” which 
included contributions from more than 60 experts around the world advocating a planetary shift toward 
more sustainable agriculture. The report concludes, “This implies a rapid and significant shift from 
conventional, monoculture-based and high-external-input-dependent industrial production toward mosaics 
of sustainable, regenerative production systems that also considerably improve the productivity of small-
scale farmers” (United Nations, Trade and Environment Review); and (2) The U.N. General Assembly’s 
“Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food” (2014), where researcher Olivier De Schutter 
critiques large-scale industrial agricultural projects, like the Green Revolution, and instead promotes small-
scale food production as the most efficient, ecological, and socially-just method of feeding the world. 
12 According to Holt-Giménez & Patel, “Around four tons of carbon per hectare is stored in organically 
managed soils.  …[T]he conversion of 10,000 small- to medium-sized farms to organic production would 
store carbon in the soil equivalent to taking 1,174,400 cars off the road” (125-126). 
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Finally, I support the environmental justice consensus on promoting the benefits of small-
scale, sustainable food production by showcasing a case study of the Beacon Food Forest 
in Chapter Four.   
The final field of scholarship informing my project is ecological restoration 
theory.  The writings of founding restorationist William Jordan III are used in Chapter 
Three to define the field, summarize its history, and evaluate its tenuous position as an 
environmentalism that both adheres to and challenges conventional U.S. environmental 
thought.  Chapter Three productively exploits this contradiction, optimizing some degree 
of resolution that ultimately challenges the field toward progressive definitions.  
Chapters Three and Four also utilize the research of ecological restoration 
scholars—like Mrill Ingram (2009), Thomas Simpson (2009), Peter Dunwiddie et. al. 
(2009), James Harris et. al. (2006), Stuart Allison (2012), Matthais Gross (2010), and 
Richard Hobbs, Eric Higgs, and Carol Hall (2013)—who have been working intently in 
the past few years on understanding restoration’s role in a climate-changed future, when 
invasive species proliferation, temperature changes, and seasonal shifts will make it 
increasingly difficult, if not altogether counterproductive, for humans to restore the plants 
and systems that predated climate change.  Until climate change threatened to transform 
entire ecologies, what any restorationist sought to restore was limited to which ecological 
processes, plants, insects, and animals came before a destructive presence.  With the loss 
of historical targets for restoration, many, like Mrill Ingram, worry that “At worst, 
climate change might render the practice obsolete, or relegate it to being an expensive 
hobby” (235).   
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Others, like Dunwiddie et. al., maintain that restoration’s relevance will hinge 
upon a site’s underlying ecological resiliency.  They argue that organisms respond in 
three main ways to climatic change: they may persist in otherwise unsuitable habitat; 
they may adapt through behavioral or genotypic changes; or they may disperse to a new 
site by migration or altering their range (321).  In each of these scenarios, restorationists 
would be able to continue contributing to ecosystem health by continuing current history-
based work or providing new spaces for migrating habitats and their flora and fauna 
(Gross, 84).  But if a site’s resiliency is threatened, organism extirpation or extinction is 
likely, rendering the restorationist’s role irrelevant. 
Harris et. al. argue that future-looking restoration endeavors will span a 
continuum of responsive efforts—designed to conserve and protect existing ecological 
assemblages as the field has always done—and proactive efforts—designed to intervene 
(via mitigation and reversal) in climate change by sequestering carbon and influencing 
local climatic conditions (174).  As Chapter Four explores further, Stuart Allison 
acknowledges that proactive restoration-as-mitigation is “a significant departure from our 
traditional way of doing ecological restoration” (104), but may nevertheless be required 
of the field as novel ecosystems become the norm.  In a debate that will continue to play 
out as climate change ramps up, restorationists continue to waiver between modeling 
damaged land according to historical precedence versus abandoning precedence in favor 
of simply maintaining ecosystem services (107).13  My project challenges restorationists 
                                                
13 “Ecosystem services” are typically defined as any positive benefit that nonhuman nature provides for 
people, although in the case of restoration, nonhuman nature can also “service” itself, that is, other 
nonhumans.  Services are often divided into four types: (1) “supporting” ecosystem services, which 
comprise the fundamental functions of any healthy ecosystem, including photosynthesis, soil formation, 
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to evaluate sites for their contextualized needs, and with the engagement of local human 
stakeholders, capitalize on the opportunities climate change presents to facilitate new 
natures that build socio-ecological resilience.  
Despite this noteworthy scholarship on how contemporary socio-environmental 
issues will affect future life for humans and nonhumans who vary in degrees of 
vulnerability, feminist environmental theory, environmental justice, and restoration 
theory and practice could yet stand to benefit from each other’s insights.  For all of the 
critical analyses brought forth by feminist environmentalists and environmental justice 
advocates, pragmatic deployments are needed to enact them.  And for the pragmatic, on 
the ground responsiveness of restoration, there are yet ideological contradictions that 
prevent it from achieving trustworthy social benefits, a problem that feminist 
environmental justice could remedy.  Furthermore, restoration needs to reconcile its 
contradictions in order to have a say in climate-changed natures and ensure its own 
viability.  In failing to recognize these issues, valuable scholarship can be left unapplied, 
rendered irrelevant, or abandoned as ineffective.  Meanwhile, those most vulnerable to 
environmental ills cannot afford idleness when it comes to the quality, or the very 
possibility, of their lives.  
My project will remedy this theory-praxis gap by examining how restoration  
                                                                                                                                            
water cycling, and nutrient cycling; (2) “provisioning” services, which comprise resources we can extract 
and utilize, including fuel, water, plant fibers, or plant medicines; (3) “regulating” services, which moderate 
our ecosystems, and include climate regulation, flood and erosion regulation, disease regulation, 
pollination, and water purification; and (4) such non-material “cultural” services as aesthetic, spiritual, 
educational, or recreational benefits.  This list was compiled in partial reference to The National Wildlife 
Federation’s website (2014). 
 As distinguished from “historical precedence”—or as I will describe in Chapter Three, “historical range 
of variability”—maintaining “ecosystem services” simply implies promoting or enabling a functioning 
ecosystem, even if relationships, processes, flora and/or fauna do not reflect a site’s precedence. 
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could embody one salient response to climate change if reconsidered in light of feminist 
environmental justice principles.  In so doing, a pathway for restoration’s future viability 
could be carved, while contributing to more socially just, ecologically viable, resilient 
communities.  Through a self-designed methodology based upon feminist environmental 
justice theory, I demonstrate that a justice-oriented restoration is needed, possible, and 
effective.  I expect this research to contribute to debates on sustainability; to the cross-
pollination of the humanities, social sciences, and sciences; and to the momentum 
building worldwide for community-driven, site-specific adaptations, mitigations, and 
remediations to environmental vulnerabilities.   
 
Methodology 
The method that guides my research is an analytic for evaluating the effectiveness 
of various approaches to environmental dilemmas.  It is predominantly shaped by 
environmental justice and feminist theory, especially science studies, 
environmental/ecofeminist theory, and material feminist theory.  There are two 
fundamental reasons for selecting these fields to guide my analyses: First, I agree that any 
effective approach to solving environmental dilemmas must first appreciate that 
“environment” is a social, political arena of power.  The feminist environmental justice 
theory I employ to analyze environmental issues engages with an interactionist ontology, 
which, according to Tuana,  
removes any hard-and-fast divides between nature and culture, while at the same 
time troubling the division between realism and social constructivism.  As I have 
argued elsewhere: “The world is neither ‘fabricated’ in the sense of created out of 
human cultural practices, nor is its existence independent of human interactions of 
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a multitude of forms, including cultural.”  Interactionism posits a “world of 
complex phenomena in dynamic relationality.” (191) 
 
If this perspective is taken seriously, then the causes of our environmental dilemmas must 
be understood as multifaceted, meaning that the solution will have to be multifaceted as 
well, addressing a number of problems, and engaging a number of stakeholders 
simultaneously.  There has been no more obvious occasion in history than today’s 
predicament of global climate change to recognize that nature and culture, human and 
nonhuman, material and discursive cannot be parsed, and that doing so not only fails to 
effectively solve major dilemmas, but creates more in its wake.   
Meanwhile, my use of an interactionist analytic productively challenges 
conventional feminisms, environmentalisms, and ecological restoration.  As a whole, 
feminist theory needs the interactionism elucidated by feminist environmentalisms, 
science studies, and material feminisms, in order to extend its insight and influence in 
matters of the body, environment, science, and medicine.14  Environmental theory needs 
interactionism in order to extend its relevancy to human communities who have too long 
                                                
14 Conventional feminisms stand to benefit from interactionism, for up until the early 1980s, the nature-
culture dualism was perpetuated by feminist theorists wary of the historical association of women and 
racial minorities with nature.  The wild and unruly space of wilderness and animalia served as a metaphor 
for racial and gendered minorities’ supposedly natural eroticism, irrationality, and uncontrollability [for 
further explanation, see Carolyn Merchant’s “Dominion Over Nature” (2001) and Evelyn Fox Keller’s 
“Secrets of God, Nature, and Life” (2001)].  Yet the “feminist flight from nature,” as Stacy Alaimo coins it 
in Undomesticated Ground (2000), came with the consequence of a lack of feminist engagement in 
important questions surrounding medicine, science, and environment (Haraway, Simians, 184-185).  
Beginning in the 1980s, feminist science studies, and later, feminist posthumanisms, postcolonialisms, and 
material feminisms, have sought to correct this avoidance.  A variety of helpful concepts have been put 
forth to transgress nature culture dualisms: Tuana’s “viscous porosity” and “interactionism” (2008); Karen 
Barad’s “intra-actionism” (2007) and “posthumanist performativity” (2008); Haraway’s “naturecultures” 
(2008), “material-semiotic” (1997), cyborg (1991), and “companion species” (2007); and Alaimo’s “trans-
corporeality” (2008).  These concepts not only assist contemporary feminisms in moving beyond what was 
once perceived as a limit, but also sketch out helpful ways of moving feminism forward toward a future 
where effective politics are no longer single-issue based, nor simply intersectional (for often, 
“intersectional” represents theory relevant only to human lives), but interactionist.   
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been abandoned by preservationist ideology.  And ecological restoration needs 
interactionism in order to live up to its purported distinctiveness within U.S. 
environmentalism, extend its benefits beyond only parklands, and carve a future for itself 
as a discipline resilient to climate change.15  All three fields need interactionism in order 
to maintain their own relevancy in the face of climate change, and contribute their 
insights toward mitigating, adapting to, and even remediating mounting environmental 
crises.   
What this first analytic strategy implies is that the research I gather be attuned to 
the following kinds of questions: Is this scholarship relevant to a diverse set of human 
and nonhuman stakeholders?  Does it mine the gaps of inherited knowledges to suture 
nature-culture, human-nonhuman, and material-discursive binaries?  And are the 
solutions to dilemmas proposed pragmatic in their attention to several constituents at 
once?   
Second, I find feminist theory and environmental justice to be effective 
environmental analyses because they develop their insights “from below,” from 
grassroots, responsive, and/or marginalized levels of power.  Knowledges developed 
from perspectives in politically stratified societies are structured, as feminist 
epistemologist Sandra Harding contends, by those with the most power and privilege, 
who can “organize and set limits” upon who performs which societal activities, and how 
                                                
15 Ecological restoration has traditionally posed a challenge to conventional environmentalisms, which have 
historically advocated a “hands-off” approach to nature, coded as exclusively nonhuman.  By contrast, 
restoration demonstrates that people can be a beneficial influence on the land, rather than inherently 
destructive, while co-creating nature.  Yet still, as Chapter Three explores in more detail, restoration has 
had trouble fully embodying that ethos, and I argue that it has prevented its effectiveness.  Environmental 
justice and feminist environmentalisms push restoration toward a full realization of its naturalcultural ethos.  
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we understand them (54).  Therefore, those at the bottom of social hierarchies frequently 
have insight into how power operates to benefit some while disadvantaging others, as 
well as how to navigate and survive marginalization.  According to Chicano studies 
scholar Chela Sandoval, those not destroyed by their lack of power can “develop modes 
of perceiving, making sense of, and acting upon reality that are the basis for effective 
forms of oppositional consciousness” (35).  As philosopher Michel Foucault historicizes, 
these are “subjugated knowledges,” “a whole series of knowledges that have been 
disqualified as nonconceptual knowledges, as insufficiently elaborated knowledges; naïve 
knowledges, hierarchically inferior knowledges that are below the required level of 
erudition or scientificity” (7).  Throughout history, oppositional knowledges have been 
marginalized, ignored, and defeated, because they threaten social hierarchies.  
Agnotologists—those who study culturally induced ignorance—trace the ways in which 
certain knowledges have been purposefully suppressed for this reason, a phenomenon 
they name “epistemologies of ignorance.”  As agnotologists argue, “Ignorance is often 
not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural and political struggle” 
(Schiebinger, 237).  Feminist philosopher Naomi Scheman explains this in relation to 
environmental in/justice:  
The environmental justice movement exists to address the fact that vulnerability 
to the negative effects of pollution, toxins, global warming, and other 
environmental dangers are inequitably distributed, that—in ways that track the 
inequities of race, class, gender, sexuality, and abilities—some are relatively 
invulnerable to what others are imperiled by.  As epistemologists of ignorance 
have argued, this invulnerability carries an epistemic cost.  It is much easier for 
manufacturers of doubt about, for example, global warming, to bamboozle those 
who are shielded from its effects, who may not notice when the vegetables in their 
supermarket start to come from different places, a not-noticing not available to 
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those whose subsistence crops are no longer viable or whose water table has 
dropped inaccessibly low. (Scheman, “Empowering,” 15)  
 
The threatening nature of oppositional knowledges, which are intentionally 
ignored or defeated, is precisely why critical scholars and activists in feminism and 
environmental justice find them valuable: one can better understand how power operates 
by looking toward its extremities, “at the point where it becomes capillary,” as Foucault 
writes (28).  So in order to alter the ways knowledge is produced and produce 
knowledges that are relevant and accurate within subjugated experience, attention should 
be focused on those made vulnerable to what geographer Ruth Gilmore has called “the 
fatal couplings of power and difference” (22).  In so doing, “we will develop richer 
analyses of how it is that radical activism might most productively exploit crisis for 
liberatory ends” (22).  Science studies scholar Donna Haraway reminds us in “Situated 
Knowledges” (1991) that subjugated accounts of reality are neither innocent nor all-
encompassing: “how to see from below is a problem” (191).  Instead, they are still 
“preferred” because “They are savvy to modes of denial through repression, forgetting, 
and disappearing acts—ways of being nowhere while claiming to see comprehensively. 
[…]  [T]hey seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming accounts 
of the world” (191).  
Historically, various feminist and environmental justice movements have been 
founded upon the witnessing, consciousness-raising, and retelling of injustices.  There is 
good reason why personal stories dominated 1960s-70s feminist medical literature, for 
example, and why case studies dominate environmental justice literature: there were, and 
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still are, few(er) accounts of reality that validate their stories.  From these stories, rich 
epistemologies have emerged.  In essence, then, this project begins its inquiries by 
seeking out the testimonies and theories of those who cannot afford to “not-notice,” in 
Scheman’s words, because I believe their ideas are most trustworthy, likely to be 
insightful, relevant to real-life conditions and consequences, and deserving of attention in 
political arenas that drown them out.   
What this second analytic strategy implies is that my research also be attuned to 
the following questions: Does my object of study work against epistemologies of 
ignorance and/or provide a counter balance to environmental hegemonies in U.S./global 
leadership, policies, discourses, etc.?  Does it strengthen marginalized voices?  Will it 
help socio-ecological communities to be more resilient?  Will it contribute to social-
ecological pragmatism, justice, and sustainability?   
 
 Chapter Introduction 
 From the perspective of feminist environmental justice, my inquiry into justice-
oriented restoration is organized into the following three chapters.  Chapter Two, 
“Ecological Livability in the Age of Climate Crisis,” asks which kinds of contemporary 
environmental politics most effectively engender what I have coined “ecological 
livability.”  The concept impels consideration about which conditions make life livable at 
all scales in an ecological community.  Primarily concerned with how power relations 
distribute environmental vulnerabilities inequitably, ecological livability is both a 
method—which politics will engage or represent the diverse non/human residents of this 
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ecology?—and a goal—which politics will increase this community’s resiliency in the 
face of climate change?   
Using ecological livability as a measure of democracy and ecological health, I 
analyze major recent climate policies.  This study reveals three overarching limitations 
that have failed to remedy the causes and effects of climate change, and consequently fail 
to promote ecological livability.  Using UN REDD+ as an example, I conclude that this 
kind of forest restoration initiative can be parsed into aspects that either prevent or enable 
ecological livability.  In so doing, I clarify the conditions necessary for enacting the 
justice-oriented restoration described in the following chapters. 
Chapter Three, “Restoration’s Return: Toward a Justice-Oriented Ecological 
Restoration,” investigates the benefits and drawbacks of conventional ecological 
restoration—itself a marginalized form of modern U.S. environmentalism—in an era of 
climate change.  It builds upon the previous chapter by suggesting that ecology and 
justice can be attained even in extant, every day environmental practices, such as 
restoration.  Using material feminist theory to tease apart restoration’s ideological 
inconsistencies, I posit that the field has potential to contribute to environmental justice, 
while addressing concerns about nonhuman life as it traditionally aims to do.  This 
endeavor is possible only if restorationists can truly distinguish their work from 
preservationism, but climate change already threatens to do that.  In harnessing climate 
change as an opportunity, I maintain that if restorationists conceive of their work as 
justice-oriented, they can both secure a future for themselves in an age of novel natures, 
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and increase communities’ resilience to socio-environmental ills brought on by climate 
change. 
Entitled “Novel Natures and Nature’s Publics,” Chapter Four combines the ideas 
from previous chapters by offering a radical illustration of what a justice-oriented 
restoration project aimed at engendering ecological livability in the age of climate crises 
could embody.  Compiled with research from dozens of articles and three personal 
interviews, it begins with a summary of the development of Seattle, Washington’s 
grassroots Beacon Food Forest, a seven-acre project designed by the neighborhood to 
plant and grow an edible urban forest free to the public for foraging.  Growing their own 
food and rehabilitating the local ecosystem are goals second only to the primary goal of 
engendering an empowered, educated community in this ethnically diverse 
neighborhood.  Beacon Food Foresters recognize the food insecurity that plagues their 
community as one of the many manifestations of climate change; localizing their food 
supply, offering it for free, and planting both culturally diverse nonnative plants 
alongside native plants, is Beacon Hill’s solution to increasing their resiliency in a 
climate changed future.  
I then debate the extent to which the Beacon Food Forest can plausibly “count” as 
ecological restoration at all, given the great extent to which it creatively departs from 
conventional definitions of restoration.  Employing cutting-edge scholarship from 
forward-thinking ecological restorationists, I argue that such unconventional projects 
should indeed encompass the future of restoration after all.  Next, I evaluate the 
collectivist, market-alternative, participatory features of the BFF that enable it to 
  28 
facilitate ecological livability in an era of burgeoning novel ecosystems.  In conclusion, 
FBFF’s positions on mutualism and responsiveness are showcased for the ways they 
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Chapter Two 
Ecological Livability in the Age of Climate Crisis 
 
The Radical Reframing of Ecological Livability 
This chapter emerges from my desire to frame global climate change as a problem 
of ecological livability.  In an age of unprecedented, climatically induced change, 
uncertainty, and extremes, I ask, which kinds of natures will be livable, and for whom?  I 
begin by suggesting that a radical reframing of environmental politics is necessary to 
ensure Anthropocene political initiatives address not only ecological vulnerabilities, but 
the social vulnerabilities that cause or emerge from them.  Then I provide an overview of 
contemporary climate change politics, which are evaluated with the critical lens of 
feminist environmental justice.  Finally, I utilize those critiques to explore The UN 
REDD+ Programme, in order to gesture toward the kinds of considerations that will be 
necessary for practicing the justice-oriented restoration discussed in the following 
chapters.  
 “Ecological livability” is a concept I extend from queer theorist Judith Butler’s 
“livability,” a term most poignantly captured for its relation to “precariousness.”  In 
Butler’s ontology, we live in a thoroughly interdependent world, as evidenced by life’s 
fundamental, inescapable condition of vulnerability (Undoing, 24).  We are each held in 
thrall to the decisions of myriad actors: in a very urgent way, our bodies are “given over” 
to the care (and carelessness) of others, meaning that our bodies are “always something 
more than, and other than, ourselves” (25).  To cite one of her examples, African bodies 
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“given over” to cellular colonization by HIV are vulnerable not only to a weakened 
immune system but to U.S. media portrayals of AIDS in Africa, which fail to capture the 
depth and extent of human loss in ways that might incite political movement toward 
livable conditions for them (ibid).  In another example, Butler discusses the inability of 
U.S. legal and medical institutions to conceive of personhood in ways that lie outside the 
normative sex-gender system (58), as evidenced by coercive surgery, psychiatry, and 
social norms to “correct” intersexed individuals (57-74).  Instances such as these 
illustrate how relationships human and nonhuman, local and global, personal and 
institutional, contour our existence, and even determine how livable our lives will be.  As 
Butler argues, some lives are made to exist more precariously than others due to their 
geopolitical and social locations: “there are radically different ways in 
which…vulnerability is distributed throughout the globe” (24).  This greatly impacts the 
nature of our epistemologies—who is made knowable (27), our affective economies—
who is recognizable (Frames, 4-5) and grievable (4-6, Undoing, 19), and by extension, 
our politics—who our nation-states protect and enable. 
 In recognition of this, Butler argues that we are ethically obliged to ask what 
conditions delimit each life as precarious.  Such an inquiry will reveal how norms support 
and maintain life chances and opportunities differentially.  Heteronormativity in the U.S., 
for example, upholds the values, traditions, and institutions typically benefiting 
monogamous, adult, heterosexual, married couples of the same race.  Not only have these 
norms privileged those who fit these parameters while excluding those who do not, they 
also shape the lives and agendas of those who fit many, though not all, of those 
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parameters.  For example, critics of homonormativity point out that many gay and lesbian 
couples or organizations who seek the social and material benefits of our heteronormative 
society by advocating to expand those norms, exclude those who will never be sheltered 
by them.16  According to Butler, our task, therefore, is not merely to expand norms so that 
more lives can be contained within their bounds; it is rather to pursue “[w]hat might be 
done…to shift the very terms of recognizability in order to produce more radically 
democratic results” (Frames, 2). 
It is in Butler’s spirit of “radical democracy” that I employ “livability” as an 
ecological concept.  And yet, the conjoining of “ecological” with “livable” also impels 
Butler’s notion of precariousness by underscoring that bodies are also “given over” to 
nonhuman actors, and that human-nonhuman inter- and intra-relations construct our 
existence on a material—as well as social or discursive—level.17  Material feminist Stacy 
Alaimo makes this connection in her essay “Insurgent Vulnerability and the Carbon 
Footprint of Gender” (2010).  In it, she continues to develop her notion of 
“transcorporeality,” the “recognition of the substantial interconnections between human 
corporeality and the more-than-human world,” by theorizing vulnerability as “a sense of 
precarious, corporeal openness to the material world” (23).  This conception of 
                                                
16 See, for example, Agathangelou et. al. “Intimate Investments: Homonormativity, Global Lockdown, and 
the Seductions of Empire” (2008). 
17 There has been much discussion over the so-called humanist limits of Butler’s writing.  While Butler has 
demonstrated a deep understanding of the material consequences of social norms and regulations, she has 
been critiqued for ignoring the ways that nonhumans and materiality are themselves agentic, focusing 
instead on the power of discourse to shape materiality.  Butler does acknowledge the limits of humanism 
(see, for example, Undoing Gender, 13, 12, 35).  However, Alaimo and Hekman point to the frequency of 
criticisms waged against Butler’s “loss of the material” (specifically the materiality of the body) through 
her dependency on discourse in Gender Trouble and Bodies That Matter (3).  In their collection, Material 
Feminisms, critiques and reworkings of Butler’s writings and interviews can be found in Colebrook, 68, 80; 
Hekman, 90, 104-6; Kirby, 221, and Alaimo, “Trans-Corporeal,” 246-7.  Further critiques in this vein can 
be found in Barad’s Meeting the Universe Halfway, 61-64. 
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vulnerability insists upon “shifting the terms of recognizability” because it requires that 
we move beyond the limits of even of the most inclusive, expanded humanist norm, by 
considering the spectrum of non/human life, or life lived at all scales.   
 Ecological livability thus directs us to appreciate both the historical power 
differences as well as the geological, planetary differences that result in human and 
nonhuman ecological vulnerabilities, and even injustice.  For example, as feminist 
environmental philosopher Chris Cuomo writes, “Climate change was manufactured in a 
crucible of inequality, for it is a product of the industrial and fossil-fuel eras, historical 
forces powered by exploitation, colonialism, and nearly limitless instrumental use of 
‘nature’,” which today endangers us all, “including those who have contributed little or 
nothing at all to the industrial greenhouse effect” (693).  At the same time, ecological 
livability reminds us to consider vulnerabilities initiated primarily as a matter of 
geographic location (693): Arctic inhabitants (both human and nonhuman) are negatively 
impacted by climate change as are metropolitan Australian inhabitants.  Of course, these 
populations are likely made differentially vulnerable to climate change due to their 
political power and ability to adapt, but appreciating environments as powerful actors, as 
we would other “cultural” or “discursive” axes of power, productively complicates how 
vulnerability is distributed across the globe. 
 While ecological livability draws inspiration from the material and discursive 
intra-connectedness of life, it also avoids the trap of victimization often associated with 
exclusive appeals to vulnerability, especially in environmentalist contexts, where as 
feminist geographer Rachel Slocum observes in media and activist portrayals of polar 
  33 
bears, “There are those who pity and others who have become only victims: the two are 
separate” (428).  Not only can appeals to vulnerability focus on the limitations of those 
harmed as opposed to the injustices that fostered harmful conditions, they also, as Cuomo 
argues, tend to “obfuscate the agency, knowledge, and resilience of members of 
disempowered or marginalized groups” (695).  Yet because “livability” is not only about 
revealing the structural and material precariousness of life, but also which policies, 
lifestyles, and choices can make life more livable—even “thrivable”—ecological 
livability utilizes the knowledges and experiences of disempowered groups to 
demonstrate how privilege, power, and geography can shape perspectives of 
vulnerability—risk, danger, “trade-offs,” etc.—induced by climate change, its causes, and 
responses.  Alternatives to discourses of victimization are emerging, as Cuomo observes,  
from indigenous, anti-globalization, feminist, and youth movements for climate 
justice.  These movements point out that many communities are in vulnerable 
positions precisely because they uphold ecological values that have not been 
engulfed by global capitalism and technological modernization, recognizing 
marginal status in fossil-fuel cultures to be a sign of wisdom and resilience rather 
than weakness. (695) 
 
Alaimo, too, argues that women—a population unduly affected by climate change—are 
powerful agents of change.  In this spirit, “Feminist organizations such as Women’s 
Environment and Development Organization (WEDO) are careful to complement 
feminine vulnerability with feminist agency, savvy, and survival strategies, calling for 
more parity in decision making and leadership” (“Insurgent,” 312).  And as many 
indigenous and material feminist scholars remind us, for all of the ways in which 
nonhuman creatures are held in thrall to human lifestyles and policies, the nonhuman 
world is yet agentic and unpredictable, providing ways in which humans can learn from, 
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not just about, nonhuman creatures and spaces.  In the upcoming pages, I demonstrate 
how ecological livability can be used to evaluate major contemporary U.S. and 
international climate change politics, thus facilitating ecologically livable responses to 
climate change. 
 
Between The End of Nature and Eaarth: Where are we now? 
In 1989, environmental studies professor and climate justice activist Bill 
McKibben was among the first public figures to predict the “end of nature” as we knew 
it, and the ushering in of a qualitatively novel, anthropogenically-altered environment: 
“There’s no such thing as nature anymore—that other world that isn’t business and art 
and breakfast is now not another world, and there is nothing except us alone” (End, 76).   
McKibben recently coined this new place we inhabit “Eaarth” (2010).  He writes, “earth 
has changed in profound ways, ways that have already taken us out of the sweet spot 
where humans so long thrived. […] The world hasn’t ended, but the world as we know it 
has—even if we don’t quite know it yet. […] [This different planet] needs a new name.  
Eaarth” (Eaarth, 2).  Of course, this new name does not signal the advent of an entirely 
novel existence; nature changes and adapts to a variety of evolutionary and cultural 
impacts.  Yet McKibben’s point is that climate change has, and will continue, to so 
profoundly alter life as we have known it, that we would do well to acknowledge the 
unprecedented shift.  Indeed, climate change is ushering in natures with which no human 
has ever confronted, let alone coexisted.  There is something “new”—and terribly 
unsettling—to these natures after all.   
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These two publications of McKibben’s, which serve as important touchstones in 
sustainability studies, temporally bookend major reformist popular, federal, and 
international efforts to contend with climate change.  Noteworthy among these efforts, in 
chronological order, are: (1) the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which increased the 
regulatory powers of the federal government to address climate matters such as air 
pollution-induced acid rain and ozone depletion; (2) the formation of the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (1992), 
whose negotiations laid the groundwork for the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (adopted 
in 1997 and enforced in 2005, though never ratified by the U.S.).  This binding 
international treaty set emissions targets that varied according to nations’ outputs, with an 
emphasis on curtailing the most pollutive among them (generally industrialized, Northern 
countries); (3) former U.S. Vice President Al Gore’s critically-acclaimed film An 
Inconvenient Truth (2006), which dramatized and publicized global warming so 
effectively that it has become a discursive touchstone in contemporary U.S. popular 
culture and environmentalism;18 (4) federal legislative efforts (such as Lieberman-
Warner’s Climate Security Act of 2007, which was blocked by Senate Republicans in 
2008, and Waxman-Markey’s American Clean Energy and Security Act, which was 
passed by the House in 2009 but blocked by the Senate the same year), which aimed to 
instantiate carbon trading as a profitable, palatable method of curbing emissions; (5) the 
2009 Group of Eight (G8) Summit, wherein the world’s “principle actors” in climate 
                                                
18 This film, and the national tour to follow, represents one achievement in a long list of Gore’s effort to 
publicize climate change.  Many applaud him for putting anthropogenically-induced climate change on 
political agendas across the world, beginning in 1970 when he organized the first congressional hearings on 
global warming.  
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politics terms “recognize[d] the scientific view that the increase in global average 
temperature above preindustrial levels ought not exceed two degrees Celsius” (G8).  
Considered an “historic agreement” by the G8, no specific goals were agreed upon as to 
future collaboration regarding reduction standards or benchmarks; it was simply 
acknowledged by the leaders who represent nations responsible for more than 40% of 
worldwide carbon emissions that a 2° C (3.6°F) increase in global temperatures would 
put our planet in jeopardy (Seager, 11-12); and (6) the 2009 UNFCCC Copenhagen 
Accord, which was intended to succeed the Kyoto Protocol as a binding, more aggressive 
standard of emissions-reductions given its overriding assertion that global temperatures 
not exceed 2° Celsius.  Instead, it became a non-binding plan to revisit emissions 
standards at future UNFCCC meetings. 
 It is generally undisputed that these measures proved either unsuccessful or 
insufficient when compared to the depth, scale, and urgency global climate change 
presents.  The most compelling evidence of this position, perhaps, is that today’s 
concentration of atmospheric carbon—just one of the varieties of industrial green house 
gases19 that plague our atmosphere—continues to skyrocket unchecked.  For millions of 
years, Earth thrived at pre-Industrial levels of 275 parts per million (ppm); this level of 
CO2 concentration has provided the basis for life as we have known it.  2014 levels 
climbed to 397ppm, a number most experts agree has undeniably pushed us past a “point 
                                                
19 Though carbon dioxide is the most notorious greenhouse gas (GHG), other industrial GHGs include 
methane, nitrous oxide, perflourocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride, and chloroflourocarbons.  To be sure, there 
are naturally-occurring GHGs that have always comprised Earth’s atmosphere, such as nitrogen, oxygen, 
water, vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide.  These produce a greenhouse effect, by absorbing 
the perfect amount of the sun’s heat, thereby maintaining a temperature zone suitable for living things.  
“But,” as Cuomo instructs, “since the 1860s, over 500 billion tons of human-generated greenhouse gases 
have been spewed into the atmosphere, causing an additional industrial greenhouse effect, which traps too 
much of the sun’s energy and has therefore led to increased average global temperatures” (691). 
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of no return” where climate change will continue to alter, if not devastate, the planet 
(CO2Now.org). 
More controversial are explanations for why international and national reform 
measures have failed.  In the U.S. arena alone, explanations quickly become complex: 
some blame climate change deniers for preventing proactive legislative, policy, and 
scientific pursuits, while some blame lax corporate regulations that allow businesses to 
continue pollutive practices unscathed.  Others point toward “major political distractions” 
that have turned our attention away from climate change mitigation efforts: the U.S. war 
with Iraq (2003-2011) and ongoing military occupation of Afghanistan (2001-present), or 
the 2007-2009 economic recession.  With these pressing political and economic concerns, 
as well as the general complacency of a variously consumerist and disempowered 
populace, the seemingly abstract concept of climate change—often perceived as a 
problem for the future in relatively privileged, and thus insulated, countries like the 
U.S.—has gotten kicked down the road.  On an international scale, many criticize the 
governments of emerging economic powers like China, India, and Brazil for preventing 
international policy efforts to curb emissions as they pursue development and economic 
growth via pollutive energy consumption that mimics industrialized nations’ historical 
consumption patterns (though for its part, China is also the world’s leading developer of 
and investor in green technologies and energy production.  Still, the nation continues its 
use of dirty energy apace) (McKibben, “Can”).  And yet, in the spirit of ecological 
livability, which advocates “shifting the terms of recognizability to produce radically 
democratic results,” I suggest that these are the kinds of explanations that produce much 
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hand wringing, but little action.  The next section describes how climate justice advocates 
and feminist environmentalists, on the other hand, illuminate three underlying value 
frameworks that indicate why major contemporary responses to climate change have 
failed to adequately confront it.  
 
Insufficient Frameworks: Feminist Environmental & Climate Justice Critiques 
 Individualist Solutions 
The first major limitation of the noteworthy climate change “interventions” put 
forth since the late 1980s can be summarized as the promotion of individualist, rather 
than institutional or community-based, solutions.  Although for the purposes outlined in 
this chapter, this critique applies more to Gore’s film, An Inconvenient Truth, than the 
other five contemporary responses listed above, it does have wider relevance to policies 
and ideologies that promote individualism.  In An Inconvenient Truth, after ninety 
minutes of conveying the scientific details and harsh realities of climate change in a fear-
laden, apocalyptic documentary, it is only during the closing credits that the film offers 
any information on how viewers can prevent further ecological damage.20  Most of the 
ideas presented promote such individual, consumerist efforts as buying energy-efficient 
light bulbs, lowering the thermostat, recycling, planting trees, and buying hybrid cars.  
But from a climate justice perspective, not only is this advice trifling in comparison to the 
scale of the crisis presented, it obscures the disproportionate role major corporations and 
                                                
20 This critique applies to the book version as well, as “what you can personally do to help solve the climate 
crisis” is reserved for the addendum (pages 305-321) to this 300-page volume.  See the following sources 
for more detailed critiques of An Inconvenient Truth’s individualism: Pollan, 42; Jensen, “Forget,” 1-3; 
Luke, 1819; Nordhaus and Shellenberger, Break Through, 277; Aiken, 111; Cuomo, 700-703. 
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governments play in contributing to climate change.  In so doing, An Inconvenient 
Truth’s depoliticized narrative fails to hold those institutional actors accountable.21   
Such individualist rhetoric disguises the ways we have been shaped by culture to 
think of ourselves and others: it prevents us from recognizing our social positions and 
relations to power by assuming that we have all contributed to climate change equally 
and can therefore rectify it with equal capacity to act and consume.  While individualist 
rhetoric proclaims to be about empowerment—“what you can do to save the earth”—it 
actually erodes political power: when Gore and other mainstream politicians and 
environmentalists suggest individualistic solutions while ignoring the wide range of 
resistance tactics available to U.S. citizens, the underlying assumption is that citizens are 
to be defined as consumers, and nothing more.  For Derrick Jensen, author and climate 
activist, being told to substitute acts of personal consumption for organized political 
resistance proves that we have become “victims of a campaign of systematic 
misdirection” (“Forget,” 1).  
This is not to say becoming more aware of individual consumption habits is 
wrong or unnecessary.  Cuomo reminds us that individuals are still responsible for doing 
their part to curb emissions, for even if household or individual acts make negligible 
impacts when compared to meta-level influences, like the military or energy policies, “it 
is a ‘mistake in moral mathematics’ to assume an act cannot be wrong because it has an 
imperceptible effect” (700).  Unfortunately, our agency as consumers does not usually 
                                                
21 To be fair, Gore attempted to address this critique by writing Our Choice (2009), which focuses on a 
variety of institutional, governmental, and industrial responses.  Yet the gesture likely came too late: An 
Inconvenient Truth captured far more public attention than Our Choice, solidifying among U.S. citizens a 
sense of either disempowered helplessness or naïve reassurance in individualist efforts. 
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reflect a similar amount of choice in determining which resources power our goods and 
services.  This has two effects.  First, an insufficiency problem: “Even if personal sphere 
reductions that can be controlled by individuals and households are ethically imperative, 
they are insufficient for adequate mitigation.  [L]arger-scale reductions that can only be 
achieved by meta-level emitters such as corporations and governments [will] still be 
necessary to avert climate disaster” (701).  Second, because fossil fuel consumption is 
rarely a matter of personal choice, individual lifestyle efforts can engender the problem of 
widespread disempowerment (702).22  As Jensen reminds us, “personal change doesn’t 
equal social change” (“Forget,” 1).  Therefore, many climate justice advocates 
recommend that money and energy otherwise spent on expensive or demanding lifestyle 
changes be targeted explicitly toward building movements that increase political 
awareness and power.  Cuomo writes, “If such efforts were to result in [even] a few very 
significant policy changes…the payoff in terms of long-term mitigation could be great” 
(708).  
Market-Based Solutions 
Second, many of the proposals, such as The U.S. Clean Air Act, The Kyoto 
Protocol, U.S. legislative efforts, the G8’s 2°C acknowledgement and the Copenhagen 
Accord, reflect a policy trend to channel climate action into market “fixes” that 
encourage the industrialized minority to continue business-as-usual, and prolong the 
                                                
22 Cuomo on disempowerment: “Studies show that there is a tendency for people to develop coping 
strategies such as denial in the face of cognitive dissonance or information about situations they have little 
power to change, and avoidant denial is all the more attractive when the truth is painful, depressing, or 
costly, as the truth about climate change certainly seems to be” (703). 
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consequences of climate change while exacerbating systems of inequality.23  The Clean 
Air Act was the first to establish in U.S. law the practice of allowing businesses to 
purchase the right to pollute (Tokar, 80),24 perhaps ushering in the wave of national and 
international market-based efforts to follow it.  Recent U.S. legislative efforts to 
instantiate carbon trading (the Lieberman-Warner and Waxman-Markey bills) are prime 
illustrations of this tradition.  In theory, one of two carbon-trading strategies are intended 
to transition businesses into emissions-reductions by making their emissions profitable: 
with “cap and trade,” companies who do not reduce their emissions according to a cap 
must purchase equivalent allowances from another company that has reduced its 
emissions.  With project-based credits, companies who do not want to reduce their 
emissions or purchase them from another business can invest in projects that otherwise 
reduce emissions, like biofuels growth, methane burning, carbon-capture projects like 
forestry development, or wind power generation.  
But in practice, carbon trading has demonstrated a different outcome, as climate 
justice advocates and feminist environmentalists have recognized.  For example, the 
European Union’s foray into carbon trading failed to reduce emissions and prohibit 
polluters (Smolker & Houser, 2).25  The reasons are many, beginning with the fact that 
                                                
23 According to Larry Lohmann, editor of Carbon Trading: A Critical Conversation on Climate Change, 
Privatisation, and Power (2006), “‘market fixes’ secure[] the property rights of heavy Northern fossil fuel 
users over the world’s carbon-absorbing capacity while creating new opportunities for corporate profit 
through trade” (33-34). 
24 According to Tokar, The Clean Air Act is a paradigmatic example of “free market environmentalism,” 
which was the “cornerstone” of the Clinton-Gore administration’s environmental policies (Earth, 26), and 
further solidified the increasingly popular institution of corporate personhood (80). 
25 See also England’s article, “Tax on Carbon: the only way to save our planet?” which cites a 2008 
Stanford University study disproving encouraging statistics about cap and trade.  Yet another investigation 
from Castle cites a 2006 study that reports a 1 to 1.5% increase in carbon output in the European Union 
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credits are often given away for free to wealthy countries and powerful companies—the 
greatest historical polluters (Lohmann, 73), thus normalizing the “right” to pollute.26  
Further, offsets might not reduce carbon emissions; instead, they may merely be moved 
from one place to another (Smolker & Houser, 1), thus perpetuating the idea that there 
actually exist “under-polluting” places.  As physicist, ecofeminist author, and climate 
justice activist Vandana Shiva argues, poorer regions of the world tend to be ideal 
locations for trading offsets, because it is extremely cost-effective for corporations to 
plant trees (for example) in poor countries rather than to reduce emissions at their sources 
(“Injustice,” 1).  This can put the burden of atmospheric clean up squarely on the 
shoulders of impoverished communities by disrupting ecosystems, livelihoods, and 
quality of life, while at times, failing to offset emissions in the first place.27  Carbon 
trading has also been taken up in policy circles as a substitute for aid to poor countries: 
coined “trade not aid,” if poor countries can make money by selling their under-pollution 
credits, then foreign aid can be cut (Seager, 19).  Most fundamentally, carbon trading 
enables emitter states to shed responsibility and “globalize” it (19), while reducing the 
political space available to transition away from fossil fuels.  As journalists and climate 
justice organizers Rachel Smolker and Gary Houser aptly summarize, “With the gross 
                                                                                                                                            
from the year before: “The statistics suggest the EU is still allocating too many carbon permits to enable the 
system to work properly.” 
26 Lohmann, 73.  With regard to the climate bill that passed the House in 2009 and died in the Senate in 
2010, Tokar writes, “some 7,400 facilities across this country would be given annual allowances to 
continue emitting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.  As many as 85 percent of the allowances 
would initially be given to polluting companies for free, reversing Obama’s campaign pledge that they 
should mainly be auctioned off” [“Cap(italize),” 2]. 
27 Chapter 4, “Offsets—The fossil economy’s new arena of conflict” (219-328) in Carbon Trading: A 
Critical Conversation on Climate, Privatisation and Power offers an unsettling array of tragic stories from 
around the world that illustrate both the ineffectiveness of schemes to offset carbon, as well as the human 
injustices and ecological devastation they can cause. 
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inequities that leave billions starving in dire poverty, while a small portion of humanity 
gobbles resources and spews greenhouse gases, it seems unlikely that marketing carbon 
will resolve the problems” (1). 
To cite one illustration of injustice caused by carbon trading (among many similar 
global stories), in “Who Pays for the Kyoto Protocol?” feminist sociologist Ana Isla 
argues that Costa Rica’s economic vulnerability combined with its rich rainforests made 
it a particularly attractive locale for Norway, Canada, Japan, Holland, Mexico, and 
Germany to compensate for over-emitting by purchasing carbon sink credits there.  But in 
the process of revaluing and redesigning Costa Rica’s rainforests as lucrative parks—or 
“oxygen generating machines”—entire communities of campesino/as (peasant farmers) 
were evicted from their homes.  Now “violently displaced” by the global carbon market, 
Isla documents how rural women were forced to prostitute themselves in cities in order to 
earn all or part of their living (210).  As can be seen from Isla’s perspective, Costa Rica 
has experienced violent exacerbation of social inequalities, poverty, and human 
suffering—part of the hidden tragedy of carbon trading. 
Another example of how market logic circumscribes climate policy involves the 
2°C benchmark to which the G8 “historically” agreed upon in 2009.  As feminist 
geographer Joni Seager reveals in “Death by Degrees” (2009), this target was established 
not according to ecological or even scientific logic, but rather by economic rationale.  
Though 2°C has become an “iconic goal in the global climate policy arena” (Seager, 12), 
there is little agreement, let alone research, among scientists as to how such a benchmark 
could be quantified, and only erroneous association of this benchmark with the UNFCCC 
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or IPCC recommendations (12-13).  As Seager explains, 2°C of global warming is not a 
real geophysical threshold:  
“It does not mark a boundary between little and much danger.  It does not 
demarcate a known tipping point, below which there is minimal threat to the 
world’s ecosystems and human populations, above which the danger is 
remarkably higher.   In reality, climate science is unable to make such fine 
distinctions; in reality, geophysical systems do not work that way.  In truth, 2° 
represents a notional point on a spectrum of…consequences…between ‘likely to 
be quite bad’ and ‘likely to be really catastrophic’.” (14) 
 
 Instead, 2°C is “patently a political target” based on the 1979 economic modeling 
of economist William Nordhaus, who merely speculated about the financial trade-offs of 
climate mitigation (Seager, 13).  Discussion of “trade-offs” aside (climate justice 
advocates dispute the ability for economists to accurately weigh and quantify social and 
environmental costs), this finding demonstrates that Nordhaus’ speculation framed 
climate change discourse from the get-go.  “[C]onstructed ideologically in the service of 
distinctive interests” (14), it was determined that a two-degree rise in Earth’s temperature 
would definitively bring global warming “‘home’ to the rich world” (16), for it indicates 
a rough point at which “truly global changes (ocean current shifts, rapid ice sheet 
melting)  will supersede regionally manifested ones and, [at which] temperate-latitude 
impacts, such as increased hurricane intensity in the US, are predicted to accelerate” (16).  
Only at or over this threshold where climate change (supposedly) becomes catastrophic, 
would the G8 apparently consider climate change mitigation a reasonable cost worth 
financing. 
Indeed, there are a plethora of larger concerns ignored in the near-exclusive 
adherence to market capitalism in order to confront climate change.  Climate justice 
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advocates demand more effective market approaches, like setting strict caps on 
emissions, avoiding the commodification of carbon through trading altogether, and taxing 
corporations directly rather than setting targets per country, both for production—
wherever their facilities are located—and for transport (Shiva, “Injustice,” 2).  Revenues 
from these taxes could then be returned equitably to citizens in order to finance climate 
adaptation and mitigation (ibid). At the same time, as Gore advocates throughout Our 
Choice, governments must provide incentives for businesses to invest in, develop, and/or 
retrofit their industries with clean, renewable energy.   
On an international scale, feminist environmentalists and climate justice 
advocates like Shiva remind us that mandating emissions levels per nation, as The Kyoto 
Protocol does, may prove to be a flawed approach because citizens do not contribute 
equally to carbon pollution.  In a globalized economy, carbon is emitted unevenly, with 
certain nations, like China, maintaining a disproportionate number of pollutive facilities 
owned by corporations in other nations, like the U.S., who outsource their industries and 
labor.  Likewise, certain nations produce a disproportionate amount of goods and 
resources for export on international markets.  Much of China’s carbon emissions, for 
example, should therefore be counted as the U.S.’s (“Injustice,” 2).  Such redistribution 
of burdens and responsibility should also extend to nations largely responsible for over-
consuming atmospheric space, by compensating those most vulnerable to climate 
catastrophes via “climate debt” reparations.28  In sum, though some extremely strident 
                                                
28 Climate reparations are demanded on two levels: 1) in order to address historical injustices associated 
with inequitable industrialization and climate change, originating in the genocide of indigenous nations, 
transatlantic slave trade, colonial era, and invasions (Klimaforum People’s Declaration, 5), and 2) in order 
to address the inequitable consumption of atmospheric space by wealthy nations and industries, and the 
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economic responses will be crucial, the words of Joni Seager are instructive: “This…is a 
good moment to be especially critical about the siren song of the ‘markets’ and to be 
especially cautious about the wisdom of using a market-based approach to solve 
problems that market-based approaches have caused” (19). 
Global Management Solutions 
The final major limitation with each of the six main contemporary attempts at 
forestalling climate change is that they champion elitist leadership, rather than 
democratically designed solutions.  Whether intentional or not, the manner in which 
climate change is framed only elevates certain leaders (elected U.S. officials and U.N. 
Ambassadors), upholds Northern scientists and policymakers as the valid “knowers,” and 
reinforces paternalism via the maintenance of unequal social statuses (there are either 
active players in climate politics or passive victims).  In this manner, global citizens are 
effectively funneled toward “the only reasonable solution”: one definition of climate 
change exists, few alternatives are reasonable or realistic, and a handful of privileged 
leaders utilizing a narrow repertoire of ideas will guide us out of climate chaos. 
An example that reflects the management style of the six climate change 
responses in question lies in Gore’s promotion of a “Global Marshall Plan” in An 
Inconvenient Truth.29  This scheme is inspired by the U.S.’s Marshall plan of 1947, which 
offered Western Europe emergency economic relief as well as long-term structural 
reorientation in order to grow their economy, and ultimately, create a capitalist-
                                                                                                                                            
concurrent uneven distribution of climate change’s adverse affects on impoverished nations or communities 
(1, 5). 
29 Gore explains his Global Marshall Plan in greater detail in his former publication, Earth in the Balance 
(1992).   
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democratic bloc robust enough to fend off the spread of communism (Earth, 296).  In this 
tradition, Gore suggests a “Global Marshall Plan” to unite the entire world under one 
regulatory climate policy, by controlling population growth,30 channeling efforts into 
technical fixes, and setting global standards for ecological economic value, regulatory 
frameworks on environmental matters, and environmental education (Luke, 1812).31  For 
those suspicious of Gore’s endeavors, like professor of political science Timothy Luke, 
this plan fuels his fear that Gore advocates launching “a new ‘planetary ethic’ for 
managing the entire planet from the United States of America for maximum ecological 
and economic sustainability” (ibid).32    
 The myopic focus on market-based solutions coming from the most powerful 
leaders in the world give cause for concern that national and international climate change 
policy efforts can become yet further instances of neocolonial management schemes, this 
time on a planetary scale.  For, as Seager reminds us, to the G8 nations, “climate change 
is not yet a threat in their own backyard, or they believe it is not” (15).  She writes, 
“Many ecosystems and peoples will hit limits to adaptation long before 2°C, and some 
                                                
30 Regarding this particular recommendation of Gore’s, it is worth mentioning that for many years, 
numerous feminists have criticized appeals for population control by environmentalists.  Wary of the ways 
in which women—especially impoverished women of color in the Global South—are often blamed by first-
world environmental advocacy groups “overpopulating the Earth” and who thus become targets for racist 
fertility control measures [for more, see Seager, “Rachel Carson,” (966-969)].  Such measures not only 
distract from the true culprits of global resource depletion—over-consumptive, wealthy nations—while 
masking underlying the underlying systems that perpetuate high birth rates in the first place: poverty, 
sexism, and lack of education and health care.  Global high fertility is a myth, as Betsy Hartmann points out 
in “The Great Distraction: ‘Overpopulation’ is Back in Town,” actually only persisting today in a few 
nations due to deep class and gender inequities.   
31 See Gore, Earth in the Balance, Chapter 15: “A Global Marshall Plan,” 295-360.  
32 This comment was made specifically with regard to Gore’s Alliance for Climate Protection, which Luke 
uses to illustrate “envirocratic” networks.  According to him, they unite liberal capitalists [corporate elites, 
policymakers, and mainstream Western environmental NGO heads] who have a mutual interest in coping 
with ecological collapse, “but still turn a profit, stay in power, and dominate the debate” (Luke, 1812). 
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already have” (15).  In light of this reality, it seems dually unjust to ignore the insights 
and leadership of communities and nations affected first and foremost. 
 Many of those insights and appeals to leadership are encapsulated in the 
Klimaforum People’s Declaration, “System Change, Not Climate Change” (2009).  
Signed by more than 500 organizations and influenced by the participation of over 50,000 
members of civil society who gathered in Copenhagen for the Klimaforum People’s 
Summit, the declaration embodies a counter-discourse produced to influence the UN 
COP15’s Copenhagen Accord.33  Numerous demands against “closed groups of powerful 
countries,” “unequal access and control over the planet’s limited resources,” and “neo-
colonial suppression of southern peoples, denying them rightful ownership and control of 
their resources”34 permeate the declaration.  Likewise, time and again, signatories 
advocate civil societies’ right to food sovereignty, to determine their own economies and 
systems of agriculture, to make use of local knowledge and appropriate technologies, as 
well as democratic ownership and control of their economies and energy grids.  Further, 
signatories demand power in shaping the definitional and responsive parameters of 
climate change.  For example, voices “from below”35—the global South, radical 
                                                
33 The Klimaforum09, which became the single largest gathering of climate justice advocates to date, took 
place in Copenhagen, Denmark from December 7 to 18, 2009 in order to provide an inclusive, alternative 
forum to the UNFCCC COP15.  With the help of hundreds of volunteers, events included lectures, panels 
and debates, poster presentations, industrial exhibitions, artwork displays, films, musical concerts, protest-
planning, and collective meals.  It brought together great minds and world leaders, such as Vandana Shiva, 
Wangari Maathai, Bill McKibben, Maldives President Mohammed Nasheed, Naomi Klein, and Nnimmo 
Bassey.  Over this period of two weeks, participation in drafting the Klimaforum People’s Declaration was 
solicited by anyone who so desired.  On December 18, 2009, “System Change, Not Climate Change,” was 
presented by Mathilde Kaalund-Jørgensen and Juan N. Rojas to the UNFCCC Plenary and distributed. 
34 Klimaforum People’s Declaration, 2. 
35 Writers and signatories of The Klimaforum People’s Declaration identify in this manner (using as well 
such signifiers as “the periphery,” “the people,” and “marginalized”) (Preamble), further specifying their 
diverse, yet structurally disenfranchised, makeup across ages, genders, ethnicities, faiths, communities, and 
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environmentalisms, grassroots organizations, indigenous perspectives—often advocate 
strategies that fall outside the framework of global management solutions, like 
community gardens, market, farm, and energy co-ops, or fair trade.  They may also 
suggest ideas that directly confront capitalism and government, such as boycotts, strict 
corporate regulations, civil disobedience, property damage, or violence—unspeakable 
actions when elite policymakers circumscribe climate change.36  By consequence, the 
very diverse ideas necessary to ensuring an inclusive, democratic, and contextualized 
response to climate change are written out.     
 Nationalizing and globalizing environmentalisms do hold the potential for 
comprehensive solutions, as ecofeminist Noël Sturgeon admits.37  Yet she cautions that 
they often impose policies and practices on people less powerful (106).  Feminist 
geographer Rachel Slocum agrees: “Having something in common is important; claiming 
too much in common erases differences” (433).  Even under the guise of conservation, 
sustainable development, fair trade, or Green Revolution,38 such undemocratic schemes 
have historically resulted in political suppression, toxic lands, water, air, and/or food, and 
                                                                                                                                            
nationalities as workers, peasants, fisher folks, indigenous peoples, people of color, small-scale farmers, 
and urban and rural social groups. 
36 I find Cuomo’s philosophical perspective especially useful when considering the ethics of engaging in 
illegal activity in response to climate inaction: “When a serious harm is at stake it may even be excusable to 
use otherwise ethically questionable means to try to mend the situation.  For instance, if you accidentally 
poison my dog with a concoction whose antidote is possessed only by you, yet you refuse to give me the 
antidote, it would arguably be permissible for me to steal the antidote from you to save my dog” (705-6). 
37 The universally ratified Montreal Protocol of 1987, which aimed to phase out the use of ozone-depleting 
chemicals such as CFCs, exemplifies this: today CFC use is down ninety-percent (McDonnell).   
38 For land not prized as pristine, “sustainable development” too often takes the form of Western corporate 
domination in developing countries.  Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, it became the normalized agenda 
for reconciling economic development with environmental protection (Tokar, Earth for Sale, 170), 
typically seen when Western corporations “transform undeveloped poverty into developed poverty” (169) 
by exploiting their natural resources, labor standards, and economic powerlessness.  See also Vandana 
Shiva’s Staying Alive (1988) for a similar argument regarding the Green Revolution (1-2), or Nalini 
Nayak’s “Development for Some is Violence for Others” (109-120) on “sustainable development.” 
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loss of land ownership, control of resources, and cultural knowledge.  Thus, it is not 
hegemonic leadership, but powerful coalitions at local and global scales that will be 
necessary to see us through a planetary calamity.  
Taken together, the brand of environmentalism championed by these acts, 
international treaties and agreements, and popular media amounts to what Luke calls 
“sustainable degradation,” a form of environmentalism that is thoroughly entrenched in 
capitalist values, creating products and policies tied to “greener growth, not necessarily 
truly green growth; a cleaner environment, not a really clean environment; individual 
choice, not collective institutional transformation; and painless consumer changes…as 
new principles for living, not burdensome producer regulation” (1819).  Through these 
channels, our politicians and ambassadors narrowly delimit which interpretations of 
climate change are speakable, and set the boundary between possible and impossible 
action.   
Equipped with the analytical tools that enable us to recognize the dangerous 
predicament world leaders have placed us in, feminist environmentalists and climate 
justice advocates work toward robust, resilient modes of ecological living.  These camps 
have developed three main strategies for bringing the existence and precarious plight of 
nonhumans and marginalized peoples into focus.  They demonstrate which policies, 
assumptions, actors, and perspectives—often masked as they are under the guise of 
progress, sustainability, and democracy—need to be resisted.  Enacting the alternatives 
they envision—a) collective, not individualist, action; b) strict market reform as well as 
bold alternatives to market-based solutions; and c) situated, pluralist, grassroots, truly 
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democratic leadership, participation, and collaboration in climate change responses—
could be the key to ensuring the entire planet’s thrivability.  Through powerful critiques 
as well as the alternative visions for a collective future embodied in the antithesis of 
conventional approaches to climate change, feminist environmentalisms and climate 
justice advocates promote the twin objectives of ecological livability—that is, 
“survivability” and “thrivability”—simultaneously. 
 
Lessons on Livability in REDD+ and Beyond 
In transitioning from the critiques and arguments posed here to upcoming 
discussions on ecological restoration, I close this chapter by considering another 
touchstone in conventional climate change politics enacted between The End of Nature 
and Eaarth: the UN-REDD Programme.  I select REDD not because it represents a stark 
alternative to the aforementioned “insufficient frameworks,” but because it embodies an 
ambiguously beneficial attempt to apply ecological restoration on a planetary scale in 
order to mitigate global emissions.  That is, by certain interpretations, REDD is merely 
another business-as-usual scheme that has clearly emerged from the kinds of 
individualist, market-based, and globally-managed responses to climate change 
familiarized by our media, elected officials, and businesspeople, and by consequence, it 
cannot promote ecological livability.  Yet by other estimates, REDD is appreciated for 
the enormous potential it holds to mitigate climate-changing emissions while delivering 
other beneficial ecosystem services and economic opportunities for developing nations.  
Utilizing the feminist environmental justice analyses that enabled my earlier conclusions, 
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this discussion teases apart some of REDD’s benefits from its drawbacks, while 
considering the extent to which it can enable ecological livability.  
The United Nations Environment Programme developed a plan during the 2005 
UNFCCC entitled Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation 
(REDD), during which the Coalition for Rainforest Nations proposed that there be 
incentives for countries to control emissions by reducing deforestation (Allison, 104; 
Erazo).  Through agricultural and cattle pasture expansion, development, and logging, 
deforestation and forest degradation are major contributors to climate change, accounting 
for 20% of global greenhouse gases (UN-REDD).39  Launched in 2008 and involving 
fifty-three countries, REDD is an offset program wherein polluters can purchase carbon 
credits generated by governments, companies, and communities for protecting or creating 
forests elsewhere (ibid).  According to the UN, “financial value” is created for carbon 
stored in forests, and incentives are offered to developing countries to secure those forests 
in order to reduce global emissions (ibid).  From this description alone, questions arise 
about the trustworthiness such a globally managed, market-based program can inspire 
among forest-dependent communities.  How are the financial values for forests and forest 
services, like capturing carbon, determined, and by whom?  And how do those values 
compare to the value placed on the continuation of business-as-usual carbon emissions?  
While ecological restoration is not explicitly mentioned in the framework, 
funding for forest restoration is made possible with the inclusion of “sustainable 
management” and “carbon-stock enhancement” language (Alexander et. al., 683), so 
                                                
39 This amounts to more than the entire global transportation sector and is second only to the energy sector 
(UN-REDD). 
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restorationists have generally approached REDD with enthusiasm.  According to 
Alexander et. al., over one billion hectares [an area larger than Canada (Allison, 104)] of 
formerly forested lands, or 6% of Earth’s total landmass, are presently suitable for 
restoration (685).  If enacted, REDD could have enormous potential to secure extremely 
effective carbon sinks: by 2030, this amount of restored land could sequester 140 
GtCO2e.40  To put this in perspective, in 2000, greenhouse gas emissions were estimated 
at 42 GtCO2e (685).  REDD represents the single greatest opportunity ecological 
restoration has ever been afforded to improve ecosystems around the world.  Especially 
on a planet of rapidly changing natures, how should restoration be performed, at what 
scale, and by whom?   
It is clear from these facts that in forested ecosystems around the globe, ecological 
restoration can be of major assistance with climate change mitigation and adaptation 
while providing other tangible biosocial benefits.  This is perhaps most true of locales in 
dire need of assistance; marginal, low-productive lands and communities stand to gain 
the most from restorative efforts, for these “will almost certainly return many more 
ecosystem services than just carbon sequestration and will benefit large numbers of 
species, not just the trees being promoted as living carbon stores” (Allison, 104).  
Furthermore, the UN-estimated $30 billion a year North-South flow of funds could mean 
multiple advantages for recipients, including economic development, biodiversity 
conservation, and the protection of ecosystem services among the world’s most 
marginalized nations (Erazo).  This flow of funds is substantial, but in order for benefits 
to be sustained, funding patterns must also promote financial parity among Northern and 
                                                
40 That is, 140 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent. 
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Southern nations.  How can funding be allocated in order to redistribute (and equalize) 
climate-related vulnerabilities and resiliencies between hemispheres? 
However, since 2005, indigenous and affected peoples throughout the world have 
been skeptical about how the REDD program will impact local ownership and 
management of forests, a topic that speaks to earlier critiques of globally-managed 
climate change solutions.  Even according to the UN, the stakes are high for these groups: 
“The rural poor are particularly dependent on forest resources. As many as 300 million 
people, most of them very poor, depend substantially on forest ecosystems for their 
subsistence and survival.  The 60 million indigenous people who live in forest areas are 
especially dependent on forest resources and the health of forest ecosystems” (UN-
REDD).  There are fears that in the interest of gaining sometimes desperately-needed 
financial boosts as well as opportunities for employment, national governments who have 
partnered with REDD will not be inclined to appreciate the interests and concerns of local 
stakeholders (Erazo).  Inadequate governance of REDD projects could result in short-
term gains for a few public and private stakeholders with vested economic interests, 
rather than long-term gains for ecosystems and communities (Alexander et. al, 684).  
Already, rising land values associated with this recently opened carbon market have 
“resulted in illegal land grabs, the appropriation of natural resources, reversals in land 
reform initiatives, food/water insecurity, and compromised and corrupt governance” 
(687).  There exist valid concerns, borne of experience, that REDD+ restoration will 
entail the continued exploitation of Global South communities, mirroring the Kyoto 
Protocol-induced displacement and impoverishment of Costa Rican campesino/as, for 
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example.  Fears expressed, especially by Global South groups, reflect the major 
evaluative impetus of feminist environmental justice: which natures will be livable, and 
for whom? 
To help address these problems, a new version of REDD known as REDD+ was 
approved at the 2009 15th UNFCCC in Copenhagen (Allison, 105).  The plus sign “is 
intended to highlight the…importance of paying attention to the needs of local 
communities” (Erazo).  Needs may include provisions for promoting economic 
opportunities for local stakeholders, such as hiring local, indigenous people to monitor 
and manage REDD+ projects, but this is not specified by the UN.  As Allison argues, 
REDD+ does not explain how economic opportunities will, or even should, be enacted 
(105).  While it is notable and laudable that the UN recognizes how connected the well 
being of indigenous peoples is to the health of their environments, without policy 
safeguards in place that spell out how affected peoples will be involved in the funding 
and management of related programs, the extent to which REDD+ can be trusted to 
promote ecological livability is dubious. 
Furthermore, as Dennis Martinez, the founder and chair of the SER Indigenous 
People’s Restoration Network explains, even if indigenous stakeholders are hired to 
manage and monitor REDD+ lands, REDD+ still does not specify that they can continue 
owning and using their lands.  Without securing this important policy, indigenous peoples 
could be prevented from maintaining their homes, cultures, and lifestyles (Allison, 105).  
The International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change summarizes these 
concerns in an indisputably critical stance:  
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REDD/ REDD+ will not benefit Indigenous Peoples, but in fact will result in 
more violations of Indigenous Peoples’ rights. It will increase the violation of our 
human rights, our rights to our lands, territories and resources, steal our land, 
cause forced evictions, prevent access and threaten indigenous agricultural 
practices, destroy biodiversity and cultural diversity, and cause social conflicts. 
(Erazo) 
 
It bears noting that so many people around the world object to a multi-national effort 
that stands to make an enormous contribution to mitigating the effects of climate 
change—certainly a goal that most indigenous groups themselves promote.  But in 
learning from situated knowledges and the importance of appreciating “nature’s 
publics,” their concerns should invite considerable deliberation.  What can UN-REDD+ 
learn from critiques of, and objections to, this program?  And how can those critiques be 
transformed into policy initiatives that deliver trustworthy benefits to indigenous 
communities while safeguarding their forests? 
 It must be recognized, however, that certain other indigenous peoples and 
organizations take a generally pro-REDD+ stance.  For example, the Confederation of 
Indigenous Organizations of the Amazon (COICA), a transnational indigenous rights 
organization coordinating efforts by indigenous federations in nine Amazonian nations, 
has partnered with multiple REDD+ parties.  Their first REDD+ project, as recounted by 
Erazo, was a collaborative effort between the U.S. Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) 
and Woods Hole Research Center.  In it, indigenous Ecuadoran Amazonians were trained 
to measure carbon storage potential in standing forests.  In the words of Chris Meyer, 
project coordinator of the Amazon Basin for EDF: 
Instead of having outsiders come in and measure the carbon in the community's 
trees, indigenous communities can measure it themselves, earn good wages, and 
learn to value another resource in their forests: carbon. … The training workshop, 
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which has been adapted for numerous other indigenous groups in the Amazon 
Basin, teaches and empowers indigenous people with technical skills needed for 
measuring carbon trapped in forests, like using a GPS to find specific coordinates; 
measuring out a 40 x 40 meter “parcel” of forest; and measuring the diameter of 
each tree in that area … indigenous peoples with forest carbon measuring skills 
will be able to generate not only good jobs for locals based on conservation, but 
also generate important information regarding the amount of carbon in their lands 
that will help them make better land management—and  conservation—decisions 
for the future. (Erazo) 
 
From this description, it appears quite possible that indigenous groups like the COICA 
can “[tap] into international concerns about the environment to obtain benefits for 
[themselves]” (Erazo).  Yet how far this kind of short-term employment and specialized 
training work can take people and ecologies is another concern about how well REDD+ 
can sustainably meet the needs of planetary carbon sequestration as well as foster long-
term indigenous well being.  How can the successes enjoyed by REDD+ recipients be 
capitalized upon and expanded into the future, even after forests have been restored, 
stabilized, and secured?  Should REDD+ include a transition plan involving funding, 
education, and/or employment assistance to be utilized for affected stakeholders after 
forests are restored? 
 In most cases, by stewarding their lands for generations and sometimes centuries, 
local and indigenous communities not only benefit their own peoples and ecosystems, but 
also benefit the rest of the world.  In fact, as Alexander et. al. report, “empirical evidence 
suggests community-managed forests are subjected to less degradation than other 
management schemes” (687).  A comparative study discussed by Allison supports this 
claim: “local, indigenous people were as accurate as professionals” (105).  Improving the 
lives of forest-dwellers who are, or may be, recipients of REDD+ funding will thus be 
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crucial to the long-term success of programs like REDD+.  Herein lies a lesson of 
intersectionality and environmental justice: the well being of the environment and its 
peoples cannot be distinguished.  Should REDD+ funds also be allocated, then, toward 
improving the lives of local stakeholders at socio-political levels, when necessary? 
But in order for REDD+ to be ecologically effective and socially just, it must 
safeguard the land tenure of local communities and gain their full, voluntary participation 
(Alexander et. al., 687; Allison, 105).  Funding must actually reach the communities and 
landholders, who should also have a say in allocating those funds and designing 
restorative projects.  Transparency and communication between policy makers, scientists, 
and laypeople is necessary.  And perhaps most importantly, programs like REDD+ 
cannot be relied upon as exclusive efforts to mitigate climate-changing emissions.  
Indeed, a generalized and encompassing objection to REDD/+, which speaks to previous 
critiques of individualist and market-based solutions in this chapter, is that it provides 
little incentive for corporations and governments to reduce carbon emissions.  In fact, 
since it may cost less in many cases to subsidize forest preservation/restoration than 
reduce emissions, REDD+ could actually create a disincentive for reducing emissions at 
their source.  Thus far, most nations have shown little interest in regulating greenhouse 
gases through high levies (Allison 105-106), but quite a bit of effort in offering 
individualist (non)solutions to citizens who are defined as consumers, thus solidifying the 
continuation of business-as-usual politics and economies.  The UN recognizes this 
dilemma when they write, “The implementation of REDD+ must co-exist with significant 
emission reductions in both developed and developing countries if we hope to curb 
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climate change (UN-REDD).  The cost of releasing greenhouse gases will therefore have 
to “increase via taxes or fines to the point that achieving actual reductions in emissions 
becomes more cost-effective than continuing to release carbon while paying for carbon 
sequestration elsewhere,” as Allison argues (105-106).  By consequence, production and 
consumption patterns in the lifestyle practices of individuals residing in wealthy nations 
will have to shift; for example, no longer will Americans be able to feel self-assured in 
their environmentalism by buying their way through climate change, and no longer will 
overly-consumptive lifestyles be possible.  At least as much effort, deliberation, and 
funding—if not more—should be focused upon transforming the practices that input 
carbon and other greenhouse gases into our shared atmosphere, as is spent upon end-of-
pipe solutions such as REDD+. 
 In light of this discussion, it is clear that any planetary initiative to curb emissions 
will have to do so with the full participation of the community members each program 
effects.  There is nothing inherently wrong with developing and implementing climate 
mitigation, adaptation, or remediation strategies at large scales; indeed, wide-scale efforts 
and sizable funding are exactly what is needed now.  Problems develop when programs—
whether large or small scale—foreclose collective, non-market, participatory initiatives 
(although this is much easier to control at small scale).  Because, as Butler reminds us, 
vulnerability is distributed in radically different ways around the world (24), any 
program, on any scale, will have to be responsive to the contextualized needs of every 
biosocial community. 
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According to Allison, “In the twenty-first century, ecological restoration will be 
increasingly important as a tool to mitigate and repair the damage due to global climate 
change” (104).  But while REDD+ exemplifies a noteworthy attempt at initiating 
ecological restoration and all of the benefits it can deliver, it may simultaneously 
exacerbate the precariousness of lives already made vulnerable by climate change.  As 
the following chapter will explain, how restoration is conceived, what it is intended to 
accomplish, and for whom it should benefit, will be crucial considerations for using 
restoration toward the ends of social justice and ecology.   Justice-oriented restoration, I 
will argue, may present both a trustworthy alternative to projects like REDD+, as well as 
a possible model for recipients of REDD+ to enact, because it embodies the antithesis of 
conventional approaches to climate change.  In so doing, it enables the life chances and 
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Chapter Three 
Restoration’s “Return”: 
Toward Justice-Oriented Ecological Restoration 
 
 
Introducing Ecological Restoration 
 Can ecological restoration be faithfully aligned with a material feminist politics of 
nature?  And if so, might restoration then constitute a compelling method of feminist 
environmental justice?41  As the following chapter details, answering both questions in 
the positive hinges upon a qualitatively different approach to restoration than typically 
conceived.  This approach is made possible by the contradictions that lie at the heart of 
restoration’s identity, contradictions that threaten its trustworthiness as an arbiter for 
naturalcultural sustainability, and by consequence, its efficacy.  In this chapter, I explore 
these contradictions in order to demonstrate to restorationists that they can—and ought to 
want to—contribute to feminist environmental justice, and to those concerned with 
feminist environmental justice that restorationists have something to contribute. 
                                                
41 I highlight material feminism and distinguish it from feminist environmental justice in order to do justice 
to the distinct contribution material feminism makes in deconstructing the material/discursive dichotomy 
that underpins the nonhuman/human dichotomy.  As discussed in Chapter One, “material feminisms” 
critique postmodern feminism’s reliance on the discursive, and deconstruct the material/discursive 
dichotomy and develop theories that “productively account for the agency, semiotic force, and dynamics of 
bodies and natures” (Alaimo & Hekman, 6).  Without privileging any of these elements, material feminists 
“explore the interaction of culture, history, discourse, technology, biology, and the ‘environment’” (7; my 
emphasis).  A politics of nature informed by material feminism, then, is one wherein nature—and all kinds 
of animate creatures and inanimate forces—are alternately (and often simultaneously) agentic and 
influenced by humans and culture. 
Whereas some feminisms and environmental justice theories promote notions of justice, equality, 
and wellbeing by advocating for expanded definitions of “the human,” thus buttressing human/nonhuman 
binaries, material feminisms contribute to feminist environmental justice by acknowledging that because 
“the human” has always been defined in ways that exclude or marginalize other humans, refusing to draw 
sharp lines between the human and nonhuman also resists human oppression of other humans, without 
reinscribing the human/nonhuman binary.   
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 Another argument running throughout this project is that restoration historically 
involves some degree of “return”—that is, returning a site to a previous state of 
ecological function—but the kind of “return” I promote implies a “turning” toward a 
future where creatively restored ecologies may or may not incorporate historical 
precedent and also function with the possibility for human use and interaction.  Such a 
creative vision is, for better and for worse, now demanded of restorationists—as well as 
the rest of us—by climate change.   So, while my vision of a future restoration will 
indeed entail a “return” to function, it may not always entail methods, actors, and 
approaches that are typical in projects and theorizations of conventional restoration.  
Instead, because our natures are under such an extreme amount of climate-related stress, 
standard restoration models may no longer be relevant.  These novel situations could be 
harnessed toward novel creations, making a space work for multiple and diverse human 
and nonhuman stakeholders.  This chapter demonstrates how an approach to restoration 
informed by material feminist and feminist environmental justice perspectives could 
optimize some degree of resolution to the challenge of climate change. 
 Conventional Ecological Restoration 
Conventional ecological restoration is the intentional, sustained attempt by 
humans to compensate for damaging influences (usually pollution, development, and—as 
I will discuss further in this chapter—invasive species42) on an ecosystem, and manage it 
                                                
42 Ecologists define invasives as “plants, animals, or pathogens that proliferate, spread, and persist to the 
detriment of the environment” (Williams, 156).  They typically exhibit high reproductivity and tolerance to 
stress (161), due in large part to the fact that in a nonnative setting, they no longer have predators or 
pathogens to keep them in check (160).  New climate and terrain may be more conducive to their 
proliferation (160).  The most successful invasives also have the ability to hybridize (160).  Finally, the 
most common trait of invasives is their preference to proliferate in disturbed soil (151).  Beginning in the 
colonial era and continuing today, razed forests, large animal grazing, Western agriculture, natural resource 
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for desired qualities.43  Though “desired qualities” may vary, restorationists traditionally 
strive to manage an ecosystem toward self-sustenance and homoeostasis by ensuring that 
species with a long coevolutionary history on each site can thrive.44  In response to 
degradation or species loss, restorationists guide ecosystems within what is called a 
“historical range of variability” (HRV) so that they may resume behaving as if 
disturbance never occurred.  Gauged via observance and records, HRV guides 
restorationists to distinguish “normal” changes that have been observed to endure within 
dynamic ecosystems versus changes that exceed the system enough to embody a 
significant departure from past composition and function (Allison, 90).  As biologist 
Stuart Allison puts it, “though ecosystems are dynamic and changeable, they cannot 
change too much and remain the same ecosystem.  At some point, extreme change must 
lead to the formation of a new type of ecosystem” (90).   
                                                                                                                                            
extraction, globalized travel and trade, and development continually feed the spread of invasives (Crosby, 
151).  And the transcontinental horticulture trade, which involves nurseries, botanical gardens, and 
individual gardeners, ensures a steady supply of escaped nonnative plant species (157).    
According to naturalist David Williams, “after habitat destruction, invasives cause more harm to 
natives than any other major threats such as pollution, disease, or overharvesting.  They alter habitat, drive 
native species to extinction, reduce water supplies, and threaten agriculture.  A 2000 study placed the 
annual economic cost of invasive species in the United States at $137 billion” (156).  Consequently, 
conservation biologists say we are living in an age of extinction, “the most lethal one since the time of the 
dinosaurs” (Hall, xi).  Thus, it is unlikely that biodiversity will recover from today’s extinctions (Williams, 
166).  
43 For other, similar definitions, see Gobster: “[The 1998 International Symposium on Society and 
Resource Management attendees] defined restoration as ‘intentional human practices to actively manage 
areas for their desired natural qualities’”) (11), and Jordan: “everything we do to a landscape or an 
ecosystem in an ongoing attempt to compensate for novel or ‘outside’ influences on it in such a way that it 
can continue to behave or can resume behaving as if these were not present” (Sunflower, 22). 
44 Aspects of this definition are derived from Bratton, who writes: “‘A common implicit goal of ecological 
restoration is to restore a self-sustaining, homeostatic system whose component species have a long 
coevolutionary history.’  One could thus define an ecosystem once ‘sick’ but now restored to ‘health’ as: 
self-replicating or self-sustaining; characterized by or developing toward homeostasis (perhaps undergoing 
repeated disturbance but returning to a similar state); having biotic components that are interrelated and 
occur in established associations” (58). 
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Yet while “restore” commonly implies a return to an original, the term is said to 
bely the essence of this field, which does not aim to arrest change or recreate a replica of 
its historic past, as if an original ecology ever existed.45  Rather, in recognition that 
ecologies are always in flux, restorative processes aim to redirect an ecological system 
using the past as a guide—in order to set it in motion again—so that it acts as it did 
before the novel introduction(s) (Jordan, Sunflower, 21-22), that is, when a multitude of 
place-specific actors depended upon one another to flourish in an intricate, dynamic and 
diverse system. 
To redirect a site, restorationists employ a variety of methods: they eliminate 
invasive species via weeding, setting landscapes on fire, introducing benign species to 
control the invasives, and/or chemically treating them with pesticides or growth 
inhibitors; they reintroduce native species via planting or gathering and disseminating 
seeds; they prevent soil erosion through plantings, tree and fabric staking, or invasive 
removals; they re-meander channelized streams and rivers by destroying dams or 
concrete channels, re-plumbing landscapes, closing ditches, or moving rocks and land; 
and they replenish soil health by adding nutrients, fungi, other organic matter, compost, 
and/or mulch.  Restorationists may scuba dive under water to fasten plants and coral with 
metal staples (Jordan, Sunflower, 11).  They may probe a former farm field with metal 
stakes in order to locate and break drainage tile that prevents a watershed from draining 
adequately (12).  They may plant hundreds of different species, or perhaps hundreds of 
                                                
45 As Jordan argues, “restoration as I define it is not about a return to an Edenic ‘nature’ outside history.  It 
is about the recreation and maintenance of historic landscapes defined in ecological terms, with or without 
reference to the ambiguous and in many ways problematic ideas of ‘nature’ or ‘natural’ or ‘native’ 
ecosystems” (Sunflower, 24). 
  65 
just one or two species.  They may disassemble stone fences, scattering rocks according 
to glacial precedent (12).  In “the spirit of…act[ing] in concert with [the forces of 
nature],” restorationists may also employ such potentially controversial methods as 
reintroducing droughts, diseases, insects, floods, or predators (28).  They may enlist the 
help of nonhuman creatures, some native, some nonnative—bison in prairies, birds and 
insects in forests—in order to control invasive plants or animals, restore soil nutrients, or 
disseminate beneficial seeds (12).  And sometimes, they simply wait to take advantage of 
nature’s disruptive forces, as when Hurricane Andrew swept away invasive plants from 
southern Florida, “clearing the ecological slate for the reintroduction of native species” 
(28).   Methodologies employed are often as unique as the landscape or waterway with 
which restorationists are working.  A site might require seasonal monitoring and tending 
over a period of many years, or a one-time intervention.  And restorationists work in a 
variety of scales, weeding and replanting every square foot of a small site, for example, 
or undertaking one generalized action at a large site, like a prairie burning, and then 
leaving it be.   According to founding restorationist William Jordan III, “Today thousands 
of projects are underway in virtually every kind of ecosystem, from tall grass prairies and 
alpine meadows to…coral reefs and tropical forests” (Sunflower, 13).   
Restorationists have undoubtedly made headway compensating for environmental 
destruction and species loss.  Over the past thirty to forty years, restoration has enabled 
near-extinct species to recover, and hundreds of thousands of woodlands, wetlands, 
prairies, and savannas to function more fully (Palamar, 285-6).  Some well known 
examples of successful restoration projects include the restoration of gray wolves in 
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Yellowstone National Park, an ongoing, multi-billion dollar restoration of the Everglades, 
the return of fire to fire-dependent ecosystems in the Northern Plains, and the removal of 
dams for the first time in history (Hettinger, 27).  More successful case studies abound 
(see the Society for Ecological Restoration’s abbreviated list for examples46), but we are 
still in the early years of restoration; only recently have quantifiable data emerged to 
judge restoration’s benefits.  Long considered a mere “act of faith on the part of nature-
lovers,” a 2009 study measured how well eighty-nine random, once degraded sites around 
the planet fared for biodiversity and ecosystem services after being restored, and 
demonstrated forty-four and twenty-five percent improvement rates, respectively 
(Borrell).  
Brief History 
 Like most other U.S. environmentalisms, restoration is rooted in the 
conservation and preservation movements of the early twentieth century (Bratton, 53).  
During this period, ensuring that native ecosystems were protected not only meant 
restoring them, but keeping people and their activities out (55; Hettinger, 27).  Historian 
Marcus Hall traces early rumblings of this ideology to the famous conservationist George 
Perkins Marsh, who incited an “important turning point” in the history of 
environmentalism with Man and Nature (1864).  It comprises “the world’s first 
comprehensive warning concerning the human propensity to degrade natural systems” 
(Hall, 6).  Whereas popular beliefs about nature up until Marsh’s publication maintained 
                                                
46 To view SER’s “Restoration Project Showcase,” visit < http://ser.org/restorations/restorations-list-view 
>. 
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that nature’s destructive forces were chiefly responsible for environmental degradation, 
Marsh placed responsibility on humans for degrading the earth (7).  
 Yet Marsh not only criticized humans’ destructive activities—a sentiment that 
would galvanize U.S. environmental movements for decades to come—he also placed 
humans at the center of responsibility for carrying out restoration (Hall, 7).  Hall argues,  
As he emphasizes in the very first sentence of this book, one of his goals was “to 
suggest the possibility and the importance of the restoration of disturbed 
harmonies.”  He elaborates that man must become a “co-worker with nature in the 
reconstruction of the damaged fabric which the negligence or the wantonness of 
former lodgers has rendered unattainable.” […]  Seeing degradation in these 
natural systems, he felt that the wisest response was to begin making reparations.  
One of his most novel assumptions was that nature by itself could not adequately 
repair damage caused by humans. (6-7)   
 
Marsh influenced some of the earliest experimenters with restoration in the U.S.  
Professor Arthur Sampson at Berkeley began teaching students about forest restoration in 
the 1920s, at about the same time that Edith Roberts and her student Margaret Shaw at 
Vassar College initiated a native species-planting project on campus, each with the goal 
of reestablishing pre-European settler conditions (Allison, 31).  Still, it is U.S. 
conservationist Aldo Leopold (1887-1948) who is usually credited with initiating 
contemporary restoration at the University of Wisconsin Madison’s arboretum, for as 
Allison argues, his revered status in the environmental movement “lends a certain staying 
power to the story” (31).  “‘The time has come,’” Leopold argued, “‘for science to busy 
itself with the earth itself.  The first step is to reconstruct a sample of what we had to 
begin with’” (Bratton, 57).  With the completion of the Civilian Conservation Corps and 
supervising ecologist Ted Sperry’s first experimental restoration project in the 1930s, 
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which transformed a former horse pasture into the prairie it once was,47 Leopold 
witnessed that first step being taken (Jordan & Lubick, 2).  Leopold also witnessed the 
failure of attempts to restore the prairie utilizing non-ecological—or in this case, 
ahistorical—methods.  The successful incorporation of historically and geographically-
accurate phenomenon, like burning, and native plant species of surrounding prairies in 
Douglas County, influenced him to develop an ethic for land management that considered 
all members of an ecosystem.  His radical “Land Ethic”48 envisioned humans as just one 
member of a vast and complex ecological community, to whom humans were responsible 
for recognizing and protecting.  This model continues to influence contemporary 
restoration, which differs from land management predating Leopold via its concern for 
biotic diversity over utility (Bratton, 57).  Still, a preservationist ideology, wherein 
humans were largely precluded from what was considered “nonhuman space” influenced 
restoration, as the 1963 Leopold Report demonstrates.  In its recommendations to the 
National Park Service, Aldo Leopold’s son, A. Starker Leopold, advises that each park be 
restored to the “‘biotic associations [and] conditions that prevailed when the area was 
first visited by the white man’” (Anderson, 335), for “‘a national park should represent a 
vignette of a primitive America’” (Hall, 185).  A year later, U.S. Congress agreed when 
asserting that protecting nature meant setting it aside in nature preserves and keeping it 
“‘untrammeled by man’” (Hettinger, 27).  Though it is important to note that “biotic 
                                                
47 For more on the prairie, named after John T. Curtis, and its history, visit UW Madison botany’s site: 
http://botany.wisc.edu/zedler/images/Leaflet_16.pdf 
48 In a series of essays compiled in A Sand County Almanac (1949), Leopold developed his “land ethic”: “A 
thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community.  It is 
wrong when it tends otherwise.”  According to Jordan, Leopold’s work has had enormous and lasting 
influence: “it inform[s] the broad mainstream of environmentalism and provide[s] the philosophical basis 
for [environmental] policies and programs” (Sunflower, 31). 
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diversity” largely continued to preclude humans during this period, Aldo Leopold did 
open the door for much greater human involvement in what was theretofore considered 
by EuroAmericans entirely nonhuman space.   
It was also at Madison’s Arboretum that UW Professors John Aber and William 
Jordan held the first international meeting on restoration in 1980.  Whereas in the 1970s, 
Jordan argues the field was universally ignored by environmentalists, considered “a 
distraction from the serious work of preservation” (Sunflower, 2),49 the science and 
practice of ecological restoration gained increasing legitimacy after this symposium.  It 
also inspired the formation of at least three cornerstones of the field: The Society for 
Ecological Restoration (SER) (est. 1988), which via publications and policy consulting 
“promote[s] ecological restoration as a means of sustaining the diversity of life on Earth 
and re-establishing an ecologically healthy relationship between nature and culture” 
(Society); the journal Ecological Restoration (est. 1981), which serves as an 
interdisciplinary forum for people to discuss all aspects of the field (Ecological); and the 
journal Restoration Ecology (est. 1993), which is published on behalf of SER, and takes 
up discussions of case studies and scientific analyses.   
While the scientific field of restoration ecology is only about thirty years old, the 
practice of restoring environments has a long and varied history that extends much 
                                                
49 Jordan argues, “Despite this history, there remains an overwhelming fact of neglect.  Environmentalism 
is, of course, a wide and diverse movement, if indeed it may be called a coherent movement at all.  And yet 
we may say that, at least until very recently, the various schools of environmental thought have to a 
considerable extent been united in their neglect of restoration, their skepticism about its value, and their 
wariness of its political implications. […]  At bottom, perhaps…is an assumption of a deep metaphysical 
distinction between nature and culture” (Jordan, “Restoration, Community, and Wilderness” (24-25, 31). 
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further than EuroAmerican conservationism and preservationism.50  That restoration has 
a past may come as a surprise, given the relatively recent history of profound 
environmental destruction.  Yet indigenous cultures around the world have practiced 
sophisticated forms of land management and permaculture for thousands of years, which 
testifies, perhaps, not so much to the historical need for ecological repair, but to the long 
history of human intervention in the environment.  In fact, most practices used by 
restoration ecologists today were employed by indigenous peoples long ago: low-
intensity burns, tilling, weeding, sewing, controlling for pests, and creating distinct 
spaces for gardens are echoed in contemporary restorative practices (Toensmeier).  Many 
of these human interventions were so seamlessly entwined with the land as to go 
undocumented in the annals of colonial history, a testament not only to settlers’ lack of 
appreciation for Native American cultures, but also to the powerful wilderness ideologies 
that would continue to influence U.S. society and environmentalism for decades to come.  
But these ideologies, which refuse to acknowledge humans’ place in nature, appear to be 
waning, as restoration’s growing popularity may indicate, along with greater 
acknowledgement of humankind’s rapidly expanding presence.  Because of both of these 
                                                
50 In “Restoration, Community, and Wilderness,” Jordan writes, “the notion of helping land recover from 
the effects of human use dates back at least to biblical times, in the fallowing of land.  The active 
rehabilitation of ecosystems was a common theme of reforestation efforts in the Middle Ages, and of the 
practice of game management and forestry since the nineteenth century.  The notion of recreating 
ecosystems for aesthetic purposes is grounded in traditions of landscape design that date back to the work 
of naturalistic landscape designers such as Capability Brown in England and Thomas Jefferson in the 
United States, and reached a high level of both achievement and self-awareness in the work of designers 
like Frederick Law Olmsted and Jens Jensen during the decades leading up to and into the twentieth 
century.  Beyond this, the practice of restoration in the fully modern sense—that is, the deliberate and 
active recreation or restoration of historic landscapes or ecosystems defined in terms of the science of 
ecology—dates back at least to the pioneering work of Edith Roberts at Vassar College during the 1920s 
and the landmark work at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Arboretum, which began a decade later” 
(23). 
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developments, Hall’s 2005 prediction, “we can expect American restorationists to begin 
inserting more culture into [eco]systems” (240) is proving quite true. 
 
Synthetic Ecology and Material Feminist Natures 
I believe Hall’s statement serves as an instructive launching point for the major 
arguments in this chapter, both from a theoretical and practical perspective, and I 
therefore employ it to segue into a discussion of restoration’s potential alliance with a 
material feminist politics of nature.  Because restoration holds to the belief that 
nonhuman nature can be created, precisely through the active interventions of human 
beings, restoration theory and practice can challenge the pessimistic, mainstream U.S. 
environmental tenet that nonhuman nature—an arena supposedly distinct from human 
society—can only be saved via “hands-off” preservation.51  In contrast, ecological 
restoration stands as a mechanism for a “hands-on” preservation, acknowledging the 
human-nonhuman interplay of every biotic system, at least to a degree that distinguishes 
it among most other traditional environmentalisms.   
Numerous material feminists concur with this viewpoint: Donna Haraway refers 
to human-nonhuman relationships theoretically as the “material-semiotic”52 and 
“naturecultures,”53 both of which describe our reality as simultaneously discursive and 
materially produced, constructed as much by the physical forces of nature as the socio-
                                                
51 Jordan makes a similar argument throughout The Sunflower Forest: Ecological Restoration and the New 
Communion with Nature (2003), which he recognizes as a “friendly critique” of U.S. environmentalism’s 
“inability to provide the basis for a satisfactory relationship between culture and nature…. In [Jordan’s] 
view…the restoration movement offers a way to correct this weakness” (8). 
52 Developed throughout Modest_Witness (1997). 
53 Developed throughout When Species Meet (2008). 
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political forces of culture.  Her theoretical subjects—the cyborg or companion species—
aim to illustrate the “leaky distinctions” between machine, human, and nonhuman, due to 
humankind’s historical co-dependencies with other humans, technologies, primates, and 
dogs, for example, or the symbiotic, cybernetic relationships we experience with every 
body around us and within us.  Karen Barad describes the conjoined nature of matter and 
discourse via “intra-activity” (122), in a similar fashion as Nancy Tuana, who employs 
“interactionism” to do justice to the complex interactions between realist and 
constructionist ontologies that reveal their inability to be parsed (190-192).  Stacy Alaimo 
envisions “trans-corporeality”—“the material interchanges between bodies” (Bodily 
Natures, 16)—as indicative that “the human is always intermeshed with the more-than-
human world” (2).    
In the spirit of these feminist scholars, Jordan purposefully uses the term 
“synthetic ecology” interchangeably with restoration to signal the human-nonhuman 
synthesis required of restorative activity, as well as the artifactual nature of co-creating 
environments in partnership with nonhuman actors.  As Jordan acknowledges, each 
restoration attempt, including those “defective” or failed, reveals opportunities for 
understanding and appreciation that are only made possible via human participation 
(Sunflower, 19).  At the same time, restoration avoids human domination because it 
“learn[s] ‘from the landscape itself,’ an assumption that the landscape has its own agency 
and projects” (Allison, 10).  Restorationists therefore respect the species that are not 
beneficial or desirable to humans and “allow the environment to develop along pathways 
that are not controlled by humans” (10).  This implies a rather radical prospect within 
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environmentalism on at least two counts: as material feminists like Haraway and 
environmental justice advocates argue (Di Chiro, 301), it acknowledges the fact that for 
thousands of years, nature has been a co-construction between humans and nonhumans.  
Indeed, the “wilderness” that European Americans encountered was always already the 
sort of “natureculture” material feminists theorize.  
Further, whereas “generations [of] environmentalists have assumed that the loss 
or degradation of areas generally described as ‘natural’ is an irreversible process—that 
we can only subtract from or degrade the natural landscape, never add to or improve it” 
(Jordan, “Restoration,” 31), “synthetic ecology” recognizes that human manipulations of 
their environments are integral, unavoidable, variably beneficial, and indeed, natural 
within a co-evolutionary understanding of history (Sunflower, 19).  Learning to 
appreciate humankind’s integration in the land, as restorationists do, releases humans 
from the exclusive confines of culture, as well as their role as inevitable polluter.  I find 
this aspect of ecological restoration ideologically positioned to align with a material 
feminist and feminist environmental justice politics of nature, which has several 
potentially positive consequences for shaping justice-oriented restoration endeavors. 
Both material feminists and restorationists argue that preservation and 
conservation—while necessary in some circumstances—will never sufficiently address 
the magnitude and depth of environmental destruction,54 and there are at least two 
reasons for this.  First, because preservation and conservationism overlook the potential 
                                                
54 Feminist environmental justice scholar Giovanna Di Chiro agrees: “mainstream environmentalists’ 
invention of a universal division between humans and nature is deceptive, theoretically incoherent, and 
strategically ineffective in its political aim to promote widespread environmental awareness” (“Nature,” 
301).  
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for human involvement in transforming nature, these strategies, as Jordan argues, provide 
a “weak base for the development of the performance and ritual that will be needed to 
explore and articulate the terms of our relationship with particular landscapes, to create 
values related to these relationships, and to generate emotional commitment to them” 
(“Restoration,” 32).  In other words, the survival of the nonhuman (and by extension, 
human) world depends upon a hands-on and integrated approach to stewarding it, not 
only because the planet requires ongoing stewardship, but also because actively tending 
to nonhuman creatures and spaces can solidify the kind of affective relationship among 
people that grounds a sustainable ethic of care.  Material feminist Ladelle McWhorter 
recounts awakening to this profound ethic of interaction, which grounded her moral 
obligation to the earth in Bodies and Pleasures (1999): in stewarding the soils that made 
possible the conditions for her garden tomatoes to grow, she “could feel [herself] 
coalescing, becoming a part of a network of endeavor, spreading out, putting down roots.  
A world was opening to [her], and [she] was starting to belong” (164).  Unable to 
definitively distinguish her own body from the soil she was nurturing, she narrates the 
process of “becoming-dirt”: “Dirt and flesh.  Suddenly, it occurred to me that, for all their 
differences, these two things I was looking at were cousins—not close cousins, but 
cousins, several deviations now removed” (167). 
Second, as material feminists, indigenous activists, environmental justice 
advocates, and certain restorationists recognize, any brand of environmentalism that 
perpetuates nature-culture distinctions and hierarchies also contributes to the 
materialization of institutional and systemic oppression.  If what counts as “society” is 
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circumscribed to urban, people-populated locales, “nature” can remain “out there”: out of 
sight, out of mind.  And if what counts as “environment” is limited to nonhuman 
wilderness, environmentalists and ecologists (and politicians, health advocates, educators, 
etc.) need show little concern for environmentally-related human problems, especially 
those emerging in urban locales, regardless of whether those problems arise from a 
degraded environment.  In consequence, environmental devastation has spiraled out of 
control, both in areas coded as “wilderness”—because they are without a strong enough 
constituency of advocates—and in spaces coded as “urban”—because so few recognize 
urban space as “real” environment, food source, recreation, and worthy habitat.  These 
interrelated problems of nature and culture are precisely what environmental justice and 
its contemporary offshoots—food and climate justice—bring together.  
      As restoration advocates ongoing, contextualized human stewardship and 
appreciation for complex, nuanced ecological relationships, material feminists understand 
that we need to nurture ideologies that foster interdependency “all the way down”—to 
borrow a Harawayan phrase (When, 164).  Though restoration as a whole has yet to 
demonstrate sustained concern with the social injustices that result from nature-culture 
dualisms, restoration’s appreciation for direct human involvement in stewarding 
environments opens a pathway toward perspectives that can tell us as much about using 
nature as not using it, about optimizing human impact on environments, rather than 
exclusively minimizing impact.   
 
Restoration’s Contradictions: Productive Sites of Slippage  
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Actualizing this optimization hinges upon ecological restorationist’s ability to 
clarify the field’s inconsistencies, directing it toward a material feminist and feminist 
environmental justice politics of nature.  To begin, Jordan’s assertion that the ideal 
restoration project attempts to replace every aspect of a lost or degraded ecosystem—not 
simply the overstory trees in an urban boulevard or the marshy hedges along an island, 
for example—must be evaluated (Sunflower, 12).  As Jordan and many other restoration 
ecologists argue, there is a difference between “restoration” and “restorative.”  
Reclamation, rehabilitation, revegetation, and recovery do not equal restoration: “What is 
distinctive about restoration is the commitment it implies to bringing the whole system 
back to a former condition whatever that might happen to be—not just those features we 
find beautiful, interesting, or useful but also those that we consider uninteresting, useless, 
ugly, repulsive, or even dangerous” (22).  This is an important consideration, because 
restoration ecology is a science of complex systems and intimate relationships; neglecting 
large aspects of a site in need of repair, while cultivating select aspects for their utility or 
beauty, is more akin to conservation or gardening than restoration.   
Yet I maintain that attempting to distinguish between “restoration” and 
“restorative” could prevent the kind of flexibility and community involvement that 
restoration will increasingly demand in the climate-changed future.  Nothing is inherently 
problematic in restoring a site with the intentions of fostering a “whole systems” ecology, 
if doing so encourages a thoroughgoing attempt at restoring a great complexity and 
diversity of species and relationships.  Yet as environmental scholar Colette Palamar 
points out, our information as scientists will always be partial and incomplete (take for 
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example the “millions of species that have not yet been catalogued or named,” let alone 
the processes and relationships that enable those species to function); therefore no 
restoration could ever completely restore a past ecosystem (290).  This point alone 
underscores the slippage between “restoration” and “restorative,” and the fluidity that 
exists between them.   
Furthermore, so long as a single interpretation of “former condition” is avoided, 
and so long as “former condition” implies “state of function” rather than a replica of a 
single moment in a site’s constantly evolving ecological history, then restoration can 
avoid hearkening to a mythological original nature, and invite a plurality of 
interpretations of what an environment could embody.  As scholars Hull and Robertson 
observe, ecologies are unbounded, “transitory assemblages of biotic and abiotic elements 
that exist (or could exist) contingent upon...the theoretical perspective one applies to 
define the boundaries” (106).  What counts as restoration then—how a site should 
function and for whom, and which actors do/not belong—could depend upon a plurality 
of interpretations within ecological limits.  But if restorationists limit their energies 
exclusively to places they think can be completely restored to an (arbitrary) past replica, 
rather than places that could be restored, if ever-partially, to a present state of healthy 
function, they will miss crucial opportunities to make much-needed interventions in 
places unable to be restored historically, as well as collaborators who may be interested 
in making a site for alternative purposes in addition to traditional habitat.   
Similarly, according to Jordan, the aim of most traditional restoration efforts is to 
erase the restorationist’s mark on the landscape (Sunflower, 12).  If restoration only 
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accepts human interaction with the land insofar as they stealthily “repair” it and hastily 
exit the premises with intentions to never return again, then the extent to which 
restoration can faithfully stand apart from preservation seems dubious at best.  This is 
certainly not what material feminists have in mind when they envision nature-culture 
interactionism.  More troubling is the assumption such a tenet perpetuates about 
humankind’s supposed inevitably destructive impact on the environment, which justifies 
an ethic to keep green spaces unpeopled and uncultured.   
This attitude, of course, belies history: indigenous restorationists have been 
combating the inaccurate and unfair depiction of a wilderness supposedly unmanaged by 
humans at least since the 1995 Society for Ecological Restoration International meeting, 
when The Indigenous Peoples’ Restoration Network (IPRN) was formed:55 Evidence 
gathered over the past two decades suggests that contrary to popular anthropological, 
ethnobotanical, and ecological beliefs that Native Americans manipulated only natures on 
or surrounding village sites for food and not the “pristine wildernesses” that supposedly 
lay beyond, land manipulation was actually practiced in a variety of ecosystems.  
Indigenous practices of burning, tilling, and breeding, for example, “produced cumulative 
and possibly permanent effects in plant associations, species distributions and 
composition, and, perhaps, gene pools and genetic structures of the species and plant 
assemblages” (Anderson, 335).  M. Kat Anderson, who has researched the restorative 
practices of Native Californians argues such activity is properly labeled “anthropogenic,” 
meaning shaped by human activity and not self-sustaining in its absence (335).  I argue 
                                                
55 The IPRN’s goals are to enhance survival of indigenous peoples and incorporate knowledge of these 
cultures into ecosystem management models (Anderson, 337). 
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that it is counterproductive, then, for contemporary restorationists to mask their efforts; 
so long as sites are nurtured and tended with the intention of assisting multiple and 
diverse inhabitants—human and nonhuman—leaving evidence of human participation 
and stewardship, in whatever form deemed appropriate by the affected community, could 
enhance that community’s sense of responsibility for green spaces and appreciation for 
human-nonhuman interdependency and coevolution. 
Finally, controversy among restorationists over whether or not restoration should 
be considered “creative” work indicates a similar discomfort with human presence in 
“nonhuman” space, and therefore an inability to imagine interactionist naturecultures.56 
Herein lies another place where distinctions become blurred, this time between imitation 
(positively coded as “natural”) and art (negatively coded as “artificial”).  Yet even at the 
most practical level, it is impossible to ignore the creative—imaginative, resourceful, 
subjective—input of restorationists.  As my discussions with Twin Cities restoration 
ecologist Carolynn Carr57 reveal (Carr interview, 9/1/11), restoration entails quite a bit of 
creativity, if only because restorationists constantly have to make interpretive decisions 
that, within the constraints of the landscape and its history, still demand quite a bit of 
subjectivity.  Numerous considerations illustrate this: will a rainy weather work party 
ruin an eroded slope, in which case volunteers should concentrate their efforts in another 
place at the site?  How might volunteers’ physical and mental abilities affect which 
                                                
56 Jordan observes that while “Most of the restorationists [he knows]…insist[] that restoration is creative 
work,” “Ecological restoration…aims to be…explicitly noncreative with respect to objectives, neither 
improving on nature nor improvising on it but attempting, blankly, to copy it” (Sunflower, 24).   
57 Carolyn Carr, M.S. is a Minneapolis-St. Paul based conservation biologist and urban restoration ecologist 
who co-runs Ecological Strategies, an organization that conducts natural resource planning, management, 
restoration, and education.  For over a decade, she has closely advised the St. Paul nonprofit Friends of the 
Mississippi River’s restoration work in the Mississippi River Gorge, which is how she and I first met.   
  80 
species are weeded or planted and where?  How should funding be allocated—to support 
a few costly species or numerous inexpensive species?  Should a site be tended chiefly to 
curb an invasive species, or to nurture an endangered species?  Should colorful plants 
ever be placed strategically for aesthetic purposes in order to engender greater 
appreciation for a locale?  Should thorny shrubs be placed nearer their companion 
species, or along a trail to discourage off-trail use?  The experiences, preferences, 
imaginations, and limitations of restorationists most certainly influence not only the 
future vision for a site, but the implementation of methodologies as well, which often 
depart from the original design given a variety of unforeseen factors that arise in the 
process of restoring.  Because answers to these kinds of questions are usually made for 
the ecological benefit of a site rather than, for example, aesthetic beautification, they are 
“noncreative” in a sense.  Yet to the extent that a variety of similarly beneficial decisions 
could alternately (though just as “ecologically” and “accurately”) be made on a site, and 
because restoration will necessarily involve limitations and constraints, restoration has 
arguably always been a “creative” endeavor.  
From a material feminist point of view, failing to appreciate creativity in material 
or nonhuman worlds reveals the limits of anthropocentrism.  For there are all kinds of 
ways that material objects, inanimate natural phenomena, and nonhuman animals escape 
capture and intelligibility, elude predictability, or create tools, relationships, forms of 
play, and homes that humans will never finally understand.  Even matter often considered 
“inanimate,” as McWhorter’s narrative on soil attests, is shown to act, aggregate, 
perpetuate itself (as well as other living things), often in unpredictable becomings, 
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expressions, and unfoldings (162-167).  Alaimo theorizes how the material world “kicks 
back”—to borrow Barad’s term (“Meeting,” 188)—by explaining how agency is an 
enactment not necessarily dependent upon a subject (“Trans-Corporeal,” 244-50).  This 
concept is only possible if “things” are not conceptualized as preceding their “relations” 
(248), which drives to the very heart of the nature-culture, human-nonhuman “intra-
activities” material feminisms put forth.  As Barad argues, reality is not composed of 
things, but of “things-in-phenomena” “intra-acting” (“Posthumanist,” 135).  Releasing 
agency—and the creative spirit exclusively relegated to human artistry—from the 
confines of the human opens an appreciation for the ways nonhumans, landscapes, 
environments, etc. “express” themselves, “invent” habitats and relationships, and inspire 
human imagination.   With regard to restoration, then, seeing creativity in landscapes 
means appreciating nonhumans as lively actors fully involved in (co)shaping their 
destinies, and “tak[ing] seriously the voice of the land” in making decisions (Palamar, 
296).  To relegate creativity only to humankind—or to claim it plays no role in shaping 
environments—risks a factual unsoundness that also clouds our ability to appreciate the 
ways nonhuman nature acts as a surprising, confounding, inspiring “trickster with whom 
we must learn to converse,” as Haraway famously writes in “Situated Knowledges” 
(Simians, 201). 
These three tensions first elaborated by Jordan—restoration vs. restorative, urban 
vs. nature/wilderness, and creative vs. duplicative—gesture toward contradictions at the 
heart of restoration’s identity.  And yet, the potential is there for valued, yet ever-partial, 
restoration projects to continue benefitting degraded environments by restoring healthy 
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system-functioning; by promoting humankind’s transparent, evident, and celebrated 
transformation of nonhuman nature; and by attending resourcefully, care-fully, to creative 
enterprises with landscapes respected as co-creators in their destinies.  These productive 
sites of slippage and the potential for new kinds of restoration projects are already extant 
in restoration’s various unresolved tensions; they just need to be teased apart, clarified, 
and underscored in material feminist critique.   
 
The Anti-Invasive Movement 
In general, conventional restorationists have failed to recognize the field’s 
potentially beneficial impact on underserved human communities in addition to the 
nonhuman communities they undoubtedly assist.  This is because today in the U.S. 
ecological restoration remains a practice that mostly services established parks, prairies, 
forests, and wetlands—places often spatially and philosophically divorced from the urban 
or rural neighborhoods whose residents could benefit from non-toxic, safe, and 
biodiverse green space (Allison, 215).  While every ecologically vulnerable locale 
deserves restorative attention, by focusing almost exclusively on places coded as 
“nonhuman,” restoration aligns itself with an elite preservationism, and misses crucial 
opportunities to combat social inequities, confront the biosocial causes of polluted 
landscapes, damaged food systems, and global climate change,58 while creating resilient 
habitat for nonhuman species.   
                                                
58 I recognize that most traditional ecological restoration projects do help to mitigate climate change by 
ensuring that more healthy green spaces exist and can be sustained.  Yet as I demonstrate in this chapter 
and Chapter Four, the kind of change necessary to impact climate change in any major way will also have 
to involve a more radical, biosocial approach to environmentalism.  
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In addition to these aspects of ecological restoration, which understandably make 
the field seem at best unconcerned with social issues and at worst impenetrable to 
“outsiders,” many have critiqued the nativist rhetoric that seems to permeate its 
discourse.  Restoration has even created a backlash, according to naturalist David 
Williams (164), with critics maintaining that the field “promotes a xenophobic, nativist 
argument, akin to that practiced by the Nazis” (164).9  For example, common rhetoric to 
describe invasive plants and animals include “weeds” (Crosby, 145; Polk, 180), “the 
‘tramps’ of our flora” (149), “exotic” (Williams, 156), “uncontrollable” (158), 
“cancerous” (158), “aggressive” (161), “impenetrable” (161), “monsters,” “demons” 
(Pollan, A52), “alien threat[s],” “creepy strangler[s],” “wild immigrants,” “pathogens of 
globalization,” “biological invaders” (Subramaniam, 137), “fugitives,” and 
“undesireables” (Cresswell, 335-6).  Clearly demonstrating their moral valence, 
metaphors of invasion and war are frequently employed to contend with invasives: “‘Cut 
down the scum, spray them with killer herbicide’”; “If we don't fight back, they’ll take 
over!’”; and “‘join forces to defeat the evil alien’” (Schroeder, 252).59  In light of these 
characterizations, it is apparent that dangerous parallels may exist between the mentality 
restoration promotes and proponents of racial, class, and sexual purity. 
                                                
9 Michael Pollan’s article “Against Nativism” traces the development of pre-World War II Germany’s 
“blood and soil” native gardening movement, which was “founded on nationalistic and racist ideals” (A52).  
Germans were encouraged to plant their gardens along the lines of “Nordic” species standards and 
“exterminate” nonnative species, while closing off Germany’s borders to “unwholesome alien [plant] 
influences” (A52). 
59 Schroeder does discuss the motivational effect metaphors of war may have on volunteers: “this 
metaphorical likening of restoration work to war has the positive effect of reinforcing the volunteers’ 
commitment, dedication, and willingness to sacrifice for their cause” (262).  Yet “Unfortunately,” he 
writes, “this martial view of restoration work may…intensif[y]…controversy and [make] it more difficult 
to resolve.  […]  The immediate impulse [is] to fight and try to defeat…enemies, rather than to try to 
understand their objections and look for ways to negotiate and compromise” (262).  
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Feminist science studies scholar Banu Subramaniam concurs in her research that 
demonstrates how “the recent hyperbole about alien species is…in response to changing 
racial, economic, and gender norms in the country” (136).  She finds several discursive 
parallels between immigrants and nonnative species: both raise the specter that aliens are 
everywhere, taking over, silently growing in strength and number, reproducing rapidly, 
parasitically consuming resources faster than they can be replenished, and causing undue 
economic hardship on the host country.60  “The xenophobic rhetoric,” she writes, “is 
unmistakable” (142). 
From a historical perspective, the irony of such xenophobia lies in the United 
States’ biocolonial roots: in just a few hundred years, European Caucasians became the 
predominant human inhabitants of most of the regions they colonized (Lahar, 101).  
Named “The Demographic Takeover” in Ecological Imperialism: The Biological 
Expansion of Europe by historian Alfred W. Crosby, the massive transcontinental 
migrations of the colonial era could not have been accomplished by humans alone (107). 
Instead, as Stephanie Lahar writes, “the human victims, the aborigines of the Lands of the 
Demographic Takeover…knew they were only one of many species being displaced and 
replaced” (107).  In fact, colonial plants, animals, and pathogens advanced as fast or 
faster than European explorers and settlers (151).  Colonialism was (as neocolonialism 
continues to be) a thoroughly biocultural phenomenon, as nonnative and invasive species 
                                                
60 In a similar rhetoric study, queer ecofeminist philosopher Danne Polk chronicles how queer bodies 
became conceived as “invasive threat”—and thus disposable weeds, or “faggots”—to the patriarchal 
imaginary, contaminating “an otherwise pure symbolic system or natural order” (80).   And geographer 
Tim Cresswell similarly explores the use of invasives for their metaphorical power in legal policy-making, 
which justifies the practice of “weeding” “out of place” residents—drug users, criminals, gang members—
from targeted neighborhoods, which are then “reseeded” with prevention programs and increased 
surveillance (335).   
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associated with the colonists, in addition to development and intensive forms of European 
agriculture and forestry, transformed environments and cultures across the globe (104-
107).  Herein lies the necessity of contemporary restoration efforts, where in light of 
history, nativism—and the xenophobic, heterosexist, elitist rhetoric it can inspire—is an 
ironic phenomenon. 
In order to combat nativism, “multihorticulturalists” point out the ways in which 
“foreign” species of nonhumans color and diversify our lives (Pollan, A52).  Some, like 
Crosby, even contend that “opportunistic invaders” of plants, for example, have certain 
benefits, such as serving as “the Red Cross” of the plant world (169).  Without the 
invasive plants of colonialism, he contends, the loss of topsoil due to development, farming, and 
industrialization would have impoverished thousands of hectares of the most valuable 
agricultural land in the world today” (154).  Some of these colonial invaders even form 
the foundation of the U.S.’ agricultural system; nearly all U.S. crops are nonnnative while 
the insects that threaten them are native species (Subramaniam, 143).  These points 
highlight the ways in which broad generalizations of nonnative and invasive nonhumans 
“obscure the heterogeneity of the life histories, ecologies, and contributions of native and 
exotic plants,” as Subramanium argues (143), while fueling misguided applications to 
human difference and integration.  
While all of these are valid points and could go a long way toward improving 
restoration’s image and practice, special care must be taken to hold them in tandem with 
certain realities of our globalized world, such as the severity of current losses of 
biodiversity, which could, in some cases, be slowed or prevented if certain ecological 
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boundaries were upheld.  For example, Crosby errs in generalizing about how invasive 
plants save soils and ecosystems from the ravages of disturbance (169).  He writes, 
“when the emergencies are over, [invasives] give way to plants that may grow more 
slowly but grow taller and sturdier” (169).  While it would be nice if invasives merely 
held place in line for the fruition of native species or became the next generation of an 
ecology’s benign native species, in most cases, “when they have an impact,” writes 
Allison, “the impact is negative” (100).  The chief problem of certain invasives is that 
they cause mass-extinctions of native species, resulting in homogenous landscapes—a 
point that some critics of restoration ironically fail to understand (Williams, 166).  As 
Williams writes, “if the proliferation of invasives continues, we could well end up with a 
world dominated more and more by a handful of very successful, very common species” 
(166). 
Though critics correctly observe that migration and some disturbance is natural—
indeed, even Native Americans and indigenous cultures around the world engaged in the 
transplantation of species, sometimes over great distances (Toensmeir), environments 
evolve, and species respond and adapt, they ignore contemporary rates of those changes.  
For example, Williams writes, “how…do we contend with someplace like Hawaii, where 
the rate of introduction has changed from its historic pace, an estimated one plant per 
100,000 years, to the modern 22 per year?  With just .02 percent of the U.S. landmass, 
Hawaii is home to 75 percent of the historically documented plant and bird species 
extinctions in the United States” (165).  Today, as the world’s species transgress oceans 
and national borders on a daily basis, we must be concerned about how they will respond 
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to their new environments without former barriers and evolutionary checks (165).  
Indeed, it is this sort of vigilance and awareness that is necessary for being responsible 
members of our ecological communities. 
In this sense, many restorationists argue that the anti-invasives movement is not—
or at least should not be—about colonial, racial, or heteronormative purity (Williams, 
165).  I agree with Williams when he writes that restoration is not about “native versus 
nonnative—and closing our land and water to all foreign influences.  It’s about 
recognizing that some introduced plants and animals have the potential to 
damage…ecosystems, and it’s about trying to determine which those are before they 
invade” (165).  This is a lesson of pluralism, which, according to Palamar, “reminds us to 
include diversity, but avoid the trap of the melting pot where the variety of views is 
eclipsed by…uniformity” (299).  In this vein, many ecologists recognize that some 
nonnatives do cohabitate in their new homes, and that part of what makes our landscapes 
unique and interesting involves the presence of diverse human, animal, and plant 
communities, whether native or nonnative.  Removing certain species, then, becomes 
more about opening possibilities for a variety of other species and relationships to 
flourish, rather than because they fall outside culturally imposed categories of belonging. 
Certainly, it can be difficult to parse how much problematic rhetoric can be 
attributed to popular media and sensationalized news headlines versus restorationists 
themselves.  Yet whether restoration is unfairly interpolated or rightly critiqued, one of 
its major challenges will be how to simultaneously address the urgent and growing 
dilemma of the development, pollution, and globalization that set the stage for ecological 
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degradation, while capitalizing on the field’s rather unique environmentalism.  This task 
will leave no room for appeals to racial or sexual purity, the racial, class, or sex/gendered 
exclusivity of its leadership and constituency, nor the incorporation of preservationist 
human-nonhuman binaries.   
 
The “Return” of Restoration 
I maintain that restoration’s success may actually be found in yet another of its 
pressing challenges, but only if the field embraces its contradictions and crises as 
opportunities.  As if restoration’s problems—its contradictory nature politics, tendencies 
toward misguided ideological leanings, exclusivity, and xenophobia—were not sufficient 
enough to prevent its efficacy and widespread appeal, climate change is leveling a great 
threat on the ecological front.  Whereas restoration has always relied upon historical 
precedent to return a degraded landscape to its previously functioning condition, climate 
change is preventing such a “return,” spurring some restorationists to question if climate 
change implies “the death of restoration” (Light, 107).   
 Though the climate has always been changing, and ecologies have always 
responded via adaptation, the magnitude and rate of contemporary, anthropogenically-
induced climate change is unprecedented.  Today’s accelerated climate change beckons 
grave concerns that human societies, nonhuman species, and ecological systems will not 
be able to meet adaptation demands quickly enough; “failure to do so,” writes 
philosopher Ronald Sandler, “will have high social, economic, and biological costs” (64).  
A major aspect of these concerns, especially for restorationists, is that as global warming 
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accelerates rates of change, information deficits and uncertainties about the ecological 
future are also exacerbated (63).  The earth’s people may well know what is causing 
climate change, but its long-term effects are difficult to quantify. 
Much to the dismay of restoration ecologists, the unprecedented boundary shifting 
endemic to climate change has incited fear that restoration will become increasingly 
irrelevant (Simpson, 343; Ingram, 235; Harris et. al, 171; Simpson, 343).  Ecological 
relationships that took millennia to evolve are rapidly disappearing.  Historical templates, 
“critical for informing restorationists of past conditions” (Hall, 4), are thus progressively 
proving either difficult to ascertain, or irrelevant to current conditions.  For example, 
entire ecosystems may need to be shifted north by one hundred and sixty kilometers—or 
further—in order to resume behaving as they once did.61  Park and agriculture boundaries 
may need to be redrawn with the intention of expanding North-South corridors to 
accommodate species’ responses to temperature shifts.  Phenology reports already 
confirm that an average of forty-one percent of documented species exhibited changes 
consistent with climate change: pollinator flight activity and spring flowering, for 
example, are occurring four days earlier per 1°C increase in temperature (Allison, 79-
80).62  Keystone species may become extinct, threatening to collapse entire ecosystems.63  
The rapid introduction of nonnative and invasive species—a consequence of both 
globalization and climate change—may prove impossible to eradicate or control, thus 
                                                
61  As Allison documents, “Every 1°C change in temperature causes ecological climate zones to shift by 
160km (in the northern hemisphere moving north with temperature increases) or to change in altitude by 
160m (moving up in altitude as temperature increases).  There is already strong data demonstrating changes 
in species distributions around the world” (78). 
62 This statistic was drawn from a study of 1,598 species with good long-term records of phenology 
(Allison, 79-80). 
63 Of course, ecosystems can also collapse with the decline of non-keystone, supportive species, such as 
amphibians, thirty-two percent of whom are threatened with extinction around the globe (Allison, 80).   
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requiring new strategies of mitigation and integration.64  Energy and food resources 
depleted in one locale may need to be harvested for the first time in other locales.  The 
global demand for carbon sinks may invigorate forestry protection and preservation in 
certain areas of the globe, yet displace the families and industries who have relied upon, 
and sustained, those forests for centuries.  And as Sandler reminds us, the ecological 
impacts of global warming will be geographically differential—greater in some places 
than in others—and not necessarily predictable (72).   
To varying extents, all these possibilities have already become realities.  
Supporting Bill McKibben’s claim that we now exist on planet “Eaarth” (2), there is 
evidence showing climate change has affected all taxonomic groups (Allison, 80), and 
virtually all ecosystems have been impacted, most of which now exist in conditions that 
are beyond their historical range of variation (91).  According to Allison, “These changes 
have created a situation in which most are hybrid65 or novel66 ecosystems or will soon 
become hybrid or novel ecosystems” (91).  Therefore, in general, HRV and native/non-
native are going to be “increasingly poor proxies” for assessing ecological integrity 
(Sandler, 72).  In fact, using these proxies would arguably amount to ecological 
                                                
64 For example, non-native species now account for over half the plant species growing “wild” in New 
Zealand (Allison, 100).  Eradication is no longer an ecologically sound approach to contending with this 
reality. 
65 Hybrid ecosystems are those that “have some of the characteristics of the current or historical ecosystem 
but which, due to changes in terms of species composition and function, now exist outside the HRV” 
(Allison, 100).  I will discuss this type of ecosystem further in Chapter Four. 
66 Novel ecosystems (also termed “no-analogue” and “emerging”) are those that differ in composition 
and/or function from past systems primarily as a consequence of changing species distributions or 
environmental alteration through climate and land use change (Hobbs et. al., “Why,” 4).  According to 
Starzomski, “They are a consequence of human activity but do not depend on human intervention for their 
maintenance.  Novel ecosystems are also not practically reversible to the original state” (88-89).  I will 
discuss this type of ecosystem further in Chapter Four.   
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insensitivity and human domination, as inappropriate templates are imposed upon 
ongoing ecological processes (72). 
The fact that ecologists must now be thrust into the uncomfortable position of 
proceeding without the templates of history to guide their work makes the future of 
restoration risky, confusing, and even dangerous (Harris et al, 171).  What is one to make 
of restoration in an age when remnants, memories, habits, and creatures of the past are 
fast becoming obsolete, when “place” in place-based environmentalism becomes 
continuously redefined?  Without historical guidance, the most restorationists can rely 
upon are educated guesses; experimentation and trial and error will gradually become the 
standard.  Greater opportunity exists than ever before for mistakes, unforeseen 
consequences, and deadly combinations.  Much has already been lost as a result of 
climate change: species, shorelines, forests, cultures, reliable seasons, “weatherable” 
storms.  Unfortunately, much will yet be lost before global actions significant enough in 
scale can mitigate climate change.  Meanwhile, if restoration can salvage what is left of 
the natures we have held dear and recreate former ecological relationships as it has 
always done, it can still embody a worthwhile endeavor.  But in light of our rapidly 
changing planet, restoration could embody a transformative endeavor if it creates “new 
natures”67 addressing the unique, contextualized needs climate change introduces.  
Indeed, restorationists have little choice but to accept the reality of these “new natures,” 
                                                
67 Throughout this project, I put quotation marks around the term “new natures” in order to signify my 
recognition that nature is never created entirely anew, but rather changes according to a variety of 
evolutionary and cultural impacts, integrating novel aspects while retaining historical aspects.  And yet, the 
kind of shifting our generations experience today because of climate change occurs so rapidly that it 
warrants, in my opinion, the designation of “new.”  “New natures,” therefore, references both the 
unprecedented ecological shifts brought about by climate change, as well as the green spaces humans—
restorationists and environmental justice advocates alike—will need to create in response to those shifts.  
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and work toward building ecological communities that can withstand novel 
naturalcultural demands. 
Restoration must revisit its role in “the return.”  To return a site to a state of 
functioning implies hearkening to a past state; it suggests coming back after a period of 
absence.  This is an ethical goal of restoration, i.e., interventions should take place where 
human encroachment has degraded an area, where human care and stewardship have 
been absent, but should now salvage, renew, and protect.  It is also a practical, material 
goal of restoration to reinstate the plants, insects, drainage patterns, etc. that were once 
familiar to a site, for these will usually ensure a site’s longevity and resilience, 
“returning” an ecological community to a previous condition of stability, diversity, and 
resilience.  The result is a site reminiscent of its former self, even if certain aspects have 
evolved over time.  Restorationist Valentin Schaefer calls this the “ecological memory” 
of a place, “the species…and…processes that will determine the trajectory for the 
ecosystem in the future” (171).  This kind of “remembering” is material; when a site is 
resilient—healthy enough to withstand the shock of disturbance or integrate novel species 
and relationships—it quite physically “remembers” what does and does not belong in its 
localized community, a “knowledge” that takes millennia to evolve and solidify.  For 
restoration ecologists, historical models are employed and ecological precedent is sought, 
based precisely upon ecological memory.  Yet climate change is undoing the potential for 
both restorationists and ecologies to “remember.” 
Therefore, the “return” of a relevant, socially-savvy restoration, as great a 
departure from the time-worn restoration model as it may be, may involve a slight to 
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significant, purposeful, turn away from a site’s ecological history in degree, and perhaps 
even in kind, depending on the gravity of climate change’s contextualized interventions.  
However, if our natures are under such an extreme amount of stress because of climate 
change that time worn restoration models may no longer be appropriate, we could harness 
these novel situations toward novel naturalcultural creations, making a space perform for 
as many human and nonhuman stakeholders as possible.  Ecologist Susan Bratton agrees 
when she writes, “Our attachment to the ‘natural past’ model of restoration may be 
causing us to miss good opportunities and to respond insufficiently to the ecosystem 
change and habitat fragmentation that is presently occurring worldwide” (66).  If the 
chief goal of restoration truly remains to return a site to a state of functioning and not to a 
fabled origin as its ideology purports, then I argue we have some room to expand the 
notion of what a restored site might look like and accomplish, especially in light of the 
rapid change global warming has already induced.  Despite the misfortune of climate 
change, we might find opportunity to ensure that the changes that do happen are desirable 
ones, if only restorationists took full advantage of the field’s potential.  If reconceived, 
perhaps restoration could be pushed toward novel, creative solutions wherein green 
spaces are crafted in order to address a multitude of needs and engage diverse human and 
nonhuman stakeholders.   
Of what these “new natures” will consist will largely depend upon who is 
involved in determining their character.  Restoration ecologists will continue to play a 
pivotal role, especially for their experience fostering functioning systems in challenging, 
depleted locales; for their resourcefulness in restoring amidst a variety of context-specific 
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limitations; for their knowledge in finding evidence of past ecological function and which 
species do/not enable each other to thrive.68  But I maintain that their expertise must be 
put into conversation with the knowledge and needs of other local human stakeholders 
who depend upon a specific ecological community for recreation, livelihood, food, clean 
water, hunting, resource extraction, shelter, aesthetic appeal, carbon sinks, or protection 
from natural disasters.  Because climate change disproportionately affects marginalized 
races, nationalities, genders, and classes of people, these “new natures” must be restored 
with the consent, participation, and design of those so affected.  This is not only because 
local stakeholders are directly affected, but also because local stakeholders likely have 
place-based knowledge that outsiders lack.  
While there appears to be ample discussion among restoration ecologists about 
the impact of climate change on the field and how to contend with it—as recent 
conversations in the leading journals of the field69 and two path breaking publications70 
reveal—there is much less discussion about employing restoration toward the goals of 
environmental, food, or climate justice.71  It is clear that climate change is threatening 
                                                
68 Indeed, climate change may inspire new, as yet unseen, ways to value restoration and restoration 
ecologists.   
69 For example, Ecological Restoration devoted Volume 27, Number 3, to the topic of “Climate Change 
and Restoration” and Restoration Ecology has published several related articles, including “Ecological 
Restoration and Global Climate Change,” by Harris et. al.  The collection of essays published in Human 
Dimensions of Ecological Restoration (2011) also devotes one of its chapters to the topic: “Climate Change 
Implications for Ecological Restoration Planning,” by Buckley & Niemi (177-187). 
70 Two recent, cutting-edge publications that take up thoughtful and thorough discussion of novel 
ecosystems amidst climate change include (1) Allison, Stuart. Ecological Restoration and Environmental 
Change: Renewing Damaged Ecosystems. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012; and (2) Hobbs, Richard J., 
Higgs, Eric S. and Hall, Carol M., eds. Novel Ecosystems: Intervening in the New Ecological World Order. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2013. 
71 Quite a few restorationists argue for better communication between “experts” and “laypeople” regarding 
restoration projects, as well as taking into consideration “social and cultural goals” (Light, 107).  But to the 
best of my knowledge, none have made explicit the possibility of shared goals between restoration and 
environmental justice.  One possible exception that I am aware of is Palamar’s article “The Justice of 
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environments all over the world—and that restoration itself is a threatened field—but it is 
less clear that restorationists would be willing at this time to incorporate the non-
ecologists, non-experts, and non-native species that would need to be considered if justice 
goals were thoroughly integrated.  If attempted, this would challenge restorationists to 
consider the truly biosocial causes and consequences of climate change, and thus 
approach restorative goals from an integrative, coalitional perspective.  This implies that 
the “new natures” restorationists attempt to create must serve many purposes, and many 
stakeholders, simultaneously.  Indeed, I argue that this is the only way we can create truly 
sustainable natures in the era of climate change.  Natures capable of sustaining, over 
many decades, the form and content of a site must be created contextually with the 
intentions of nourishing and protecting the humans and nonhumans who have a stake in 
that ecology, affected though it is by climate change.  
Of course, moving forward with this approach prompts several questions: what 
gets left behind in this endeavor, and who will be satisfied with the trade-offs?  This plan 
may force us, in certain circumstances, to abandon former goals and struggles, as well as 
the histories and species that have depended upon the stewardship of restorationists.  If 
either climate change or the needs of a human community prevent certain species and 
processes from being reinstated as they would have been in the past, the end result could 
potentially look quite different from the restoration of yesterday.  At what point will the 
demands of climate change force us to consider whether we are faithfully practicing 
“restoration,” which concerns itself with re-establishing biodiverse ecosystems, or 
                                                                                                                                            
Ecological Restoration,” which characterizes restoration as a potential development the environmental 
health movement in U.S. history.  Her thesis, though focusing on health ecology, is generally supportive of 
mine, in that she argues this partnership could reinvigorate today’s environmentalism. 
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something qualitatively different, like land management, which is primarily concerned 
with natural resource utility?  Will “doing justice” for humans always (or sometimes, or 
never) take precedence over “doing justice” for nonhumans?  That is, who will be 
satisfied if a justice-oriented restoration embodies “light” anthropocentrism?  Further: 
though restoration itself would have to be radically revised, does a justice-oriented 
restoration suggest an abandonment of radical climate change policy in favor of reformist 
adaptation?  In other words, does this plan help us invest our energies into a lofty and 
transformative enough endeavor to make significant headway against climate change? 
It must be recognized that no site could integrate every species or meet every need 
of every resident—indeed, such an all-encompassing goal could certainly not be achieved 
even under traditional restoration endeavors—and thus, a justice-oriented restoration plan 
would have to be negotiated in ongoing contestations; the result could not please 
everyone, and special care would have to be taken to ensure that as many human and 
nonhuman stakeholders as possible are benefitted.  But at the very least, this conception 
would be far more democratic, inclusive, and respectful than what counts as restoration 
today.   
More urgently, in my estimation, it is one of the most realistic, practical, and 
hopeful ways forward as we struggle to meet the needs of a rapidly changing, rapidly 
degrading planet.  Part of surviving, and even living well amidst climate change, will 
have to involve a degree of adaptation.  We have no other choice.  The transformative, 
radical aspect of a justice-oriented restoration lies in its ability to unite the wisdom and 
strengths of social justice advocates with environmental advocates and in so doing, 
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address a simultaneity of constituents and needs at once.  Such a pairing could contribute 
powerfully to dramatically different, truly sustainable commons.  This project therefore 
moves any discussion on climate change beyond the usual claims heard in the U.S.—
“climate change is happening,” “it is anthropogenically caused,” and “adaptation and 
mitigation are urgently needed”—by asserting that the “new natures” being produced at 
unprecedented rates also present great opportunity for democracy, justice, and 
sustainability.  If harnessed toward the goals of environmental justice, ecological 
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Chapter Four 
 
Novel Natures and Nature’s Publics 
 
 
Introducing the Beacon Food Forest 
Seven years ago, a few permaculture design students in Seattle, Washington had a 
radical idea: build a food forest72 on public land designed by neighborhood residents that 
would be free and open for public foraging.  In so doing, they would accomplish several 
goals at once: create community, provide opportunities for education about food 
cultivation, combat food injustice in a food desert, curb climate change-inducing 
emissions from food transport by localizing the food supply, and rehabilitate their local 
ecosystem.73  Five years later, Friends of the Beacon Food Forest (FBFF) are well on 
their way toward realizing this transformative vision. 
 Though it pushes the bounds of conventional restoration significantly, the Beacon 
Food Forest (BFF) model begins to provide a pragmatic materialization of a justice-
oriented restoration project aimed at solving social and ecological dilemmas now and in 
the future.  This chapter details the development of the U.S.’s largest forageable food 
space (Lupo; Schiller; Gellerman),74 as well as the problems and potentialities of 
                                                
72 Food forestry is a gardening or land management system that mimics a tiered forest ecosystem, but 
substitutes edible plants for nonedibles.  The upper story typically consist of fruit and nut trees, the middle 
story includes small trees, berry shrubs, perennials, and annuals, the lower stories involve fruiting 
groundcovers, herbs, grasses, and fungi, with a rizosphere and root zone below that.  According to the BFF 
website, “Companions or beneficial plants are included to attract insects for natural pest management while 
some plants are soil amenders providing nitrogen and mulch [this method of pairing companionable species 
together is called agroecology].  Together they create relationships to form a forest garden ecosystem able 
to produce high yields of food with less maintenance” (Beacon Food Forest).  
73 Or, according to the BFF mission statement, “Our goal is to design, plant and grow an edible urban forest 
garden that inspires our community to gather together, grow our own food and rehabilitate our local 
ecosystem” (Beacon Food Forest). 
74 To be clear, the BFF is the largest forageable food forest on public lands in the United States, according 
to Jenny Pell (Gellerman).  There are large, 2,000 year old food forests in Vietnam (Tabafunda) and the 
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restoring resilient enough biosocial communities to contend with the “new natures”75 
climate change has initiated.  With FBFF, I answer “can food be free, fresh, and easily 
accessible?” (Stone) in the affirmative, and explore how contextualized projects like the 
BFF can mount a significant enough confrontation to the vulnerabilities contributing to 
and caused by climate change to restore ecological livability.   
 In 2009, instructor Jenny Pell76 of Permaculture Now! tasked her permaculture77 
design students, including Glenn Herlihy and Jacquelyn Cramer, the two founders of the 
Beacon Food Forest, with creating a final dream design project on an extant piece of 
land.  Having lived in Beacon Hill, Herlihy was aware of a fourteen-acre vacant plot of 
                                                                                                                                            
Middle East, so “food forests are not new,” says Pell (Gellerman).  “‘Where we’re stretching the bounds,’” 
according to Herlihy, is by “‘creating a food forest that will also be a public gleaning area’” (Baskin). 
75 As Chapter Three explains, I use the term “new natures” to encapsulate the ways in which our 
naturecultures are—and will continue to be—different from the past due to unprecedented shifts caused by 
climate change.  It does not imply that nature is ever fabricated entirely anew, as if cultural, historical, and 
material entities have discontinued their influence on present and future systems.  Rather, “new natures” 
can be likened to the “novel ecosystems” to which recent scholarship in ecological restoration attests: as 
this chapter will detail, these systems differ in composition and function from past systems because 
conditions have so drastically changed due to land use change, habitat destruction, the arrival of nonnative 
species, climate change, or a combination of all four (Hobbs et. al., “Why,” 4; Allison, 99; Starzomski, 88-
89).  “New natures” therefore references both the unprecedented ecological shifts brought about by climate 
change, including the societal impacts of those shifts.  Furthermore, I also employ the term to describe the 
green spaces humans—restorationists and feminist environmental justice advocates alike—will need to 
create in response to those shifts, in order to design the most desirable ecologies possible in the 
Anthropocene. 
76 Marisha Auerbach and Kelda Miller joined Jenny Pell in co-teaching the permaculture course, along with 
several prominent guest speakers from the local permaculture and raw vegan community.  Classes were 
held at the Raw Vegan Source/New Earth Permaculture Farm in Redmond, at Seattle Tilth, the Home of the 
Good Shepherd, as well as other workshop locations in 2009 (Wiki). 
77 Permaculture is a whole systems approach to land management modeled after natural ecosystems, 
wherein system self-sustenance is the goal.  To that end, the soils, plants, insects, and fungi (etc.) are 
purposefully gardened in order to be mutually beneficial and self-propagating (Leschin-Hoar).  This means 
that over time, the need for human maintenance—weeding, watering, planting, etc.—will decline.  But 
permaculture, for Pell, is much more than a gardening methodology: “it’s an ethical framework with a lot 
of principles that…[try] to get to sustainable, resilient human communities. And also embed the skills from 
the community—invite people back into that process, getting people back into learning skills” (Gellerman).  
Still, Herlihy adds, “‘As much as we are promoting permaculture,’ ‘we have to allow other gardeners to 
freely express their ideas in their ways’” (Mellinger).  To appease a diverse neighborhood of stakeholders, 
the BFF also includes “more familiar urban farming features alongside the food forest: community garden 
plots, collectively managed plots, orchards, and edible arboretums, as well as a new concept Friends of the 
Food Forest are calling a ‘Tree-Patch’—much like a standard garden plot, but with a tree” (ibid). 
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land adjacent to Jefferson Park, owned by Seattle Public Utilities (SPU).  Jefferson Park 
is a forty five-acre green space two and a half miles from downtown Seattle, and home to 
soccer and baseball fields, tennis courts, lawn bowling, a kids’ summer water spray park, 
golf course, skate park, playground, and recreation center.  Jefferson is a well known and 
loved, centrally-located and visible park in the Beacon Hill neighborhood, which is 
among the most ethnically diverse zip codes in the country (Gellerman).  Nearby 
establishments include the business district, a public middle school and high school, a 
community center, day care centers, and the Veterans hospital (Beacon Food Forest).  Yet 
despite all of these resources, which made the sunny, west-facing slope Herlihy sited so 
attractive to the permaculture students, regions within the Beacon Hill neighborhood have 
“relatively high number[s] of households without vehicles that are more than one-half 
mile from a supermarket” (USDA), which classifies parts of this neighborhood as food 
deserts.78  More than just an unused slope with beautiful views of the Olympic Mountains 
and downtown Seattle, this site could be utilized to grow a free, accessible forest of 
edible shrubs, trees, and groundcovers that would supplement the diets of an entire 
community, at no financial cost to the community. 
The design students presented their final food forest project to a large audience of 
community members who, much to Herlihy and Cramer’s surprise, received it well 
enough to inspire future meetings on developing it into a reality.  By 2010, the year when 
organizers brought their idea for a food forest to city officials, Mayor Mike McGinn had 
                                                
78 According to the USDA, a food desert is a region where nutritious, fresh, affordable, and culturally-
appropriate food is inaccessible (particularly without automotive transportation) for at least 33% of the 
population, and/or where these foods are only available more than a mile away from urban home dwellers 
or ten miles away for rural home dwellers.  In 2006, there existed more than 6,500 food deserts.  These 
spaces typically exist in low-income rural or urban locales.   
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declared it “the year of urban agriculture” in Seattle, and supported the project with 
enthusiasm (Taylor).  Seattle City Council members have since created the Food Action 
Initiative, the goals of which involve improving public health; reducing climate impact; 
and improving the security of our food supply.  Each of these goals is addressed by the 
BFF project (Beacon Food Forest).  
This good fortune indicated to the organizers not only that the city might be more 
amenable to approving their radical idea than they had imagined, but it also underscored 
that they were part of a burgeoning grassroots movement for food justice sweeping the 
nation.79  Capitalizing on that momentum and contributing to it, the food foresters proved 
to skeptical SPU administrators that the space they wished to cultivate—officially 
designated as water quality land surrounding a city reservoir protected by strict rules80—
would be designed to enhance water quality by absorbing runoff along the slope, while 
providing several other key amenities for the community (Beacon Food Forest).  SPU 
granted the food foresters permission to build on and cultivate seven of the fourteen 
acres, so long as BFF operations were overseen by Seattle Department of 
Neighborhood’s (SDN) P-Patch staff.81 
                                                
79 Food injustice is defined by Robert Gottlieb and Anupama Joshi as “‘the maldistribution of food, poor 
access to a good diet, inequities in the labor process and unfair returns for key suppliers along the food 
chain’” (6).  Food justice is then defined as “ensuring that the benefits and risks of where, what, and how 
food is grown and produced, transported, and distributed, and accessed and eaten are shared fairly” (6).  
Gottlieb and Joshi also note in Food Justice (2010) that “food system change” has become increasingly 
popular.  They detail several alternative food groups” who they argue have the potential to “prioritize the 
need to address inequities while seeking to change the [food] system as a whole”; “be integrated into other 
social justice movements”; and “to serve as a key common element binding together different groups on 
behalf of a broad social change agenda” (7). 
80 For example, this land is designated as “water quality land,” and therefore cannot house restrooms or 
garbage cans (strict rules apply for additives, etc.) 
81 “P-Patch” is a term unique to Seattle community gardens.  Beginning in 1973, the city decided that 
fallow farmland should remain productive and grown by its surrounding communities, rather than 
developed.  The first farm lent to this community gardening program belonged to the Picardo family, for 
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Working alongside SPU and SDN, the organizers held three public meetings to 
brainstorm and strategize the possibilities of starting a food forest.  The first meeting, 
held in February of 2010, was attended by thirty people, and that number steadily grew 
into the hundreds at successive meetings as enthusiasm spread across the neighborhood, 
ideas were solicited from residents, and organizers worked feverishly in a massive 
outreach campaign (Beacon Food Forest).  Interpreters were brought into the meetings, 
the neighborhood was canvassed with six thousand fliers in five languages, and 
informational tables were set up at community fairs and events (Mellinger).  Initial 
concepts were disseminated in the local public elementary school newsletter, which 
publishes in fifty languages (Beacon Food Forest).  Reporters noted that among the 
enthusiastic neighborhood supporters were twelve Chinese grandmothers, whose faces lit 
up when they learned that the forest could include produce such as the Chinese yang-mei 
berry that they could not find elsewhere (Dolan; Mellinger).  Their enthusiasm was 
shared by BFF organizers, as Herlihy recounts: “It’s nothing but enlightening and 
empowering to be able to ask your community to dream about what they want and then 
invite them to do that dream. It’s huge, you know?  It’s a great and wonderful 
experience” (Interchange Media). 
As these meetings were taking place, the food foresters applied for and won a 
$22,500 SDN grant, the bulk of which was spent on hiring a Washington-certified 
landscape architect to draw up a formal design (Dolan).82  With the guidance of 
                                                                                                                                            
whom the name “P-Patch” is dedicated.  Today, the city boasts over eighty-two P-Patch gardens totaling a 
landmass of over twelve acres and 1,900 individual plots, which are overseen by SDN P-Patch staff (SDN). 
82 The hiring of a Washington State-certified landscape designer was required by SPU and the city council 
(Harrison, Mellinger). 
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permaculture specialist Jenny Pell, Margarett Harrison of Harrison Design was selected 
to draft a final plan that delivered on the collective requests of the neighborhood 
residents, while considering how natural features of the site—soil nutrient content, water 
drainage patterns, resident and migratory species, etc.—would interact via permaculture 
principles.  Though aesthetically, permaculture tends to appear disorderly, SPU 
specifically requested that the site look designed and organized, with informational 
signage (Harrison).  Harrison designed the structure of the forest, but the community was 
in charge of “paint[ing] the final picture” by suggesting specific species of plants and 
other features (ibid).  Harrison was thus challenged to reach a compromise between the 
goals of neighborhood residents, city agencies, and the organizers.  As one reporter 
observed, “Since it’s a community project, it has to cater to many groups” (Schiller).  But 
food foresters embraced this challenge as an opportunity to promote a philosophy that 
celebrates diversity, risk, and faith in the community, as indicated by Herlihy: 
We see this as an opportunity for an international kind of food forest because 
we’re a very diverse neighborhood in a very diverse part of southeast Seattle.  
We’re looking for the community to help bring in ideas for fruits and trees, so that 
opportunity is still open to see what we can plant and we’re willing to make that 
experiment and give it a try.  Our creative endeavor is to be experimental and to 
try to find plants that may be very beneficial to the groups that may eat them. 
(Marx)  
  
From the beginning, then, planners were intent on considering how a multitude of 
cultures “can participate and see something of themselves reflected” in this forest 
(Thompson).   
Fortunately, Seattle is an ideal location to grow foods from around the world, 
given its long growing season, consistent precipitation, and temperate climate.  Given this 
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setting, the multicultural population, and community interest and participation, the list of 
plants planned for the BFF grew from one hundred species to over a thousand as people 
proposed their favorite fruits and vegetables from their native countries (Lupo).  
Requested varieties of produce—many of which are currently planted and thriving at the 
food forest—include goji berries, loquats, pawpaws, mulberries, Asian pears, plums, 
walnuts, blueberries, gooseberries, currants, kale, lettuces, heirloom broccolis, 
raspberries, apples, pears, yuzu citrus, guavas, persimmons, honeyberries, and 
lingonberries.83  Fruit trees from all over the world will grow alongside international nut 
trees, which may produce thirty bushels each when mature.  The community 
overwhelmingly desired berry patches, which Harrison designed into both sides of the 
pathways for easily accessible picking.  Permaculture guilds—or microsystems—of 
companionable ground covers, shrubs, grasses, and trees will exist in clusters throughout 
the park, each selected with the intent of empowering nearby plants and fungi to grow 
autonomously without synthetic additives and water inputs.  Many of those clusters will 
reflect geographic or national similarities, as in Somali guilds, Vietnamese guilds, or 
native Seattle guilds.  For example, Pell designed a Chinese guild that includes an 
overstory of sweet chestnuts, an understory of persimmons, mulberries, and Chinese 
haws, and a lower zone of common Chinese herbs (Gellerman).  Other guilds will be 
dedicated to their use-value, as with the edible, medicinal, herbal, and crafting guilds 
(Baskin).  “‘If all goes according to plan,’” said Gail Savina, executive director of Seattle 
                                                
83 This list of species was compiled from a series of reports and interviews on the BFF, including Foley, 
Husted, Pell, Mellinger, Schiller, Dolan, Lupo, Thompson, Baskin, and Herlihy. 
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nonprofit City Fruit,84 “‘the harvests could dwarf what would be possible on the same 
space if it were strictly planted with rows of vegetables’” (Dolan).  Fruit is especially 
valuable “because you can grow a lot of food on a really small footprint” (ibid.). 
  “Living gateways” of fruiting vines will connect these guilds with other 
community-requested amenities, such as a kids’ play and picking area, filled with 
thornless, mini-edibles; bike racks; storage and tool sheds; an outdoor kitchen and 
barbeque; collectively managed garden plots for traditionally-grown vegetables; a 
community garden of P-Patch plots for individual families (available to rent at 
$10/year85) (Beacon Food Forest); and a sheltered classroom for community workshops 
on pickling, preserving, pruning, plant identification, soil building, and seed saving.  
Notably, neighborhood residents also demanded that at least two out of the seven acres be 
dedicated to native plants, demonstrating that resident nonhumans are valued members of 
the neighborhood, and that food forests be conceptualized as beneficial to nonhumans as 
much as humans.  Salal, salmonberries, huckleberries, thimbleberries, willow, and 
dogwood are among the native species planned, (Dolan), most of which are edible.  
Those that are not—certain grasses, for example—can be used for crafting (Thompson).  
All plant material not used for food, habitat, or crafting will be harvested to enhance the 
food forest through their uses as construction material, firewood, hedges, fences, or 
mulch (Herlihy).   
Perhaps the most radical aspect of the BFF is that it is intended to be foraged by 
                                                
84 City Fruit is a Seattle nonprofit that protects, promotes, educates and helps with the harvest of urban fruit 
trees (Dolan). 
85 For the right to rent a ten-foot by ten-foot plot, P-patch members will also be required volunteer eight 
hours a year in the food forest.  
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the public, i.e. any person that happens to pass by, or more importantly, needs free food.  
But “the concept of ‘free’,” according to Herlihy, “freaks everybody out” (Herlihy).  
Some surmise that such insecurity lies in the way the BFF thwarts public-private 
ownership boundaries (Reddington).86  As Harrison recalls, “‘There was major discussion 
about it. People worried, ‘What if someone comes and takes all the blueberries?’  That 
could very well happen, but maybe someone needed those blueberries. We look at it this 
way—if we have none at the end of blueberry season, then it means we’re successful’” 
(Leschin-Hoar).  In a different publication she adds, “‘that’s been perceived as a good 
thing.  We’ll just plant more’” (Stone).  Herlihy agrees: if people overharvest, “then man, 
they must be really hungry. So if they do that, they deserve it” (Herlihy).  Because food 
foresting is a much more productive method of growing than row-crops and 
monocultures, Pell emphasizes that her “‘biggest dream is that it all gets eaten’” (Dolan).  
It is therefore doubtful that overharvesting will ever become much of a problem, so long 
as the forest remains healthy.  As Herlihy reminded me, creating abundance guards 
against exploitation (Herlihy). 
 Still, organizers and community members do not want people uprooting or killing 
plants; with a project like this that relies on trust and involves large numbers of diverse 
stakeholders, “‘you do have to have etiquette,’” says Pell (Dolan).  Yet the more people 
who remain involved—that is, the more entrenched and valued a public resource the 
forest becomes, the more stewards it has to protect it.  All the same, strategies have been 
suggested to contend with greedy harvesters, but remarkably, none that would leave 
                                                
86 As food forester Laura Raymond commented, “‘Working in a collaborative model requires a different 
sort of engagement, sometimes a higher level of involvement, than if a space is divided up and people 
steward their own area’” (Thompson). 
  107 
anyone empty-handed: display plenty of informational and instructional signage, and 
keep up community involvement through frequent work parties to increase the amount of 
eyes on the land.  Reporting for Arcade, Madeline Reddington puts it nicely:  
In making a community endeavor of something as intimate as food, Beacon Food 
Forest is an experiment about trust. It’s a refreshingly bold move— testing the 
idea that putting faith in the public engenders honorable behavior.  The founders 
hope to see people treat the shared space with consideration, respect each other 
and harvest responsibly.  
 
Meanwhile, as Herlihy has often reminded reporters, such concerns distract from 
the overarching values of the food forest, which are bringing communities together and 
educating people about growing food and sustaining our ecologies.  “The real harvest,” 
he says, “is education” (Herlihy), and this education is made possible, in many ways, 
when soil becomes “the common denominator” for such a diverse neighborhood 
(Husted).  
By December of 2011, the food foresters—now officially named Friends of the 
Beacon Food Forest—received a $100,000 grant from the SDN to begin implementing 
phase one of Harrison’s plan.  And thus, a grassy field that had sat idly in the hands of 
SPU for a century became an experiment to grow the largest forageable food forest in the 
United States.  SPU only allowed the foresters to cultivate a 1.75-acre “test zone” before 
needing to gain approval to move onto the next phase (Husted), and SDN’s grant was set 
to expire at the end of 2012, so FBFF “had ample incentive to hit the ground running” 
(Thompson).  They employed the Washington Conversation Corps, which hires homeless 
youth and drug/alcohol rehabilitation patients, to work alongside Harrison performing 
grading work and establishing dirt terrace walls (Harrison).  In September of 2012, FBFF 
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hosted the first public work party.  One hundred and twenty people from twenty-eight zip 
codes participated (Taylor, 12) in laying cardboard to shade out the grass, which was then 
layered with woodchips and watered with mycorrhiza mushroom culture to establish the 
soil’s microbial life (Baskin).  Though much of the labor and material was donated, by 
this point in time the food foresters and SDN P-Patch Staff were managing $206,295 in 
grant awards and matching funds from the city (Taylor, 12), much of which was spent 
purchasing dozens of plants and building supplies, and establishing a resident beekeeper 
and apiary of native pollinators as well as European honeybees. 
Since then, the BFF has enjoyed the media spotlight from near and far, and 
benefitted from the help of thousands of volunteers, as well as thousands of combined 
hours of dedicated management and organizing by the steering committee.  Though the 
core volunteers have always been neighborhood residents (Herlihy), social media 
outreach and mass email updates have been key in notifying and mobilizing eager 
volunteers outside of Beacon Hill.  Volunteers have included University teams, 
elementary school students, church groups, hospital staff, Rotary Clubs, community court 
system offenders, and emergency shelter system residents (ibid).  University of 
Washington architecture students built a hexagonal gazebo and benches near the top of 
the slope for communal gatherings (Taylor, 12).  From the first workday, most work 
parties have involved more than one hundred volunteers at a time, and range in frequency 
from once a week to several times a week throughout the Spring, Summer, and Fall.  A 
major topic of one of the steering committee meetings I attended in August of 2013 was 
how to manage the overwhelming demand for volunteerism; food forest organizers only 
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have so much time to lead events and train people.  It was, of course, a good problem to 
have, but they were also considering how to build upon the excitement and momentum 
they were currently enjoying in order to sustain the forest well into the future.  One 
strategy is to focus neighborhood outreach attempts on the middle and high school 
students, in hopes that involving kids will spark interest in their parents (13).  Another 
strategy is to establish partnerships with local businesses and institutions, like the VA 
hospital, with whom they are trying to institute a therapeutic gardening program  (Dolan).  
 Productive relationships with city agencies have also ensued.  According to 
Herlihy, this has been his most pleasant surprise yet (Herlihy).  From Seattle Public 
Utilities to Seattle Parks and Recreation, the Seattle Department of Neighborhoods, the P-
Patch Program, the city council and mayor’s office, “[they] have found an unbelievable 
amount of support,” despite the “practical hassle of negotiating” between agencies 
(Thompson).  Furthermore, according to Herlihy, “The process is having unintended 
additional positive steps: through inter-agency cooperation, the door is open to create a 
sizable network of urban gardens in the city” (Dolan).   
In light of the overwhelming interest in the BFF and consistently popular turnouts 
for work parties, it is perhaps no surprise that its impact has reached far beyond the 
confines of the seven-acre forest parameter.  For starters, from a trans-local perspective, 
food foresters hope that volunteers will be able to leave a work party not only with ripe 
produce, but also with a few whole plants of their own to transplant into their yards 
(Gellerman).  Other excess produce and plants can be donated to food banks (Tabafunda).  
Some involved in the steering committee envision part- or full-time paid staff helping to 
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manage the day-to-day forestry work and volunteerism (Dolan; Pell), which would 
extend organizers’ vision of food justice beyond providing accessible food to providing 
stable incomes in the neighborhood.87  From a wider geographical perspective, Harrison 
notes the potential for the BFF to set a precedent for land use in Seattle, and indeed the 
entire Pacific Northwest (Messenger).  The possibilities for food forest land use seem 
endless: urban areas could employ them to stabilize and contribute to food shelves, 
decrease heat island effects (Hilton), establish living genetic seed banks of staple crops or 
rare and near-extinct species (Gellerman), and provide employment or job skill training 
programs as well as educational or recreational opportunities.  In short, many eyes are on 
the BFF, evaluating its successes: according to one reporter, “If the Beacon Food Forest 
meets the excitement that it has already generated, it could revolutionize how cities 
confront a number of urban issues” (Hilton). 
Already, several other food forests are being proposed in city parks such as 
Basalt, Colorado, Helena, Montana, and Spokane, Washington (Taylor, 13).  Austin, 
Texas has commenced its “East Feast Festival Beach Food Forest,” project, which is 
modeled after the BFF (Toon).  Also directly inspired by the BFF is London’s Mabley 
Green, a $1.5 million project set to become the world’s largest “edible park” (Childress).  
Because the BFF serves so many purposes simultaneously, and because so many cultures 
are reflected in it, Pell openly wonders, “what pieces of this are going to inspire people to 
come and take it and make it their own?” (Gellerman). 
                                                
87 According to permaculturist Jenny Pell who advocates for paid staff, supporting neighborhood residents 
with an income fits into the permaculture principle of “right livelihood” and would contribute to the 
neighborhood’s resilience.  However, certain statutes are in place maintaining that because the land is 
public, it cannot be profited off of; instantiating a paid workforce would therefore require reforming city 
codes (Pell). 
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Beacon Food Forest as Justice-Oriented Restoration 
The Beacon Food Forest may be an innovative illustration of environmental 
pragmatism in an era of climate, food, and environmental insecurity.  But is it ecological 
restoration?  In revisiting the conventional definition of restoration,88 it is clear that 
Beacon Food Foresters endeavor “sustained attempts to compensate for [the] damaging 
influence” of habitat destruction coupled with nearly a century of park development (in 
this case, an ongoing domesticated grass monoculture and an untended ridge of invasive 
blackberry brambles).  It is also clear that the burgeoning ecosystem is being “managed 
for [the] desired qualities” of “self-sustenance and homeostasis,” and that at least two of 
the seven acres being transformed will be devoted to the planting of natives, which 
conventional restoration typically advocates.   
Yet the BFF project does not satisfy the conventional definition of ecological 
restoration verbatim.  The major discrepancies are a) the site was completely devoid of 
historical clues as to which former species thrived and coevolved.  Indeed, with the 
exception of two of seven acres that will be devoted to natives, the majority of species 
slated to be cultivated were never intended to align with any historical point in time, and 
furthermore, brand new nonnatives will be deliberately introduced.  This provides a 
glimpse into just how developed, altered, or degraded our natures can be and yet still 
                                                
88 According to the definition used in Chapter Three, “Conventional ecological restoration is the 
intentional, sustained attempt by humans to compensate for damaging influences (usually pollution, 
development, and invasive species) on an ecosystem, and manage it for desired qualities. Though “desired 
qualities” may vary, restorationists usually strive to manage an ecosystem toward self-sustenance and 
homoeostasis by ensuring that species with a long coevolutionary history on each site can thrive.  In 
response to degradation or species loss, restorationists guide ecosystems so that they may resume behaving 
as if this never occurred.” 
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benefit from restorative attention; and b) no trained restorationists have been consulted in 
this project that has always been, from the beginning, partly permaculture in philosophy 
and methodology, and partly whatever form of gardening or forestry the neighborhood 
has desired.  Instead, FBFF seek to focus on enabling the land to resume behaving in an 
ecologically functional manner by restoring ecosystem services,89 yet those that have 
never before existed, and without the explicit guidance of restoration as a model.  In these 
ways, the BFF pushes conventional restoration to radical ends. 
 A few other restorative projects aimed at relieving environmental, food, or 
climate injustice do exist in more conventional forms.  The award-winning restoration 
work90 happening on the sinking island Isle de Jean Charles off the coast of Louisiana is 
one such example.  Together with hundreds of volunteers, two ecological restoration 
firms staked a variety of native marsh grasses to floating trays and set them afloat in the 
waters surrounding Isle de Jean Charles hoping that they would collect enough sediment 
to take root and provide the island with 1500 feet of secured shoreline.  The project not 
only reintroduces lost habitat but also provides a valuable buffer zone for the impending 
hurricanes that will continue to ravage the island’s ecosystem, particularly after it was left 
ecologically unstable from decades of oil exploration and drilling.91  The ability for 277 
                                                
89 As defined in fn13 of Chapter One, “Ecosystem services” include any positive benefit that nonhuman 
nature provides for people, although in the case of restoration, nonhuman nature can also “service” itself, 
that is, other nonhumans.   
90 In 2013, The Environmental Protection Agency awarded the “Saving a Vanishing Culture” project first 
place in the Environmental Justice and Cultural Diversity category of the Gulf Guardian awards.  
Distributed since 2000 within the multi-state Gulf of Mexico Partnership Program, these awards honor the 
agencies, groups, and individuals taking proactive steps to protect or enhance the health of the Gulf of 
Mexico.   
91 Consecutive hurricanes attributed to climate change—Juan, Andrew, Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike—have 
ravaged Jean Charles with increasing frequency and force, leaving permanent flood and erosion damage on 
an island whose ecology can no longer recuperate from these storms, and whose residents are without the 
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residents to continue living there, most of whom are Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe 
members whose families escaped persecution on the mainland (Psaki, Woodruff), is also 
threatened.  Some classify these families as the nation’s first climate refugees (Psaki).92 
In spite of such an apt illustration of conventional ecological restoration working 
toward the ends of justice and ecology, I instead focus this chapter upon the Beacon Food 
Forest because it is a more radical example of how a grassroots, community-developed 
restoration—a justice-oriented restoration—could be conceived in an era of “new 
natures.”  More conventional restoration projects can and should be initiated as well, but 
in the BFF, I argue that we are presented with an example of restoration’s truly creative 
revisioning, where stewards seek to “return” the land to a state of social-ecological 
function, rather than any historic “origin.”  I argue that the BFF embodies ecological 
restoration’s potential in an era when, because of climate change, we will have to be 
increasingly creative and pragmatic. 
 In order to convincingly argue for the BFF’s classification as justice-oriented 
restoration, the following discussion details how the project aligns with a feminist 
environmental justice politics of nature and advances conventional restoration by 
productively exploiting conventional restoration’s “sites of slippage” discussed in 
                                                                                                                                            
income to rebuild homes year after year.  Oil companies have left their marks on the island community 
since the 1930s.  Long after abandoning the region in the 1960s due to unfruitful oil exploration, six oilrigs 
and extensive canals plundered through sensitive cypress forests, mangroves, and marshes, remain.  They 
continue to funnel salt water into the fresh water ecosystem (Psaki).  Too salinized to grow much of 
anything and thus retain shoreline, the once 24-square mile island today stands at a half-mile long by a 
quarter-mile wide (Woodruff). Furthermore, levee building over the years has isolated Isle de Jean Charles 
from the sedimentation of the Mississippi river, which would have helped replenish the land with nutrients 
and mass, preventing it from sinking (Simon).  Citing costs unable to justify, the Army Corps of Engineers 
left Isle de Jean Charles out of its plan to construct a 72-mile levee fortress around Louisiana’s coastal 
population to protect from more Katrina-like devastation (Katz).  
92 A thorough study of how Isle de Jean Charles may demonstrate justice-oriented restoration lies beyond 
the scope of this project.  However, I intend to return to this inquiry in future research.  
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Chapter Three.  Then, I incorporate cutting-edge research in ecological restoration on 
“novel ecosystems,” which demonstrates that the possibility exists for the BFF to align 
with contemporary interpretations of ecological restoration.  Finally, I show how the 
justice-oriented restoration embodied by the BFF also demonstrates a promising 
alternative to the conventional climate change politics critiqued in Chapter Two, thus 
facilitating ecological livability. 
 
The Cutting Edge of Conventional Restoration 
The BFF model challenges conventional restoration’s ideological inconsistencies 
(detailed as “sites of slippage” in Chapter Three).  These include 1) inflexibility regarding 
the so-called distinctiveness between “restoration” and “restorative”; 2) the goal of 
erasing restorationists’ mark on the landscapes they assist; 3) excluding the inevitable 
creativity involved in restoration, whether human or nonhuman; and 4) the strict 
adherence to a nativist dogma.  The first “site of slippage” in conventional restoration 
that the BFF productively exploits entails the supposed distinction between projects that 
reflect “restoration” rather than those that are “merely” “restorative.”  However, if we 
take seriously the reality that it is a) impossible to distinguish ecological boundaries 
without some level of interpretive remove; b) impossible to completely understand every 
species and ecological relationship on a site, and therefore that it is impossible to c) 
completely restore any single past ecosystem as if it were frozen in time, then we are left 
with no other option but to acknowledge, and even embrace, the fluidity between 
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processes of reclamation, rehabilitation, revegetation, recovery,93 and restoration.  Rather 
than quibbling over indistinguishable boundaries, it seems more important that 
environmental stewards remain flexible in their interpretations of what a site could 
involve and for whom it could function, while remaining attuned to the goal of “bringing 
whole system[s] back to a former condition whatever that might happen to be,” to 
paraphrase Jordan (ibid., 22).  Though whole, “complete” systems can never be entirely 
known, let alone restored, approaching a restorative project with an eye toward which 
ecological relationships are present versus missing will, at the very least, ensure some 
foresight about what we can expect out of how a site will perform—and for whom—
especially in the face of social-environmental stressors.   
In the case of the BFF, the once-empty seven-acre slope is arguably reclaimed, 
rehabilitated, revegetated, recovered, and restored all at once, to different degrees, in 
various sections of the forest, and depending upon different interpretations.  Organizers 
are also careful to remind the public that the function and purpose of the BFF may well 
change over time, depending upon the neighborhood’s desires and needs.  For now, FBFF 
want the site to function for current human and nonhuman stakeholders.  Had BFF 
organizers limited their vision and design of the land to Jordan’s narrow interpretation of 
restoration, they would miss vital opportunities to optimize it for a diverse set of human 
and nonhuman stakeholders. 
A second manner in which the BFF productively exploits conventional 
restoration’s inconsistencies and directs the field toward justice-oriented restoration is by 
                                                
93 As Chapter Three discusses further, each of these first four processes are said to be merely “restorative,” 
rather than “restoration,” according to Jordan (Sunflower, 12, 22). 
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explicitly inviting human input and presence back into the nonhuman fold, rather than 
seeking to erase any human mark on the landscape.  Not only does this solidify a 
distinction between justice-oriented restoration and preservation; it clarifies its distinction 
from conventional restoration as well.  Jordan, a restorationist who has always 
appreciated the human-nonhuman interplay of every restorative act, helpfully asserts,  
If the gardener or farmer in some sense takes charge of the landscape, the 
restorationist does just the opposite, relinquishing his or her hold on it in an 
attempt to turn it back over to itself, or, more accurately, to let it be—and to help 
it become—what it used to be before he or she or we arrived in it.  This does not 
necessarily imply that the model for a restoration project must be a landscape that 
is “natural” or wild or free of human influence, but only that it be a landscape 
shaped by forces—including human beings—other than ourselves, however we 
choose to define that term.  (“Restoration,” 27)   
 
The difference between Jordan’s acknowledgement of human presence in the land 
throughout conventional restoration projects and how the BFF has been envisioned is that 
the BFF is conceptualized as human space long after restoration of the space has been 
completed.  Though permaculture principles maintain that this forest should eventually be 
as self-sustaining as possible, this is not in order to write humans out of the picture.  
Instead, it is meant to relieve the need for the kind of continual energy- and labor-
intensive inputs required of most agricultural and gardening methods, thus sparing 
valuable human and material resources.  Meanwhile, when considering the use-value of 
the species selected to be planted, both nutritionally as well as emotionally—the 
nonnative plants requested by Beacon Hill residents from their homelands could foster a 
sense of belonging—the forest certainly services humans as much as nonhumans.  But 
most importantly, FBFF envision the forest as a place for people to inspire, educate, 
learn, and connect.  This hands-on, participatory, and open-access ethos is neither 
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associated, for example, with preserves like our National Parks (which yet require some 
degree of human management), nor with most restoration projects, where restorationists-
as-visitors merely intervene in existing ecologies.  The BFF, by contrast, requires and 
inspires ongoing human engagement, which could even go beyond Jordan’s opinion of 
restoration:  
With restoration rather than preservation as a model, millions of people will spend 
more time creating intimate wild places in their own neighborhoods and less time 
visiting—and consuming—nature in remote wilderness areas.  In the process they 
will get closer to nature than they would hiking or driving through a national park, 
and they will be helping to build local community rather than weaken it by 
investing time and resources in vacations and first or second homes in the 
country. (ibid, 33) 
 
The BFF pushes conventional restoration even further than this because humans might be 
considered direct beneficiaries of restorative efforts, in addition to nonhumans.  In the 
BFF, justice-oriented restoration has the potential to not only inspire human communion 
with nonhuman nature, as Jordan rightfully argues of [conventional] restoration 
(“Restoration,” 26), but human “nature” as well.  The public is invited to reclaim lost 
knowledge when the BFF creates a platform for education by hosting lectures, tours, and 
workshops, inviting diverse educators, and even building an outdoor classroom and 
gathering space.  The BFF implicates the public in humankind’s environmental 
destructiveness by restoring the site’s lost ecological function.  The food forest also 
restores lost human community by working across linguistic, ethnic, racial, and class 
difference and encouraging connection over at least one major “common denominator”: 
soil.  
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A third, related inconsistency clarified for conventional restoration in the BFF is 
whether or not restoration is “creative” work.  While Chapter Three argued for the 
inevitability of creativity in restoration—a reality imposed by the subjectivity of 
restorationists and the limits of each project—the justice-oriented restoration of the BFF 
was undoubtedly creative from its inception.  From the very first idea as collaborative 
group project, to the continual input and brainstorming solicited of the Beacon Hill 
neighborhood, to the artistry involved in landscape architect Margarett Harrison’s design, 
to the ways in which the current design has deviated from the original in light of new 
ideas, various limitations, and unexpected nonhuman proliferations, the BFF is an 
entirely creative endeavor.  This is not to say that the BFF does not also involve a 
significant amount of science, ecology, city planning, economics, and other factors that 
constrain the limitless potential of truly creative, collaborative work.  Rather, in many 
ways, these constraints force new kinds of creativity and collaboration across difference.   
Furthermore, Herlihy frequently reminds reporters that the BFF design and 
purpose could change any day, depending upon the will of neighborhood residents 
(Herlihy).  FBFF also acknowledge that much of the BFF design is an exercise in risk; 
while permaculture specialists understand, to a certain extent, how various species of 
plants, pollinators, invertebrates, weather conditions, and animals will work together, the 
majority of the plants are from widely disparate areas of the planet, and have never before 
shared space.  How all of these nonhumans will relate with one another is nothing one 
could plan for or appreciate ahead of time.  Mirroring the unanticipated interactions 
among diverse human neighbors, there exists an amount of nonhuman creativity—what 
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shapes the forest will choose to take—yet to be witnessed.  For all of these reasons, the 
kind of restoration illustrated by the BFF is creative, both in a human and nonhuman 
sense. 
Fourth and finally, the BFF eschews any strict adherence to nativism that some 
conventional restorationists may advocate, in favor of a closely tended forest of native 
and nonnative species.94  While food foresters are keen on including at least one native 
species in most guilds, in Herlihy’s words,  
We’ll be dealing with all kinds of stuff.  And plant selection is a very tricky issue 
for us because we’re opening [the forest] up to the community with many ideas 
that we need to be careful not to put in invasives that are coming from other 
countries or something.  But we’re experimenters; that is a big part of it.  We 
can’t just like follow the map because things are changing and we need to flow 
with the change. (Herlihy)   
 
Here, Herlihy signals that plant selection and pairing must be done with vigilance and 
care, so as to avoid releasing invasives into other unchecked environments.  But he also 
suggests that our natures are changing so rapidly that the foresters would be without a 
historical roadmap even if they wanted one.  Part of “flowing with change,” then, is 
responding to the needs of contemporary, local, mostly native ecologies, as well as 
today’s local human inhabitants of the neighborhood, who desire nonnative edibles.  
 As this summary indicates, the BFF moves in a progressive direction through the 
slippages of conventional restoration thinking.  Yet the question remains: does this 
direction embody a significant enough departure from conventionally conceived 
restoration as to warrant a qualitatively different practice?  Or as so many restoration 
                                                
94 Even the pollinators will be both native and nonnative.  According to Herlihy, both European honeybees 
and native bees are effective pollinators for most species of plants, but native pollinators can travel much 
further, and will fly to pollinate even in poor weather, when European bees will not (Herlihy). 
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scholars and practitioners fear, does such “progressive” thinking mark the “death of 
restoration” (Light, 107)? 
 
Restoring Novel Ecosystems 
While the BFF may demonstrate the possibility of capitalizing on conventional 
restoration’s ideological inconsistencies in order to push the field toward more 
progressive ends, the paradox of “restoring” newly created lands—a process currently 
underway at the BFF—remains.  Yet even within the field of restoration, scholars and 
practitioners are beginning to appreciate that climate change could present a great 
opportunity to co-create resilient novel ecosystems in the Anthropocene.  As 
environmental philosopher Andrew Light argues, key to embarking on this path will be 
“disentangl[ing] restoration from narrow expectations of historical fidelity that do not 
reflect the current state of restoration practice” (107).  I will explore this new progressive 
way of conceiving restoration to demonstrate that the BFF is an exemplary restoration 
project in the age of climate change, setting the course for the future of restoration’s 
sustainability. 
In 1990, the SER interpreted the field’s mission as fostering indigenous, 
“historically accurate end product[s]”: “‘Ecological restoration is the process of 
intentionally altering a site to establish a defined indigenous, historic ecosystem.  The 
goal of the process is to emulate the structure, function, diversity and dynamics of the 
specified ecosystem’” (Throop, 49).  By 2002, a new concept of ecological restoration 
was underway.  Ecosystem dynamics and human features amidst landscapes were 
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acknowledged alongside a definition potentially inclusive of “synthetic” features: 
“‘Ecological restoration is the process of assisting in the recovery of an ecosystem that 
has been degraded, damaged or destroyed’” (49).  Though the goal of achieving 
durability [where “durability” implies creating relatively stable systems that allow for 
natural succession (Light, 114)] instead of historical fidelity is highly contested and often 
lamented,95 I argue that in pursuing durability, restorationists are nevertheless encouraged 
to remain loyal to the lands they assist.  In the first place, their loyalty has always been to 
assisting extant ecosystems toward sustainable functioning and resiliency.  But those 
systems are now climatically altered; responding to today’s new systems and species is 
part of remaining faithful to what currently functions, and what will continue to function 
in the future.  Secondly, as environmental studies and philosophy professor William 
Throop argues, “good restoration” exhibits “‘loyalty to predisturbance conditions, which 
may or may not involve exact reproduction.’  There are many ways of being ‘loyal’ that 
diverge from past ecosystem structures, and the constraints on what counts as loyalty are 
largely contextual” (49). 
For these reasons, today’s restoration theory falls into not one, but three camps: 
(1) a continued emphasis on restoring historical systems in the name of preservation; (2) 
a focus not upon maintaining systems based on pre-disturbance conditions and the 
historical range of variability, but rather using restoration to maintain as much 
biodiversity and as many ecosystems as possible, given expected climate change; and (3) 
a proactive attempt to use restoration to mitigate the effects of global environmental 
change through carbon sequestration (Allison, 103).  The latter two represent significant 
                                                
95 Allison writes that no consensus exists in the field, and so it is currently in a state of flux (102-103). 
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and noteworthy departures from traditional conceptions of restoration.  While 
restorationists and scholars may tend to align themselves among these three ideological 
camps, I argue that understanding how (and whether) ecologies are responding to climate 
shifts will be key to appreciating which context-specific approach restoration should take 
in order to assist in the creation of ecosystem resiliency. 
 Indeed, context will increasingly be key in the quickly changing Anthropocene.  
For example, ecologists have recently been noting two “new norms” with respect to 
classifying ecosystems, which poignantly illustrate McKibben’s assertion that “Eaarth” 
has replaced the world as we have known it (Eaarth, 2).  One contemporary ecosystem 
norm is hybridity, wherein some characteristics of historic or current ecosystems are 
retained, but due to species composition and function changes, these ecosystems exist 
outside the historical range of variability (Allison, 100).  As Allison notes, in the best-
case scenarios, hybrid systems still contain original keystone species and many original 
ecosystem functions (100).    
The other “new norm” ecologists have come to expect are “no-analogue,” 
“emerging” or novel ecosystems, which differ in composition and function from present 
and past ecosystems. They develop when conditions have changed so drastically that 
keystone species and ecosystem functions that previously characterized a site have been 
lost.96  In these cases, the ecosystem has “crossed a threshold or tipping point” (Allison 
                                                
96 Novel elements should be distinguished from novel ecosystems.  According to Hobbs et. al., “there can 
be significant novel elements (invasive species, modified soil conditions) without the ecosystem passing a 
critical threshold that renders it practically impossible to return to hybrid or historical conditions.  Hence, 
there are many ecosystems with novel elements that are in fact hybrid between historical and novel” 
(“Defining,” 60). 
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102) where it cannot be reversed to the original state (Starzomski, 88-89).97  Novel 
ecosystems arise via land use change, habitat destruction, the arrival of nonnative species, 
climate change, or a combination of all four (Hobbs et. al., “Why,” 4; Allison, 99; 
Starzomski, 88-89).  “They are a consequence of human activity,” writes environmental 
studies scholar Brian Starzomski, “but do not depend on human intervention for their 
maintenance” (88-89).  Some scholars, like Michael Perring and Erle Ellis, demonstrate 
that the majority of the planet’s ecosystems have already crossed from historical to 
hybrid.98  Yet “it is currently impossible to say when we will cross into full global novel 
ecosystems” (Starzomski, 89).   
In these situations, it is clear that restorationists must concentrate on restoring 
ecosystem functions to ensure the continuation of services relevant to local human and 
nonhuman stakeholders.  It is also clear that this contemporary form of restoration 
solidifies the potential need for the field to embrace partial restoration (i.e. “restorative”) 
endeavors, explicit human presence, creativity, and nonnative species into land 
management schemes.  
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the ways progressive restoration thinking is 
embracing novel ecosystems through the strategies of managed relocation, transformative 
restoration, and adaptive management.  Managed relocation, also known as “assisted 
migration,” “assisted colonization” and “assisted translocation” (Allison, 110), is a 
restorative strategy wherein humans consciously move at-risk species from a location 
                                                
97 To be sure, certain aspects of novel systems are contested.  For example, whether novelty “is a 
continuum” or whether there exist “clear breakpoints where it is clear that one system is novel and another 
is not” is subject to debate (Hobbs et. al., “Defining,” 59). 
98 Perring and Ellis’ research is summarized in Figures 8.1, 8.3, and 8.4 (69-73) of their essay, “The Extent 
of Novel Ecosystems” (2013). 
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where they currently exist to a location outside their historical range of variability that is 
more likely to have better conditions for them in the future—likely poleward or upward 
habitats (Allison, 110; Starzomski, 93).  Essentially responding to novel or hybrid natures 
by creating desirable novel or hybrid natures, there may be different reasons for 
attempting managed relocation: first, and most typically, managed relocation may 
promote species dispersal and survival, especially those with poor dispersal abilities, 
“with the assumption that if we build the proper ecosystem, the more mobile species will 
come afterwards” (Allison, 110).  Another reason may be to avoid ecological surprises 
brought on by climate change, or alternatively, to design the ecosystems we predict will 
be present in the future (Starzomski, 93).  Managed relocation is clearly an aggressive 
approach to restoration, and one that necessitates caution in application, but even early 
attempts have proven promising (in the short-term).99   
A related response to managed relocation proposed by progressive restorationists 
is transformative restoration, in which nonnative species are planted outside their 
historical range of variability in order to both replace native and nonnative species lost 
due to climate change, and invite beneficial nonnative species that will help prevent the 
establishment of harmful nonnative species.  Allison warns that species can appear to be 
neutral for decades before becoming problematic as conditions change (111), but 
transformative restoration is a likely future response to likely future scenarios, where it 
will become increasingly important to anticipate change, mitigate danger, and preserve 
                                                
99 As Allison discusses, “[Managed relocation] is already being used in some situations such as establishing 
individuals of the rare conifer Torreya toxifolia in North Carolina, far from their current home in Florida, 
and the establishment of several new colonist populations of about a dozen species of trees in British 
Columbia in areas outside of their distributional limits” (111). 
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biodiversity and ecosystem services.  As ecologist Thomas Simpson summarizes, with 
such bold approaches to restoration, “maybe, just maybe, we can take most of the plants 
and animals of that world—that other world before us—with us” (344). 
A third response to novel ecosystems that may or may not incorporate managed 
relocation and transformative restoration is adaptive management.  This is “a process of 
experimental design and implementation of management that occurs simultaneously and 
continuously so that the process of learning about a system happens while the system is 
being managed” (Allison, 107).100  To a certain degree, adaptive management has always 
been inherent to restoration practice.  Some contend that what has differentiated 
restoration from other scientific practices is that restorationists perform research even as 
they engage in reviving nonhuman nature, which poses unique challenges: “‘[T]he 
difficulty with … restoration…is [that] you’re not gonna have all the questions answered, 
but you have to do something. You reach a point where you look at the land and you see 
everything dying and the soil washing away and you don’t know everything at that point, 
but you know you have to do something’” (Helford, 132).   
But it is worth noting that with adaptive management specifically in the context of 
hybrid and novel ecosystems, human needs are addressed alongside nonhuman ecological 
management.  As restorationists like Allison are beginning to appreciate,  
Large environmental problems always have social dimensions and it is vital that 
human societies are included in the planning, management, monitoring and re-
adjustment that occur during adaptive management.  …[A]daptive management 
                                                
100 This can be likened to the “interactional expertise” Mathias Gross discusses in Ignorance and Surprise 
(2014), where knowledge is gained in dialogue with nature-as-active participant (23): “Interactional 
expertise in ecological restoration can be developed through encounters with the natural world even though 
full scientific immersion is not reached.  Indeed, much work in ecological restoration is based on a type of 
knowledge generation that has been labeled ‘discovery in the context of application’” (22).  
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[is] about “bringing together old knowledge, from diverse sources, into new 
perspectives for practice.” (108) 
 
From this overview of contemporary ecological restoration theory and practice 
responsive to climate change, it becomes plausible to understand the BFF as a legitimate, 
albeit progressive, form of restoration, a restoration that is faithful to burgeoning 
definitions of the field as well as burgeoning novel natures.  Though the plants are not 
necessarily being moved to Seattle in order to thrive better than they would in their 
homelands, the BFF can model managed relocation, as plants from around the world are 
being sowed in hopes that they will prosper in a poleward, temperate climates, and 
deliver culturally-appropriate foods.  The BFF site is undergoing transformative 
restoration as well, as invasive blackberry brambles and monocultured grass are replaced 
with native and nonnative species in an attempt to both prevent blackberry propagation 
and transform an unproductive, unused landscape into something completely novel and 
ecological and utilitarian.  Food foresters utilize adaptive management in their approach 
to learning from the forest and its unique species combinations, accommodating their 
designs and plans as the forest grows in succession, as species needs alter, and/or as 
human needs and desires evolve [to this point, Jenny Pell lends a helpful perspective: 
“Culturally, failure is seen as bad, but there’s learning opportunities in failure…. There’s 
so many mistakes to be made…let’s make them!  Then share what we know” (Pell)].  All 
of this is being accomplished in an attempt to anticipate the future ecological and 
nutritional needs of Beacon Hill and remediate climate change by capturing carbon and 
localizing the food supply. 
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Such experimentation is not without its risks, however, and food foresters, like 
progressive restorationists, must proceed facilitating novel ecologies with caution.  
Because experiments on this scale have never been tested in the long term, we cannot 
know with certainty how well some species will survive in new locations, or whether 
they will inadvertently introduce new diseases, become invasive, or become hosts to 
invasive insects and animals.  Another discomfort, recognizable as a preservationist 
sentiment but arguably valid in an era when human actions are so clearly disproportionate 
to those of other species, is how much more human initiative and manipulation of 
nonhuman environments these approaches entail than conventional restoration.  In 
response to human-induced degradation, humans will increasingly be accountable for 
creating, designing, and implementing ecosystems untested by evolution.  To this 
concern, Allison questions, “Are restorationists exhibiting dangerous levels of hubris as 
they play at being not just local ecosystem managers but planetary managers?” (112).   
As I see it, the only reasonable and ecologically faithful response has to be that 
humans can no longer afford hubris as they go about creating novel and hybrid 
ecosystems, because the stakes are too high; if we fail to learn from past and future 
mistakes, and if we fail to be responsive to our changing environments by making 
immediate and as-needed adaptations along the way, we will lose every nonhuman 
species and system that supports human, and much nonhuman, life on Earth.  The long-
term implications of facilitating the “evolutionary jumps” inherent in new natures have 
yet to be understood.  But we have little choice in the matter, as well as limited attempts, 
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at creating natures that will adapt us to new life with climate change, while preventing the 
escalation of climate change and its effects. 
 Managed relocation, transformative restoration, and adaptive management have 
not yet become the norms for restoration, as novel ecosystems have not yet become the 
norm for planetary existence.  Therefore, these approaches should not yet fully replace 
certain traditional conservationisms and conventional restorations.  Further, their 
utilization should not replace an awareness and skepticism of the arrival or proliferation 
of nonnative species that are causing significant problems.  Finally, this discussion should 
not be interpreted as an argument that novelty—whether climatically induced or human 
engineered—is intrinsically good or beneficial.   
 However, choosing to ignore hybrid or novel ecosystems altogether as being 
unworthy of stewardship is as dangerous as the drivers of climate change itself.  Instead, 
humans can utilize novel approaches contextually, alongside more conservative 
approaches, in order to respond adequately to the specific present and future needs of a 
site.  Furthermore, as Light et. al. summarize in “Valuing Novel Ecosystems” (2013), 
novel ecosystems could even open opportunities previously unknown or unforeseen.  
Some may include the improved benefits associated with explicitly designed ecosystems, 
which could deliver specific functions for specific stakeholders; ecosystems designed 
with higher diversity, which may also produce increased resilience in the face of rapid 
changes; serving as valuable informational sites that build understanding for how to 
intervene in novel ecosystems; and the fostering of new environmental values (258-259).  
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In the BFF, each of these potentialities is possible.  This project thus paves the way for 
new modes of appreciating, utilizing, and valuing nonhuman nature. 
 
Fostering Ecological Livability at the Beacon Food Forest  
 In addition to demonstrating a pragmatic and future-oriented alternative to 
conventional restoration, the BFF also provides alternative strategies to the conventional 
ways with which climate change is contended.  In contrast to the individualist, market-
based, and globally managed climate schemes critiqued in Chapter Two, the BFF’s 
hybrid-novel ecosystem facilitates ecological livability by presenting the public with a 
contextualized model of a collective, market-alternative, participatory justice-oriented 
restoration project in an era of burgeoning climate devastation.  This kind of response 
both to social marginalization as well as environmental degradation will be key to 
ensuring the mutualistic relationships that build environmental justice, food security, and 
climate resiliency. 
Collective Action 
A major limitation of common climate change “interventions” put forth for the 
past three decades is the individualism they promote, which fails to hold larger systemic 
and institutional influences, such as government, corporations, and economically 
privileged populations, accountable.  Further, these influences obscure the nuanced, often 
political, ways in which the causes and effects of climate change are stratified, effectively 
homogenizing the varying social positions and relations to power that would reveal active 
versus passive perpetuators of climate change (however complicated and sometimes 
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contradictory they may be).  Instead, effective solutions to environmental degradation 
will have to make transparent the connections between such individualist influences as 
voting, consuming, disposing, energy-use, transport, etc., and such institutional 
influences as corporate funding, industry regulation, trade policies, crop allocation, 
employment rates, farm policy, etc.  The BFF elucidates these kinds of connections, 
moving food foresters beyond merely individualist solutions to food insecurity. 
It is helpful to compare the BFF model to the community garden model, the latter 
of which has become an important, increasingly popular neighborhood response to food 
insecurity.  While community gardens take different forms across the country, there are 
certain generalizable features.  For example, community gardens usually cost money: plot 
renters pay an annual (though often nominal) fee.  Community gardens are also typically 
meant for individual or single family-use, and therefore their impact typically ends with 
the individual or family.  This, of course, is still no small feat: community gardens are 
increasingly relied upon to “fill in the gaps” for families in need of fresh, affordable 
produce.  They can also be spaces of socialization and community, neighborhood 
beautification and revitalization, oases of safety amid crime-ridden blocks (Crouch), and 
much needed habitat for pollinators and migratory species.   For all of these reasons, 
community gardens can be said to be both individualistic solutions to food insecurity and 
climate change, as well as, in some cases and to varying extents, potential sites of 
community building and collaboration.   
The vast majority of the BFF on the other hand, is free for foraging and accessible 
to anyone, any time (the exception being the small section devoted to community garden 
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“P-Patch” plots), meaning that the goods are not only produced collectively, but are also 
distributed for the collectivity.  Further, there are no bounds to the forest; the public has a 
right to glean from the entire forest, rather than an individual plot.  All of this makes a big 
difference in a food desert, where zoning politics both reflect and amplify income 
disparities and racial stratification, resulting in curtailed access to local, organic, GMO-
free food (which can also be prohibitively expensive). 
While the BFF may also provide all of the other amenities possible in community 
gardens (socialization, beautification, safe space, habitat, etc.), the next feature that truly 
distinguishes the BFF from community gardens—thus solidifying a decisive break from 
individualism—is that the forest is foremost about community building and education.  It 
is about teaching the food production skills much contemporary U.S. culture has lost, and 
providing a space to take risks in hopes of carving a path forward for novel plantings and 
pairings in a climate-changed future.  This focus has good potential to overcome the 
“disempowerment problem” Cuomo warns against with respect to individualist 
environmental solutions (708),101 in that energy and resources that could be spent on 
taxing personal lifestyle changes are instead targeted toward building community and 
enhancing a food justice movement that increases political and environmental awareness 
and power.  Much individual satisfaction is certainly possible—if not probable—on 
personal levels, from the psychological and physical health benefits of volunteering to the 
nutritional benefits of consuming fresh, pesticide-free, organic nuts, fungi, and produce.  
                                                
101 Cuomo’s “disempowerment problem” discussed in Chapter Two refers to a consequence of a lack of 
personal choice within climate solutions, such as reduced fossil fuel consumption.  She argues that people 
are likely to feel overwhelmed, and depressed when they reason that they have little power to influence 
climate change in meaningful ways (702-703).   
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But the collective potential for empowerment and sustainability is even greater: education 
and community connectivity can span geographies, ethnicities, and generations.  Already, 
Beacon Food Foresters have witnessed their actions inspire other cities, schools, and 
families to cultivate their own food forests on park lands, private lots, backyards, and 
school lawns. 
The BFF also influences wider scales of power: local, state, regional, national, 
and/or international communities, businesses, and governing bodies.  While there is 
ample evidence that the BFF has motivated several other urban agriculture and food 
forests, there is less evidence that the BFF has inspired local business or corporations to 
become more socially just or environmentally minded (a partial explanation for that can 
be found in the upcoming section).  It is evident, however, that in order for the BFF to 
exist in the first place, and continue expanding into its seven acre allotment, several 
government agencies had to get involved: Seattle Department of Neighborhoods and P-
Patch staff, Seattle Public Utilities, Seattle Parks Department, the city council, and the 
mayor’s office (ibid).  Remarkably, the BFF’s influence is reaching beyond the seven-
acre lot and directly into these agencies, leading to a possible (or partial) resolution to the 
“insufficiency problem” Cuomo laments regarding mainstream, individualist climate 
resolutions (70).102  As Herlihy recounts,  
People have been proud of this project for the intergovernmental agency 
relationships we’ve…created: [we’ve] been the focal point between SPU, Seattle 
Parks Department, the community, the mayor’s office, and the council…All those 
people have been involved in—or have had to get involved, whether they like it or 
not—due to the community’s demand, and due to this novel use of open space.  
                                                
102 Cuomo’s “insufficiency problem” discussed in Chapter Two describes a consequence of individualist 
solutions to climate change. While ethically imperative, these may yet not suffice as adequate mitigation, 
which can only be accomplished by “meta-level emitters such as corporations and governments” (701).  
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…We’re demonstrating what you can do with public land, right?  And we’re 
lucky that SPU and public agencies are letting us do that, to some degree, but 
we’re also setting a big example for the city.  There are big public gardens 
[elsewhere]…. but…this one’s very high on the list as far as involving a lot of 
different groups and forcing that dialogue and introducing the language about 
urban agriculture into the language of these agencies as well and having them 
adopt our policies about how to use the land and how to grow community gardens 
and how to stretch that boundary.  (Herlihy) 
 
For example, “because our language is going through these agencies…[and] councils” 
(emphasis in original), says Herlihy, a number of other government organizations, 
especially those “looking to heal,” like the Indian Health Board, the Veteran’s Hospital—
a federal agency—and the Community Court, have contacted the BFF in search of 
partnerships and programming opportunities (ibid).  In these complex ways, the BFF has 
not only benefitted neighborhood residents and environments, but has also positively 
influenced institutional spaces of power and privilege, by holding the local government 
accountable for ensuring food access at the BFF, and inspiring it to expand sites like the 
BFF throughout the city.   
Market-Alternative 
 Generalized market responses to climate change reflect the popular trend of 
channeling environmental action into economic “fixes” that typically allow entrenched 
financial systems and lifestyles to proceed without reformation.  In so doing, they usually 
fail to confront environmental destruction, as well as the social causes wrapped up with 
them, in any lasting or meaningful way.   
This is why so many effective climate justice initiatives have completely 
circumvented “business-as-usual” avenues, and the BFF is no different in this regard.  
Food foresters nearly avoid market participation altogether by a) localizing the food 
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supply, which greatly reduces the need for energy-intensive transport and refrigerated 
storage; b) planting self-propagating perennials that not only return every year, but once 
mature, require little maintenance and no synthetic additives; c) ensuring a source of free 
food, so that residents have an outlet for food consumption that lies outside the economic 
(and conventional farming) grid; and d) opening the space to any public, which thwarts 
the processes of ownership and land allotments crucial to capitalist markets.  The only 
possible exception to a full circumvention of market participation is the fact that the BFF 
has been funded by city grants and exists on city agency-owned land, which taxpayers 
subsidize.  On some level, it is safe to assume that the city is willing to invest financial 
resources into this project because they see the BFF as alleviating financial burdens for 
the city or enhancing property values.103  At the same time, however, by awarding food 
foresters sizable grants to transform this land, Seattle is also participating in a 
redistribution of financial resources that directly impacts, and in some ways, compensates 
food desert victims. 
The most overt way the BFF avoids being colonized by capital and protects their 
mission from being hijacked by corporate interests is in the steering committee’s 
steadfast decision to refuse the funding of any business whose ethics fail to comply with 
food forest principles and the goals of their stakeholders.  Herlihy explains their stance: 
We have to stick to our ethics in how we relate to nature. That’s a big one: how 
are we going to grow food?  Are we doing justice to the ecosystem?  To the 
planet? To the region?  The local area?  To the people getting involved?  [I]f 
you’re getting involved or want to provide funding or some kind of collaboration, 
then you have to follow that. (Herlihy) 
                                                
103 The extent to which projects like the BFF are advantageous to cities, placing the burden of food 
production, safety, and affordability on the community’s shoulders rather than the government’s, where it 
ought to be, demands further discussion apart from this study.  
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The food foresters as a whole are not necessarily anti-market or anti-corporation; they 
admit that sometimes “healing the land” requires corporate funding, and they have been 
fortunate to receive enough funding from public sites to turn down corporate offers.  
Herlihy elaborates further:  
We turn down corporations. We…will allow them to come and work, but you 
cannot provide funding or something so that you can put your logo on ours. We’re 
not associating with…groups like that.  […]  We’re just dubious [that they] fit[] in 
with our policies and ethics. Like with Whole Foods [to whom food foresters 
turned down offers to supply food for their work parties], [it’s] mostly their GMO 
issue104 and what they’re labeling as organic: they’ve been busted several times 
for labeling…nonorganic things…as organic. They were not behind labeling 
GMOs; they have since shifted—or their workers have since shifted—to 
supporting our next initiative in November for labeling GMOs, which is huge 
across the country…. (ibid, emphases in original) 
 
Yet Herlihy admits the trade off is hard; the BFF could always use more donations.  
Permits, plantings, signage, research—all of it is very expensive.  But respecting the 
principles outlined by their community is valued, because they understand what they do 
in relationship to local-global processes of climate-, energy-, and food-in/security.  The 
pathway for relationship building and understanding is not entirely foreclosed, however: 
“We’re pretty radical. … We’re willing to say no.  If you’ve done bad stuff in the past, 
your corporation, you know, we’ll tell you about it.  But if you want to come work and 
learn how to do it better, we will totally accommodate you” (ibid).105 
                                                
104 According to several consumer and organic watchdog organizations, Whole Foods deceived their 
customers into believing the products they were buying were organic and GMO-free, when in actuality, 
they were not (Adams).  Up until the last two years, Whole Foods also failed to support propositions in 
California (Proposition 37) and Washington (Initiative 522), for example, that demanded GM product 
labeling (Adams).  By Spring of 2013, Whole Foods announced its support for 522, and launched a nation-
wide campaign, “Will Vote for Food” (WillVoteforFood.Com) to support initiatives for food company 
transparency, food labeling, and customer education on GMOs (Ragoff). 
105 One thing food foresters will have to remain cognizant of, even if they can afford to continue developing 
the land without corporate sponsorship—and thus stave off corporate push to colonize, rebrand, or market 
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Participatory Democracy 
Many contemporary attempts at forestalling climate change rely on centrally 
managed models with elitist leadership, rather than democratically designed, 
participatory solutions.  While politicians, businesspeople, and ambassadors frequently 
delimit which interpretations of land use, natural resource access, and zoning are 
admissible, setting boundaries between possible and impossible action, food foresters 
challenged city planners to reconceive a seven-acre park space.  From the very beginning, 
the students who envisioned the food forest brought their idea to the public, making the 
project both by the people and for the people.  This demonstrates how integral “nature’s 
publics” can be to our ecologies as the nonhumans who provide ecosystem services.   
Emerging from the ground-up, neighborhood residents took food security, climate 
change-resiliency, and environmental health into their own hands, and made demands of 
their elected officials to bring the food forest into fruition.  The BFF has therefore been 
an “anti-Global Marshall Plan” from the beginning: while the forest can yet exist as a part 
of a broader coalition or international network of environmental justice initiatives, thus 
contributing to a broad movement with shared goals, the project itself is decentralized, 
context-specific, and participatory in its decision making.  
Among attempts to relieve food insecurity and ecosystem destruction, the power 
dynamics of the BFF are unfortunately rather unique, according to Allison (179).  Such 
significant problems are often addressed “from the top,” with “large government or 
                                                                                                                                            
the BFF and its plantings in any way—is the gentrification of this working class, ethnically diverse 
neighborhood.  The class and racial demographics of some U.S. neighborhoods changed after productive 
community development resulted in attractive community gardens and reduced crime rates, ushering in 
higher rents and property taxes (Crouch, Grist). 
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multi-national organizations developing the design and protocol” (179).  Local 
individuals or organizations are then obliged to implement those plans.   
[S]imply imposing a set of plans and regulations from the top has not worked well 
in many ecological management programs.... [I]f the flow of information, 
regulations, and requirements are all in one direction—from a large bureaucratic 
organization to local individuals who have to live with the results of that plan—
there is a high potential for resentment to build up.  Resentment almost always 
results in a failure to achieve the grand outcome envisioned during the initial 
planning process. (179)   
 
It is from this kind of experiential knowledge that so many Global South, indigenous, and 
marginalized communities are skeptical that U.N. programs like REDD+ will have 
beneficial impacts on their lives and livelihoods.   
Many members of the BFF say that their inspiration for approaching their forest 
development democratically comes from observing healthy nonhuman ecosystems, and 
modeling the biodiversity they demonstrate.  As the project’s website asserts, “The 
Beacon Food Forest recognizes diversity as the definition and essence of a healthy 
ecosystem and a healthy human community.”  To paraphrase Herlihy’s interpretation of 
this value, a healthy forest system works because many species of plants empower one 
another; indeed, most individual species would wither without the symbiotic benefits 
neighboring species offer.  Similarly, with  
diverse…people, you have a diversity of ideas and solutions….  Key to the 
success of a community garden is that there’s enough input and solutions being 
offered, especially in this changing planet.  We need people from [various] 
cultures who can introduce new ideas that may be the saving grace of the garden, 
or that can produce the biggest harvest of the garden. (Herlihy) 
 
Cultural and biodiversity alone, however, cannot ensure the food forest’s success 
and long-term sustainability.  Diversity has to be appreciated, cultivated, and fostered 
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through outreach, stakeholder participation, and ongoing negotiations.  At the BFF, a 
plurality of ideas for forest design, methodology, purpose, and plantings were solicited 
from the very first meetings and mailings, and continue to be collected from emails, 
volunteer input, and social media, then discussed at steering committee meetings.  
Participants from near and far have overwhelmed food foresters with their enthusiasm 
and eagerness to volunteer.  
Despite their “free and open to all” ethos, the food forest is not cooperatively 
owned, which would have made it a truly democratic commons.  Still, the BFF’s success 
did inspire Seattle Public Utilities to open two more of its unused lots in Magnolia Manor 
and Bitterlake to the public, who desired community garden P-Patches (Pernitz).  
According to SDN’s Community Gardening Coordinator Sandy Pernitz, “with [their] 
continued success… [SPU] will see the benefits of community run gardens/forests on 
their land and continue to broaden that opportunity where appropriate” (ibid). 
Since the ethos expressed by FBFF travelled through various government 
agencies, the P-Patch Community Gardening Program has instantiated site-specific use 
agreements for the first time (Pernitz).  This action illustrates that SDN recognizes how 
important it is for various publics to determine their own needs and values; as 
progressive-minded restorationists Hull and Robertson argue, “‘what is best’ is 
negotiable,” “and many people are equally well qualified to participate in the negotiation 
about values” (114).	  	  	  
More pragmatically,	  if these gardens—indeed, if all our environments—are to be 
sustained, they must hold particular value to the people using them and to the places 
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where they exist.  In recent studies, several restoration scholars acknowledge the 
importance of engaging the public in their work (Yung et. al., 252; Allison, 179; Ingram, 
236), not only because, as Yung et. al. argue, “Public engagement in public land 
management and public policy formation is increasingly seen as a democratic 
imperative,” but also because restoration is more likely to succeed when the public has a 
say, and a stake, in its development and outcome.  Especially in an era when the growing 
human footprint requires greater attention to how urban and other domesticated habitats 
can be effectively used toward biodiversity and ecosystem services, stakeholder 
participation and collaboration are more valuable and necessary than ever.  Yet whether 
pragmatism or ethics guides these restoration scholars’ embrace of the feminist 
environmental justice imperative that “nature” implies “nature’s publics,” it is clear that 
justice-oriented restoration is both possible, and perhaps probable, in a historical moment 
that can no longer accommodate a nature-public distinction. 
 
 “Looking-Back” as Looking Forward 
I conclude this project by highlighting some eloquent words included in a recent 
mass email update to all those included on the BFF listerv.  I extend their use of 
“mutualism” as a metaphor that underscores why the BFF is an exemplary pragmatic 
embodiment of feminist environmental justice theory: 
Dear Food Foresters and Friends, 
Mutualism is one of several forms of symbiosis where two or more species 
exist and benefit from the relationship.  
Food Forestry and good organic gardening practices look to create 
mutualistic relationships between plants, fungi, insects and yes…humans. A big 
example of this is the mutual relationship between fungi and plants, 48% of land 
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plants depend on a mycorrhizal relationship to supply inorganic and trace 
elements for uptake. The fungi depends on the plants for food and vice versa, 
humans eat and help propagate both. Another example of mutualism is pollinators 
and plants, 30% of our food depends on pollination by insects, insects depend on 
the pollinating plants and at the same time the plants depend on the insects for 
propagation. Fungi, plants, insects and humans have a mutually beneficial 
relationship in which all individuals benefit…. 
The question is are we humans doing our part to keep a mutualistic 
relationship with the ecology of the planet, our Host?  
Can we say a majority of our actions as a species are beneficial with our 
ecology or do they fall into the other two categories of symbiosis: 
Commensalism; one organism benefits without affecting the other or Parasitism; 
one species benefits while the other is harmed?  
Want to form a mutualistic relationship in your life?  
Grow food with a community of diverse species and join in the work party 
at the Beacon Food Forest to help the plants, fungi and insects help you. 
Together we form an efficient natural cycle and will enjoy many beneficial meals 
together. (BFF listserv) 
 
The impetus of mutualism is response, as illustrated in the central ethical question 
of this email: how do BFF stakeholders want to respond to their changing ecologies and 
the dilemmas they face individually and collectively?  The fungi at the forest, FBFF 
write, respond to plants in order to empower them to survive, and the plants respond to 
fungi in nourishing them through decomposition.  Plant and animal life respond to human 
needs for sustenance, livelihood, companionship, spirituality, and recreation.  How do we 
humans want to respond to plant, animal, and human life?  
Donna Haraway argues that responding to another creature, human or nonhuman, 
is less about reacting and more about offering something in return, as the word’s Latin 
etymological roots indicate (When, 19-27).  True response is about “looking back,”106 
                                                
106 This particular discussion on “looking back” is inspired by Haraway’s critique of philosopher Jacques 
Derrida’s famous study, “And Say the Animal Responded?” (1997).  In his essay, Derrida ponders his 
relationship with his cat, particularly their ability to respond to each another.  What makes this piece 
canonical in philosophy and critical animal studies is that Derrida was rather uniquely, for his time and 
community, willing to acknowledge that he was in the presence of a someone, rather than a something.  Yet 
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about taking pause from pressing forward with one’s own agenda and momentum in 
order to allow oneself to be interrupted by another creature through observing, listening, 
awaiting communication, looking for connection.  Assuming that one has the capacity to 
respond, replying to or answering that creature means taking responsibility for it.  Here, 
reciprocating action is found—the basis of each and every relationship. 
An ethos that has always united restorationists has been a duty to respond to 
ecological damage, and in so doing, respond to damaged relationships between humans 
and nonhumans as well (Throop, 54; Jordan, Sunflower, 2-3).  Allison summarizes this 
ethos aptly, when he argues that restoration is about transforming human-nonhuman 
relationships from a lopsided, one-way use of ecosystems and resources for human 
benefit with no thought of the consequences to other species or future generations of 
humans, “to a relationship of mutual interaction in which humans learn to work with 
ecosystems for the benefit of both.  […]  Restoration is about recognizing the 
destructiveness of our actions and reining in our behavior so that we become part of the 
ecosystem, not its destroyer” (173).   
Up until climate change started accelerating, responding faithfully to degraded 
natures may have meant looking-back in time to gauge what might make nature healthy 
again.  Even then, with historical models as guides, the “crisis discipline” of restoration 
involved a degree of acting without perfect knowledge and perfect ability to predict 
outcomes (Allison, 211).  Environmental sociologist Reid Helford encapsulates this well: 
                                                                                                                                            
Haraway argues that Derrida “came right to the edge of respect” with this essay, for he failed to “become 
curious about what the cat might actually be doing, feeling, thinking…” (20).  “Incurious,” Haraway writes, 
“he missed a possible invitation, a possible introduction to other-worlding,” fell short of true response, and 
foreclosed the possibility that his cat is a being who also “looks back” (20-21). 
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“Restorationists describe their work as urgent and warn of the dire consequences of 
losing plant and animal species forever.  Restoration science can’t look like other basic 
scientific research, they claim, because it must save nature at the same time it strives to 
study it” (132).  Yet despite imperfect knowledge, restorationists’ responses have been 
faithful, because degradation necessitates immediate action as much as understanding. 
Now that climate change is here, restoration must press on with amplified 
imperfections in knowledge and outcomes.  With climate change, restoration’s 
response—a looking-back—will have to be about looking-forward to gauge what might 
make nature (all of its human and nonhuman inhabitants) healthy again.  In failing to do 
so, restoration fails to create an intentional and desirable future.  In failing to innovate as 
we look forward, by remaking ecologies as they once were or otherwise would have 
been, out of a sense of guilt, restitution, or nostalgia, to paraphrase environmental justice 
researcher Ronald Sandler, we force the world to adapt to us, rather than us to it (77).  In 
short, we fail to respond in a mutual relationship, and we fail to realize the opportunity 
that lies within the crisis of climate change to remake an environmentally just world from 
a socio-environmentally damaged world. 
The shift in how restoration should respond to climate change is echoed in recent 
conversations on the efficacy of “sustainability” as a concept to guide contemporary 
environmentalisms.  As geographer Melinda Harm-Benson and legal scholar Robin Craig 
argue in “The End of Sustainability” (2014), because “‘sustainability’ refers to the long-
term ability to continue to engage in a particular activity,” and “assumes that we a) know 
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what can be sustained and b) have the capacity to maintain stationarity,”107 sustainability 
may no longer be the adequate or appropriate response to Anthropocene conditions.  
They explain: “With climate change, we face a future in which we have no idea what we 
can sustain” (ibid).  As a metric to formulate environmental goals, “resiliency” holds 
more promise than sustainability because “resilience thinking acknowledges 
disequilibrium and nonlinear, continual change—often as a result of crossing a ‘tipping 
point’ or threshold” (much akin to our experience of climate change) “and reorients us to 
focus on coping with change” (ibid).   
Coping also involves response, but it qualifies the kind of response that is 
possible.  From its etymological origins, “coping” arises when two parties “meet in 
battle” and “come to blows.”  This definition suggests disequilibrium, challenge, and 
difficulty.  “Coping” entails dealing effectively within conflict, and “resilience” is the 
capacity to recover from conflict.  If resiliency is to become the most appropriate metric 
to gauge environmental goals, it also points toward an important qualification of what 
mutualism can mean in the Anthropocene, when so many species, systems, and cultures 
have been lost or fundamentally altered, and when so many others will endure forever 
changed.  It is possible—indeed, inevitable—for mutual relationships to avoid 
commensalism or parasitism while yet occurring inside differential relations of power.  
As Haraway reminds us, “the capacity to respond, and so to be responsible, should not be 
expected to take on symmetrical shapes and textures for all the parties” (When, 71).  
Mutualism is not so much about equality as reciprocity across difference.  This is perhaps 
                                                
107 “Stationarity” refers to an ecosystem’s ability to continue operating “within an unchanging envelope of 
variability” (Harm-Benson & Craig). 
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where a feminist environmental justice-informed restoration can be most impactful: 
though (some/many) humans have forever damaged and altered the course of planetary 
history through domination, (some/many) can yet make reparations with human and 
nonhuman partners in our coexistence: from the Latin “reparare,” to “make ready again,” 
justice-oriented restoration can respond to injustice and ecological degradation by 
building more resilient novel natures, “making ready again” ecologically livable 
environments.  Moving forward into the unknowns, risks, losses, and opportunities 
engendered by climate change, our continual question must always be, what should a 
responsive sharing of biosocial vulnerabilities and resiliencies look like in our 
contextualized restorative practices?  If we are to create an ecologically livable world for 
as many humans and nonhumans as possible, then justice-oriented restoration must be 
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